





HELEN & MICHAEL  
OPPENHEIMER





# CHRISTOLOGY AND PERSONALITY

CONTAINING

I. CHRISTOLOGIES ANCIENT AND  
MODERN

II. PERSONALITY IN CHRIST AND  
IN OURSELVES

BY

WILLIAM SANDAY, D.D.

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1911

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.  
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD  
LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK  
TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

## NOTE

As the brief tract on *Personality* is really a continuation and supplement of *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, it has been thought that it might be convenient to some readers to have the smaller work bound up with the larger.



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# CHRISTOLOGIES

## ANCIENT AND MODERN

BY

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OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1910

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TO THE

*Theological Faculty of the University of Goettingen*

THE AUTHOR GRATEFULLY DEDICATES THIS BOOK

AS SOME SMALL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE

HONOUR THEY HAVE DONE HIM BY

CONFERRING ON HIM THE

DEGREE OF D.D.



## PREFACE

I HOPE this is the last of the preliminary studies which I have found myself compelled to make in approaching the larger task which lies before me of writing, or attempting to write, what is commonly called a Life of Christ. It is necessary that I should make clear, as much to myself as to others, the broad lines of the conception which I have formed of the most central portion of my subject—that portion round which everything else really revolves.

That is my main purpose in this book. It may perhaps justify—it is very possibly the only consideration that will justify—the particular scale and method adopted. My object is to bring out leading principles, unencumbered by details; and leading principles in a form in which they can be apprehended by that wide general public to which I must ultimately address myself.

The book consists of eight lectures, five of which were delivered before, and the remaining three after, Christmas of last year (1909). I intentionally made a break in the middle, because I found the argument developing in a direction which I had not myself exactly anticipated at the outset, and which is indeed to the best of my belief as yet rather new and unexplored. I was anxious to give to this the

most careful consideration I could. I have added to these eight lectures the substance of a University sermon, removing the sermonic form and adapting it to its place in the present volume. I was not satisfied with the latter part of the sermon as it was preached, and I have substituted an extract from a paper read at the Swansea Church Congress which, if I am not mistaken, expresses the thought that was in my mind with greater clearness and precision.

This discourse on 'The Guiding Principle of Symbolism' takes up a subject to which I had devoted one of the essays in my last book (*The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, Oxford, 1907). It may be taken as an *apologia* for the whole position of which these writings of mine are the outcome. One of the most sympathetic and generous, though at the same time also one of the most penetrating critics of the book of which I have just been speaking, seemed not a little puzzled to understand how I could accept so much as I did of modern criticism and yet work round so nearly to the position implied in the ancient Creeds. It is this apparent paradox which I have now done my best to explain. In the last resort the key to the position is that there is a God in heaven, who really shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will. I believe that in His hand is the whole course of human history, and especially the history of those who deliberately seek His guidance. I therefore trace His influence in the

ultimate decisions, the fundamental decisions, of the Church of the Fathers ; and it is to me incredible that He should intend the course of modern development to issue in direct opposition to them. If I find my own thought leading me into such opposition, I at once begin to suspect that there is something wrong, and I retrace my steps and begin again. On the other hand I am well aware that I must not play fast and loose with criticism ; I believe that it must be looked fairly in the face, and that we must assimilate its results as best we can. Here, too, I quite admit that, if I can be shown to be wrong, I have also no choice but to retrace my steps and begin again. Of course the difficulty is to make these two processes meet. But, so far as my experience goes, I have never found the results of the two processes finally conflicting. I have tried in the last paper to describe to the best of my ability that principle of continuity which runs through the two processes and binds them together. I think that I have been honest with myself ; I am not conscious of any real forcing on either side. But of that others must judge.

I have once again to thank my friend Dr. Lock for his great kindness in looking through the proofs and helping me with his criticisms.

OXFORD, *March*, 1910.

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I

ANCIENT CHRISTOLOGIES



# I

## ANCIENT CHRISTOLOGIES

It is not surprising that there should be some tension between Theology and Religion. When one thinks of the difference between the two, one is constantly reminded of a group of poems in which Wordsworth drives home the difference between Poetry and Science—‘The Poet’s Epitaph’, the Matthew series, including ‘Expostulation and Reply’ and ‘The Tables Turned’, and especially of the crowning malediction in the last of these :

Sweet is the lore which Nature brings ;  
Our meddling intellect  
Mis-shapes the beauteous form of things ;  
We murder to dissect.

For the infinite tenderness and subtly blended variety and delicacy of nature, we have only to think of the no less infinite tenderness and subtly blended variety and delicacy of Religion, and by the side of it of what to many no doubt will seem the grim skeleton of Theology, to have irresistibly recalled to us those damnatory lines. And yet, in spite of Wordsworth and all the poets, there is such a thing as a science of Anatomy, and it has after all its justification and its necessity ; it is the indispensable foundation of a vast field of knowledge and of

innumerable practical applications of priceless value for the amelioration of the conditions of human life. And so, just in like manner, though we may denounce Theology to our heart's content and with much satisfaction to ourselves in certain contexts and circumstances, nevertheless Theology too has its deep justifications, and indeed its inner necessity to a sound and masculine and strongly based religion.

We may keep up the analogy, and it will help to remind us that for the mass of mankind the science of Anatomy, however indispensable, is better kept out of sight; and in the same way it is perhaps expedient that for most of us Theology also should at least not be too obtrusive. We should not bring it forward where it is apt to jar, any more than we should bring forward science under inappropriate conditions. For many of us at most times, and even for the few among us at many times, it is enough to know that we have a theology in the background. And yet we cannot wholly do without it; consciously or unconsciously, it must be there. Theology is after all only reasoned and connected belief; and belief is certainly not the worse for being reasoned and connected. Some of us, by the circumstances in which we are placed, have a greater call than others to make, or to try to make, our religion rational. That is, I suppose, the main object for which Universities exist—to try to make all things rational. And so here in a University I trust that I shall only be regarded as discharging, or doing my best to dis-

charge, my proper function, if I ask you to follow me in an attempt to map out one difficult and important, and at the present time no doubt insistent, branch of theology.

Perhaps I cannot describe better than in these terms the object that I have in view. I shall endeavour just to map out on a broad scale the main outlines of my theme. It would be out of place in a course of public lectures, and I need not say impossible, to go into any minute detail. I shall not try to do so, any more than is necessary to give some concrete grasp of the subject and to present it in such a way as to make the few suggestions that I may have to offer at the end intelligible and helpful. The last thing that I should wish to do is to lay down conclusions dogmatically. Indeed I think it is sufficiently known by this time what my method really is. I am like an older 'Clerk of Oxenford', of whom it was said :

And gladly wolde he lerne, and gladly teche.

—learn and teach together at the same time ; teach a little, if I can, in the process of learning, which I know will never end for me till life itself ends.

The outline of these lectures that is in my mind is : (1) to sketch the course of ancient Christological speculation, so far as it is necessary for my purpose ; (2) in like manner to sketch the course of speculation—which will be, in this case, mainly German

speculation, for Germany is the only country in which the study of the subject has had a continuous history during the last century and up to the present time—with some remarks at the end upon more isolated Christologies here and in America; (3) to dwell at somewhat greater length on two forms or aspects of Christology which appear to have a special interest at the present time; and (4) to throw out tentatively some suggestions which may perhaps be a help to us in clearing up our own ideas and in presenting the subject to our minds.

The total net result of the Apostolic Age—or we may say, of the preaching and life of two generations of Christians—was that the Church at large thought of its Founder as divine. Those who had occasion to inquire into Christianity from without, as the younger Pliny had, in his administration of the province of Bithynia about the year 112, soon discovered that it was a leading and distinctive characteristic of the new sect that its members sang hymns to Christ as a God. And a Christian homilist, writing about the middle of the second century, begins his address by laying down that Christians ought to think of Jesus Christ as of God, as of the Judge of quick and dead (2 Clem. i. 1).

This general confession was no doubt for the great mass of the faithful quite simple and unreflective. The Church possessed an ample body of theology—the product of strenuous and severe and,

we may well say, inspired thinking—in the Epistles of St. Paul and St. John and of some other leaders of the first generation. But it was, if we may say so, theology *held in solution*, not yet precipitated in the form of systematic doctrine. The average Christian was only just beginning to formulate his own ideas. He did so under the impulse and influence of Apostolic thought; but it was not to be expected that he should be able to reproduce this with perfect balance and insight, when he tried to express either it or the facts which lay behind it in his own words. A child, when it begins to walk, naturally staggers and stumbles a little until it has found the use of its limbs.

The first definite experiment which some early Christians made, in the effort to realize to themselves the divine nature of Christ, was that which we call Docetism. The ancients, and in particular the early Christians who were familiar with the Old Testament, had the idea of Theophany. Did not God walk in the garden of Eden in the cool of the day? Did not three men pay a visit to Abraham before the destruction of Sodom, and predict to him what was to happen in the future? Did not the Captain of the Lord's host stand before Joshua and encourage him, when he was baffled and depressed by the ineffectual siege of Jericho? Were not these really divine manifestations on earth? Did they not offer some analogy for the far

greater manifestation which had taken place in the latter days? Speculation had not gone so far as to determine the exact relation in which the earthly appearance stood to the divine act which was its cause. The older appearances in any case were only transitory and evanescent; but might there not be one that was more prolonged? Was it so very strange that there should be some who thought that the manifestation of Jesus Christ in the flesh was to be explained in this way? Was not the human form which He wore—for one year, for three years, for three and thirty years—just assumed for the time? Was it not a disguise, a semblance—if we will, a phantom?

Doubtless there is something naïve—some would say perhaps childish—in such reasoning. But, as in childhood, simple things and deep things often lie near together. It would be a mistake to suppose that these Docetae had quite taken leave of their senses. I will give just one specimen of a Docetic work, the apocryphal *Acts of John* which date from about the middle of the second century. In these Acts the Lord is represented as holding converse with the Apostle John in a cave on the Mount of Olives at the very time when to the eyes of the multitude He was being mocked and crucified on Calvary. But before His departure there is a scene in which Jesus, as a kind of mystagogue, leads in a rhythmic hymn with His disciples. This is part of it:—

I have no house and I have houses. Amen.

I have no place and I have places. Amen.

I have no temple and I have temples. Amen.

I am a lamp to thee who beholdest Me. Amen.

I am a mirror to thee who perceivest Me. Amen.

I am a door to thee who knockest at Me. Amen.

I am a way to thee, a wayfarer.

Now respond thou to My dancing.

See thyself in Me who speak : and when thou hast  
seen what I do, keep silence about My mysteries.

Who am I ? Thou shalt know when I go away.

What I am now seen to be, that am I not : but what  
I am thou shalt see when thou comest.

If thou hadst known how to suffer, thou wouldst have  
had *the power* not to suffer.

Know thou suffering, and thou shalt have *the power*  
not to suffer.

That which thou knowest not, I Myself will teach  
thee.<sup>1</sup>

We see what it means. In the New Jerusalem there is no temple, for the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple thereof. There is no circumscribed and local abode of the Godhead. And yet Christ as Spirit dwells in 'the upright heart and pure'. In Him the soul sees itself transfigured, and takes the impress of that divine ideal.

Docetism was not all folly. Rather we may regard it as one primitive form of the assertion of that mystical element which has never been wanting to Christianity from the first days until now, and we may be sure never will be wanting to it.

<sup>1</sup> *Acts of S. John* (ed. James), p. 13 f.

The leaders of the Church, no less than the Docetae, insisted on this element; and yet they would have nothing to do with Docetism. Here again I think that we are apt to do less than justice. We take the action of these leaders as though it were just a matter of course and there were no merit in it. It is one of the titles to fame of Ignatius of Antioch that he was the great opponent of Docetism. Probably no one did more to kill it. It was against the Docetists that Ignatius formulates his creed in singularly compact and weighty phrase:

Be ye deaf therefore, when any man speaketh to you apart from Jesus Christ, who was of the race of David, who was the Son of Mary, who was truly born and ate and drank, was truly persecuted under Pontius Pilate, was truly crucified and died in the sight of those in heaven and those on earth and those under the earth; who moreover was truly raised from the dead, His Father having raised Him, who in the like fashion will so raise us also who believe on Him—His Father, I say, will raise us in Christ Jesus, apart from whom we have not true life (*Trall.* 9).

Again:

There is one only physician, of flesh and of spirit, generate and ingenerate, God in man, true Life in death, Son of Mary and Son of God, first passible and then impassible, Jesus Christ our Lord (*Eph.* 7).

Ignatius uses language which is not always exactly in keeping with the rules of the later theology (e. g. αἶμα θεοῦ, πάθος θεοῦ): but the striking thing about him is the way in which he

seems to anticipate the spirit of the later theology ; the way in which he singles out as central the points which it made central, and the just balance and proportion which he observes between them. He has a broad and simple view of the mission of the Son by the Father, which is more like that of the prologue to the Fourth Gospel than anything else. The leading thought is that of revelation. The Son is the unerring mouthpiece or spokesman of the Father (*Rom.* viii. 2) ; He is the Word of God proceeding out of silence, i. e. breaking the silence of ages (*Magn.* viii. 2). It is to the credit of Ignatius that he writes like one who still feels the immense personal impression of the life of Christ. But it must not for a moment be supposed that he lays stress on the incarnate Christ in any sort of contrast to the exalted or glorified Christ, the Christ who is Spirit and who holds sway over mankind as Spirit. Another leading idea with him is that of the indwelling Christ, as the source of life for all believers (*Eph.* iii. 2, *Magn.* i. 2, *Smyrn.* iv. 1, *Magn.* xv ; for the indwelling compare *Eph.* xv. 3, *Magn.* viii. 2, xii). Ignatius speaks indifferently of the indwelling of Christ and of God ; such phrases as 'in God' 'in Christ' occur frequently ; in one place (*Magn.* xiii. 1) we have 'in the Son and Father and in the Spirit'. This triadic formula also occurs or is implied more than once. The Apostolic Fathers do not expound Trinitarian doctrine, but they steadily use the language which gave rise to it in the

same way in which it is used in the Apostles' Creed (e. g. 1 Clem. xlvi. 6, lviii. 2). There is indeed no rigidity. It is well known that Hermas equates Son and Spirit (*Sim.* v. 5, 6,<sup>1</sup> where the pre-existent Son is Spirit, as in 2 Clem. ix. 5). There is also the same alternation of Trinitarian and Binitarian language (the conjunction of Father, Son, and Spirit by the side of Father and Son) that we find in St. Paul and elsewhere in the New Testament. The doctrine of the Trinity is not Tritheism. The Church doctrine embraces these varieties of usage and does not regard them as in any sense contradictory.<sup>2</sup>

The group that is commonly known as the Apostolic (really Sub-Apostolic) Fathers marks a period of transition. There is no conscious speculation or systematizing; and yet thought is at work; language and usage are in process of becoming more fixed; the foundations of more developed doctrine are really being laid, but laid, as it were, underground. I do not think that we need stay to discuss Gnosticism, which is not so much a movement within Christianity as a movement from

<sup>1</sup> It seems to me to be pressing a passage like this too hard to treat it as representing a distinct type of doctrine. From the later point of view it is loose, inaccurate, and unguarded; but there is no deliberate divergence from ordinary Christian teaching.

<sup>2</sup> There is a specially interesting discussion of the so-called Binitarian language in Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, p. 192.

outside—derived in varying proportions from the Oriental religions and from some current forms of Greek philosophy, especially Neo-Platonism—which intersected the orbit of Christianity, but is only to that extent Christian. Occasionally we come across really penetrating and valuable ideas among the Gnostics. For instance, the essential principle which underlies the doctrine of the Trinity finds its first expression in a Valentinian writer—perhaps Valentinus himself.

There was, he says, at first nothing whatever that is begotten; the Father was in solitude, unbegotten, not circumscribed either by space or time, with none to counsel Him, with no kind of substance that can be apprehended by any ordinary mode of apprehension. He was in solitude, as they say quiescent, and reposing in Himself alone. But inasmuch as He had the faculty of generation, it seemed good to Him at last to bring to birth and to put forth what He had within Himself that was fairest and most perfect; for He was no lover of solitude. For He was, the writer says, all Love; but love is not love, unless there be an object of love.<sup>1</sup>

Do not let us lay stress on the fact that behind this is the Gnostic theory of ‘emanations’ or ‘aeons’, and that that theory is pure mythology. It is fair to the Gnostics to remember that there did not exist at that time any proper conception of *personality*, and that even our own idea—as applied to these transcendent objects—is only approximate

<sup>1</sup> Hippolytus, *Refut.* vi. 29 (ed. Duncker and Schneidewin, p. 272).

and imperfect. It is not to be supposed that thinkers like Basilides and Valentinus intended their mythological imaginings to be taken quite literally. The deepest root, the central meaning, the meaning that we can best grasp and hold on to, in the doctrine of the Trinity, is just this development of the truth that God is Love. He is Love, and Love cannot be solitary, but implies a response ; it implies a perpetual outflow and return. That is the essence of Trinitarian doctrine.

I find myself, as I go on, constantly impelled to plead for a lenient and generous judgement on these old thinkers as against their modern critics, who with all the advantages of prolonged experience and improved methods naturally find not a little to provoke their censures. And this is I think especially the case with regard to the next considerable Christian movement of which I shall have to speak : i. e. the group of writers commonly known as the Apologists—Aristides, Justin, Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, Athenagoras, Melito. In their case I unwillingly cross the path of just those among the moderns whom I most admire and to whom my own obligations are greatest—Harnack, Loofs, and even a younger writer, Geffcken, whose more generous treatment of the Latin Apologists in his valuable book *Zwei Griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig u. Berlin, 1907) I heartily welcome. Of course there are differences of degree ; and I would

not put (e. g.) Aristides in the same class with Justin and Athenagoras. Nor would I detract from the real importance of the criticism that we owe to Harnack and Loofs, who have greatly helped us to put the Apologists in their place in the history of doctrine.<sup>1</sup> Only I confess that, when we come to form an estimate of these writers as a group and as individuals, it seems to me hard measure to judge them so predominantly by modern standards and by the standard of a particular set of modern opinions. My own belief is that judgements of this kind should only be (as it were) the last paragraph in our verdict. In such cases as these, I believe that our first question should be, what problems did these men set themselves to solve? Secondly, I would ask, what materials, data, or instruments had they in the thought of the time to enable them to solve them? And thirdly, what use did they make of these materials, and what mental contribution did they make of their own?

The chief thing that the Apologists did—at least the chief thing from our present point of view of Christology—was to apply to Christianity the doctrine of the Logos as it stood in the current popular philosophy. St. John, I need not say, taught a doctrine of the Logos; and St. Ignatius taught a very similar doctrine after him. But the Apolo-

<sup>1</sup> The ultimate source of much of this criticism is probably von Engelhardt's *Das Christenthum Justins des Märtyrers* (Erlangen, 1878).

gists gave it a rather different turn by assimilating it more completely to the popular philosophy of the day. St. John and St. Ignatius both identified the historical Person of Jesus Christ with the pre-existent Divine Word. They regarded the Incarnation as primarily a revelation of the Father. The Apologists took this idea and developed their doctrine of the Logos in the sense of the divine reason. For them the Logos was especially the creative reason, the divine intelligence as expressed in creation. They thus showed a tendency to lay a one-sided stress upon cosmology. They emphasized cosmology at the expense of soteriology, the work of Christ in creation at the expense of His work in redemption. This is the main count in the indictment against them.

Prof. Loofs sums up the effect of the Apologists' teaching thus—and the passage is the more noteworthy because it is quoted at length and endorsed by Harnack :—

The Apologists laid the foundation for the transformation of Christianity into a revealed doctrine. In particular, their Christology had a fatal influence upon the subsequent development. By taking for granted the transference of the conception of 'Son' to the pre-existent Christ, they facilitated the rise of the Christological problem of the fourth century ; they displaced the starting-point of Christological thought (from the historical Christ into the region of pre-existence) ; they threw into the shade the actual life of Jesus as compared with the doctrine of the Incarnation ; they combined their Christology

with cosmology, but they were not able to combine it with soteriology.<sup>1</sup> Their doctrine of the Logos is not a 'higher' Christology than was in vogue; rather, it falls behind the genuinely Christian estimate of Christ: it is not God who reveals Himself in Christ, but the Logos, the depotentiated God, a God who *as God* is subordinated to the highest God (Inferiorism or Subordinationism). Moreover, the depreciation of the idea of an economical Trinity in favour of metaphysical conceptions of pluralism in the Divine Triad goes back to the Apologists.<sup>2</sup>

The facts are capable of being stated in this way; and it is perhaps right that they should be so stated. Measured by the rule of the two German professors, that is no doubt the light in which the Apologists would have to be ultimately regarded. And yet, even from that point of view one would have liked to see a little more recognition of the services and merits of the Apologists in relation to their own time. Sooner or later, it was inevitable that Christianity should be brought into relation with the contemporary philosophy. And, if that was to be done at all, was there any grander idea, already coined and current, than that of the Logos, that could be used for the purpose? Was there any idea

<sup>1</sup> It is fair to remember that the Apologists were addressing *pagans*, and that it therefore was not likely that they would lay bare the *arcana* of their own religion; see p. 24 below. The really fundamental defect in all patristic theology was the imperfect understanding of O. T., and of the O. T. antecedents of N. T.

<sup>2</sup> Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*<sup>4</sup>, p. 129; cp. Harnack, *Grundriss d. Dogmengesch.* p. 110; *Hist. of Dogma* (E. T.), ii. 220 ff., 225 ff.

with anything like the same sweep and range? Was it not a noble thought on the part of Justin which led him to see 'seeds' of the Divine Word at work in the Gentile thinkers of old, in men like Heraclitus and Socrates or Plato and Pythagoras, while the Divine Word as a whole was incarnate in Christ?

To see the doctrine of the Logos at its best, we may look at it for a moment in stronger hands than those of Justin. The following is Origen's reply to a scoff by Celsus directed against the late date and local character of the Incarnation, which Celsus compared to Zeus awaking out of sleep and sending off Hermes in the comedy<sup>1</sup>:—

Observe here too Celsus's want of reverence when he most unphilosophically brings in a comic poet, whose object is to raise a laugh, and compares our God the Creator of the Universe with the god in his play who on awaking dispatches Hermes. We have said above that, when God sent Jesus to the human race, it was not as though He had just awoken from a long sleep, but Jesus, though He has only now for worthy reasons fulfilled the divine plan of His incarnation, has at all times been doing good to the human race. For no noble deed among men has ever been done without the Divine Word visiting the souls of those who even for a brief space were able to receive such operations of the Divine Word. Nay, even the appearance of Jesus in one corner of the world (as it seems) has been brought about for

<sup>1</sup> The extract is from Orig. c. *Cels.* vi. 78, 79; I avail myself of a quotation in Dr. Hort's *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, pp. 133 ff.

a worthy reason : since it was necessary that He of whom the prophets spoke should appear among those who had learnt one God, who read His prophets, and recognized Christ preached in them, and that He should appear at a time when the Word was about to be diffused from one corner to the whole world.

Wherefore also there was no need that many bodies should be made everywhere, and many spirits like to that of Jesus, in order that the whole world of men might be illumined by the Word of God. For it sufficed that the one Word rising like the Sun of Righteousness from Judaea should send forth His speedy rays into the soul of them that were willing to receive Him. And if anyone does wish to see many bodies filled with a divine Spirit, ministering like Him the one Christ to the salvation of men in every place, let him take note of those who in all places do honestly and with an upright life teach the word of Jesus, who are themselves too called 'Christs' ['anointed ones'] in the passage 'Touch not mine anointed ones and do my prophets no harm.' For even as we have heard that anti-christ comes, and nevertheless have learnt that there are many antichrists in the world, even so, when we recognize that Christ has come, we observe that owing to Him many Christs have been born in the world, to wit all those that like Him have loved righteousness and hated iniquity : and for this reason God, the God of Christ, anointed them too with the oil of gladness. . . . Wherefore, since Christ is the head of the Church, so that Christ and His Church are one body, the ointment has descended from the head to the beard [the symbol of the full-grown man Aaron], and this ointment in its descent reached to the skirts of his clothing. This is my answer to Celsus's impious speech when he says

that 'God ought to have breathed His Spirit into many bodies in like manner and to have sent them forth throughout the world'. So then while the comic poet to raise a laugh has represented Zeus as asleep and as waking up and sending Hermes to the Greeks, let the Word which knows that the nature of God is sleepless teach us that God with regard to seasons orders the affairs of the world as reason demands. But it is not to be wondered at, if, seeing that the judgements of God are sublime and hard to interpret, uninstructed souls do err, and Celsus among them.

There is then nothing absurd in the fact that to the Jews, with whom were the prophets, the Son of God was sent; so that beginning with them in bodily form He might arise in power and spirit upon a world of souls desiring to be no longer bereft of God.

I would ask you to observe the largeness of view, the enthusiastic vision, with which the Christian writer follows out the permeative penetrative influence of the Divine Word, not limited to Christian times, not requiring a multitude of reiterated supernatural interventions, but developing itself at once naturally and progressively, and as it were by its own momentum, through the agency of duly commissioned teachers, carried into the furthest corners of the earth.

A philosopher has recently propounded and answered for us the question :

What does the existence of God, or the personality of God, mean for the religious thinker save the

intense conviction of the rationality and the righteousness of the universe? And is it not strange to say of faith in God that 'it will only give us light on *one particular dogma*, that the world is wisely and righteously governed'? Surely this is the sum and substance of all religious faith and of all philosophical construction.<sup>1</sup>

And may not we in turn ask: Is not this just what the doctrine of the Logos as the Apologists employed it stood for—with the further addition that they saw in it the whole of the world's history culminating in the manifestation of Jesus Christ? For the Apologists certainly did not conceive of the activity of the Logos as purely intellectual, but they saw in it the source of all moral and spiritual excellence as well.<sup>2</sup>

There are two figures which stand out in the period immediately following the Apologists—Irenaeus and Tertullian. These two writers have exercised a profound influence, not only over subsequent theology in general, but in particular over the subsequent course of Christological doctrine. In different ways they contributed much to shape the conception of the Person of Christ which has prevailed within the

<sup>1</sup> Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Philosophical Radicals*, p. 211 *calc.*

<sup>2</sup> I am glad to see the Apologists defended by Dr. Orr, *Progress of Dogma* (1901), pp. 37 ff., 49 ff., 78 ff.; Dr. James Lindsay, *Studies in European Philosophy* (1909), pp. 53 ff.; and (but less directly as thinkers) by Prof. Gwatkin, *Early Ch. Hist.*, i. 173–211.

Church down to the present day : Irenaeus, we may say, especially with reference to the Person of Christ in itself, as the meeting-point of human and divine ; and Tertullian, especially with reference to the place of Christ in the doctrine of the Trinity.

At this point I want a word which is one of a group that has been so horribly misused that as a rule I avoid it as much as possible. The three words 'orthodox', 'heterodox', and 'heresy' have come to have an ugly sound and to mean ugly things which often do serious injustice. Much that we call heresy was only in its origin experimental thinking which was sure to be tried sooner or later, and which did not imply moral obliquity in those who had recourse to it. And in the reaction against this unfair use of names on the one side, 'orthodoxy', which ought to be a term of praise, has come to be with many almost a term of reproach. But in the present instance I want to use it in the best sense of which it is capable. We need a word to express a deep centrality and balance of thought, undisturbed by extraneous influences of any kind and resting on a basis of genuine religion. I think we might say that Ignatius had this, and that Athanasius had it, and Leo ; but it seems to me to be pre-eminently characteristic of Irenaeus. I should describe him as representing the best type of orthodoxy.

Irenaeus was a thinker almost in spite of himself. He did not like speculation. He shrank from it, and deprecated its too free employment. His own

outlook upon the world was full of a deep sense of awe at the mystery of things. There is truth in the criticism that his thinking was determined by various influences—the scriptures of both Testaments, the baptismal confession which by this time was becoming a rule of faith, the Apostles' Creed in its simplest and most primitive form, as well as by certain current ideas and categories—which were not completely fused and harmonized. But he was one of those whom instinct seems to draw towards that which is really central. Take, for instance, that glorious sentence (*Adv. Haer.* v. Praef. ad fin.) in which he speaks of following the one true and sure Teacher, the Word of God, Jesus Christ our Lord, who for His infinite love was made as we are in order that He might make us to be as He is (*qui propter immensam suam dilectionem factus est quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse quod est ipse*). For Irenaeus, the whole history of redemption culminates in Christ. He imagines the question asked, What new thing did the Lord bring at His coming? And the answer is that He brought everything that is new by bringing Himself (*omnem novitatem attulit semetipsum afferens*, iv. 34. 1).

It enables us to do rather better justice to Justin, and to see that in part the limitations which we observe in him are due to the fact that only apologetic or controversial writings of his have come down to us, when we remember that the most characteristic doctrine that we associate with Irenaeus,

the doctrine of the *recapitulatio*, was apparently suggested by Justin, in a passage which Irenaeus quotes (iv. 6. 2). This doctrine of 'recapitulation' goes back ultimately to St. Paul: it is the summing up of all things in Christ—in particular, the summing up of all humanity, so that what had been lost at the Fall might be recovered through Christ. This doctrine meets us at the threshold of our inquiry, and it will also meet us at the end of it (see pp. 124 ff. *inf.*). It will be well to bear in mind this early phase of its history.

The central position of Irenaeus is the assertion of the true deity and true humanity of Christ. He speaks of a *commixtio et communio dei et hominis* (iv. 20. 4), and he does not distinguish between the working of the two sides as they are distinguished in the doctrine of the Two Natures.

In this respect Tertullian goes a step further. With his peculiar gift of formulation, we constantly come across phrases in him which find their echoes in later Western theology. We observe that he uses the term *substantia* instead of *natura*; but he speaks, just as the later Latins spoke, of the *proprietas substantiae, deus et homo, . . . secundum utramque substantiam in sua proprietate distans; videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum, in una persona, deum et hominem Iesum*. He is careful to guard against the idea that the nature of Christ was a *tertium quid*, compounded of divine and human; the proper attributes of each must be preserved intact, *ut et spiritus*

*res suas egerit in illo, id est virtutes . . . , et caro passionem suam functa sit, . . . denique et mortua est, quodsi tertium quid esset, ex utroque confusum, ut electrum, non tam distincta documenta parerent utriusque substantiae.*<sup>1</sup>

We might easily suppose ourselves to be reading the Epistle of Leo.

Even more important was the work of Tertullian in fixing the phraseology of the doctrine of the Trinity. Even his language is still inevitably to some extent fluid; a conception at once so difficult and so novel as that which we now call a distinction of Persons without separation could not be expressed otherwise than tentatively and with a certain amount of verbal experiment. And yet here again we cannot help being conscious of the effort by which this powerful mind is creating a new vocabulary, the leading terms in which were destined to be permanent. The following is one of the most prominent passages from the treatise 'Against Praxeas':—

All are One, inasmuch as all are of One; by unity, that is, of substance; and yet notwithstanding there is guarded the mystery of the divine appointment, which distributes the Unity into a Trinity [this is the first known place in which the word occurs], ranging in their order the Three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; three, that is, not in essence but in degree, not in substance but in form, not in power but in manifestation, but of one substance and of one essence and of one power, foras-

<sup>1</sup> *Adv. Prax.* 27.

much as there is One God, from whom these degrees and forms and manifestations are set down under the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost (*[quasi non sic quoque] unus sit omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiae scilicet unitatem, et nihilominus custodiatur οἰκονομίας sacramentum, quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, tres autem, non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis, quia unus deus, ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti deputantur* (§ 2)).

Tertullian sees, rightly, that the unity of the God-head comes first, as dominant and fundamental; the trinitarian distinctions are distinctions within this unity. He repudiates with energy anything of the nature of Tritheism: 'any mention of two Gods or two Lords we do not suffer to escape our lips' (§ 13), though Father, Son, and Spirit are each severally God and Lord. We observe how this language of Tertullian is echoed in the *Quicumque*.

The Trinity of Tertullian is what is called an 'economic Trinity', i.e. a Trinity of dispensation or of function, like the assignment of parts or duties in a household; the work of the Father has special relation to the creation, conservation, and government of the universe; the work of the Son has special relation to the redemption of man; and the work of the Holy Spirit is the continuation of this. The three modes of activity succeed each other, and they are something more than the modes of action of a

single subject. Tertullian was (so far as we know) the first to use the Latin word *persona* in this connexion, though it is hardly likely that he attached to it the full sense that came to be attached later. His great coinage was that of the *tres personae* and *una substantia*, which after much vacillation the East also accepted in the form *τρῆς ὑποστάσεις, μία οὐσία*. It was Tertullian who really created the watchword of the Nicene theology, which the influence of the Church of Rome, making itself felt at critical moments, caused to prevail in the end throughout the Christian world.

The conception of the 'economic Trinity' could not be the last word of the Church; when thought began to probe deeper, a deeper conception was needed. But it was right and proper, because it was natural, that the conception should begin in this form. It really reflects the historical process by which the idea of a Trinity arose. The first impulse towards it, we may be sure, was given by the belief in the Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ; and then as a further step came the necessity to co-ordinate with this that world-wide movement which all Christians described as the work of the Holy Spirit.

When we follow this, the historical sequence, of ideas, we also see why it was that Tertullian laid stress—according to the later standards, a somewhat undue stress—on the subordination of the Second and Third Persons. He still has in his mind the Divine Economy; he is thinking of the Godhead,

we may say, under the figure of the family. And he was very anxious not in any way to impair the central truth of Monotheism. His adversaries claimed to maintain the sole 'monarchy' of God; and Tertullian also desired to maintain it. But to a Roman, familiar with the working of the imperial system, it was natural enough to think of monarchy as administered through agents. The reigning Emperor frequently associated with himself his son or destined successor with a real, if subordinate, share in his *imperium*. The monarchy was thus unimpaired, though the basis of administration was widened. And so, when the Christian thinker looked first at the Incarnate Life of Christ, and next at the work of the Spirit diffused throughout the world, and when from the contemplation of these he lifted up his eyes to that supreme Source from which both appeared to come, it seemed inevitable—and indeed, judged by no standard, was it wrong—that he should fall to using the language of subordination.

At this early stage in the history of the formation of Christian doctrine metaphors were flying about, current ideas and catchwords were circulating all round; and it was not strange that a man like Tertullian, as impetuous as he was masterful, should seize one after another and impress them into service, without staying to consider very carefully how far they were really applicable. Tertullian does not hesitate, when it can help him, to borrow the Gnostic idea of emanations. He uses freely the imagery of

a ray projected from the sun, of a stream flowing from its source, of a flower growing from stem and root. No reasonable person would find fault with him for doing this. We only need to remind ourselves that metaphor is metaphor, and that an analogy which is apt and helpful at one point is not therefore equally applicable to all.

With Tertullian we have reached a convenient break ; and we will follow the further development of the doctrine of the Person of Christ in the next lecture.



## II

### ANCIENT CHRISTOLOGIES

*(Continued)*



## II

### ANCIENT CHRISTOLOGIES (*continued*)

LET me explain, at the outset of this second lecture, that my object in going back to these ancient Christologies, and indeed all through this course, is not either historical or systematic, but practical and with ultimate reference to ourselves. I do not propose to make a study of either ancient or modern Christologies for their own sake or for any other purpose except so far as they may help us to shape our own ideas; and when I speak of our own ideas, I mean those which lie at the root of our own thinking here as we stand in the twentieth century. Accordingly, I feel absolved from any attempt to follow out the course of the history in the slightest degree exhaustively. If I were studying this branch of ancient theology for its own sake, I should have to take movement by movement and school by school and trace every subtle variation, with its fortunes and vicissitudes as they left their mark upon their time, in a connected narrative. But that is not necessary and would only distract us from our real purpose. Enough for this, if we can just map out broadly some of the main types of ancient and modern thinking, as specimens of the processes which the human mind has gone

through with reference to the subject and as aids to us in the work that we shall have to do for ourselves. For the same reason I shall try to avoid technicalities, and to express what I may have to say in the simplest and most generally intelligible language that I can find.

We have seen that the outcome of the Apostolic Age was a general diffused belief that Christ was divine. But then the question arose, What was the real meaning and significance of this? The life of Christ had been to outward appearance a human life. What was the relation of this outward humanity to the inward divinity? And, in particular, How was this inner divinity to be thought of in conjunction with the humanity? Was it there from the very first, or did it come to be? Was Christ a man who was raised to the height of deity? Or was He always from the first God in human form?

The question might be put in another way. In contemplating the Person of Christ, was it well to begin from the side of the Godhead, or from that of the Manhood? It was but natural that in their way of approaching the subject Christians were divided. Indeed, there were various shades of difference according to the extent to which the speculative problem was pressed home. The main body was content with such a degree of formulation as they found in the baptismal Confession—that widespread summary of Christian faith which is

now known as the Apostles' or Old Roman Creed, of course in its earliest and simplest form. This summary, which served the double purpose of baptismal confession and rule of faith or creed—beginning as the first and gradually coming to be used also as the second—did not trouble itself with metaphysics, but (1) simply affirmed so much of Trinitarian doctrine as was implied in the juxtaposition of Father Son and Spirit side by side, and (2) was not more speculative in regard to the Person of Christ, but just set down the leading features indicated in the Gospels, not labelling them as respectively divine or human, but leaving them for contemplation just as they were. This confession or creed, though doubtless shaped in the first instance by some individual hand—perhaps one of the successors of St. John in Asia Minor or an early bishop of Rome—was virtually a product of the Christian community, as it expressed in the simplest and most broadly acceptable terms the thoughts to which Christian minds were gravitating all around.

With this then, as I have said, the main body of the Church was content. And a certain number of those who were more speculatively inclined conducted their speculations in the same temper—the temper of balancing human and divine against each other and emphasizing the facts of the Gospel story rather than any kind of quasi-philosophical theory. This was indeed the permanent attitude of the

Western half of Christendom, and especially of the Church of Rome as its centre and head, notwithstanding the fact that owing to the cosmopolitan character of the capital of the Empire that Church was at first for about a hundred and fifty years the scene of not a little desultory theorizing.

But on the flanks of this middle party there were thrown out two wings, consisting for the most part in both cases of minor thinkers—not really deep philosophical minds or leaders of the Church, but men of second-rate powers with a certain amount of intellectual curiosity who tried to push on a step beyond that which satisfied the masses. In circles such as these there arose the two kinds of theorists who bore the common name of Monarchians, because their leading interest was to guard the sole ‘monarchy’ of God—or, as we should say, the central principle of Monotheism, while yet asserting the deity of Christ. They agreed in this, but differed in the extent to which they asserted it. On the one hand there was the thoroughgoing school—if it can be called a school—who were intent on asserting it to the utmost limit possible, who in their view of the Person of Christ started from the Godhead and made the Manhood a mere passing phase or mode of the Godhead, identifying the Son with the Father (*υιοπάτωρ*) or Son and Spirit together with the Father. And, on the other hand, there was the school or party of those who, starting from the Manhood, regarded Christ as primarily

a man who by successive communications of the Divine Spirit was gradually deified.

It is in this last connexion that we meet with the phrase *φιλὸς ἄνθρωπος* by which Christ is described as 'man pure and simple'. It would be a mistake to suppose that this was anything like Humanitarianism in our modern sense of the word. There was hardly any such thing in antiquity. The nearest approach to it would be the insignificant Palestinian sect of Ebionites, who denied the Virgin Birth and thought of Christ as just a prophet in whom the Spirit of God resided for a season. The group of teachers who for the most part found their way to Rome—Theodotus of Byzantium, Theodotus the Banker, Asclepiodotus and Artemas or Artemon—would seem generally to have accepted the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. They did not deny the supernatural in the Person of Christ; what they really rejected was the doctrine of the Logos and that which went with it. The question with which they were really concerned was that of the relation to each other of the two natures in Christ. After the manner of the later Antiochene School and the Nestorians, they kept them broadly distinct, and they insisted on starting from the human side. Christ was a man to whom deity was gradually communicated; He was not a pre-existent Divine Being who assumed human flesh.

Approximating to this type, though differing from it by not rejecting the idea of the Logos, is the

doctrine of Paul of Samosata, who is described by his opponents as the vainglorious, overbearing, and secular-minded minister of Zenobia of Palmyra, and whose fall quickly followed that of his mistress (A.D. 272). He too taught a doctrine of Christ 'from below' (κάτωθεν).<sup>1</sup> Christ was to begin with a man, in whom dwelt the impersonal Logos or Wisdom or Spirit of God, as the human Logos or reason resides in us men. There was a difference in the degree of this indwelling; it was greater in Moses than in the Prophets, but greatest and closest in Christ. In Him it rested upon the complete union of will, which was maintained intact through all temptations. As a reward Christ received the Name which is above every name. The stress that is laid on union of will prepares us for the later Antiochene theology.

The case of Paul of Samosata serves to illustrate the way in which the two kinds of Monarchianism, though starting apparently from opposite poles, might meet in the middle. With Paul, the Logos was the Divine Logos, which therefore in this respect was 'of one substance' (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father. The Synods which were held at Antioch in the years 264-8 to try the case of Paul condemned the use of this phrase; they clearly did so because it was applied to the Logos as impersonal; the conception of distinct *hypostases* in the Trinity had not yet been reached. And there was

<sup>1</sup> Eus. *H. E.* vii. 30 ff.

a feeling that the use of this term—ὁμοούσιος, 'of one substance'—really identified Father and Son after the manner of the Sabellians. In the course of about another century—say from 268 (Third Synod at Antioch) to 362 (Synod at Alexandria) the idea of separate *hypostases* became established, and was seen to qualify sufficiently the fundamental unity implied in the Homoousion: God was One, but He exists in three forms or 'persons'.

The same difficulty made itself felt in the Monarchians of the other branch. For them, the only way of reconciling the deity of Christ with the one sole deity of God seemed to be to identify the two. As invisible, God was Father: as visible, He was Son; as Father He could not suffer, as Son he suffered, and so on. There was a tendency to make the different phases succeed each other in time. This appears in Praxeas (*post tempus pater natus et pater passus* &c.), but it is carried out most fully by Sabellius, who is the most typical exponent of this way of thinking. The successive manifestations of God as Father, Son, and Spirit remind us of the 'economic Trinity', and point back to the historical conditions under which the doctrine of the Trinity arose. The stimulus to it came with the attempt to correlate the Godhead on earth with the Godhead in the heavens. Of all this class of Monarchians Noetus appears to have been the simplest. With him the identification of Father and Son was little more than a strong assertion of the Godhead

of the Son: he asks naïvely, 'What harm do I do in glorifying Christ?' Others tried to qualify and guard the language which they used. For instance, Callistus, who was Bishop of Rome 217-22, is careful to say, not that the Father suffers, but that He 'suffers with' (*συμπάσχει*) the Son, where 'the Son' stands for the human body of Christ and the Father for the divine occupant of the body.

We are ourselves familiar with the unguarded and untheological language (e. g.) of hymns ('God is born on earth to dwell'), which does not distinguish between the proper functions of the Divine Persons, though with no deliberate intention of confusing them;<sup>1</sup> and it is not surprising that in this tentative stage of the Church's doctrine this Monarchian language should have been widespread among the faithful, and that the leading teachers should have felt it as a serious evil that was difficult to contend against and overcome. The reaction against Sabelianism (which became a general term including all forms of Monarchianism) had not a little to do with the exaggerations on the other side; and in particular the dread of this form of error contributed to the rapid rise and spread of Arianism.

The Arian controversy was no doubt the greatest of all the crises in the history of ancient Christianity. In it was fought out the one fundamental issue, Was Christ to be regarded as God in the full

<sup>1</sup> There is a sense in which the language may be defended: see p. 48 below.

sense of the word, or was He of the nature of a demi-god, a being intermediate between God and man but in the strict sense neither God nor man?

The issue as well as the course of this conflict was not due solely to the merits of the orthodox cause as an expression of theological truth. It was much mixed up with political movements which swayed backwards and forwards, now to this side and now to that. But there are some general observations that naturally impress themselves upon us in following the course of events. One is that the weight both of character and ability was decidedly and strongly on the side which ultimately prevailed. Arianism showed at its best as a missionary creed imparted to semi-barbarian nations like the Goths and Vandals. But in these cases its excellence and attraction was relative or comparative; any form of Christianity was an advance, and a great advance, on the heathenism which it displaced; and in the hands of simple and earnest men like Ulfilas the more distinctive features of Arianism played but a small part. Another point, that has come out more clearly as the history of the controversy has been more closely studied, has been the importance of the part played in it by the steadiest and staunchest of all the Churches, the Church in which the character of the Latin race made itself most deeply and continuously felt, the great Church of Rome. It is now seen that the catchwords of the

Nicene faith are really Western and not Eastern. They are probably due in great part to the personal influence of Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, both with the Emperor and in the councils of the Church; but, apart from individual influence of this kind, it is clear that a determining bent was given to the thought and policy of Athanasius himself by his prolonged exile in the West (339-46). In metaphysical discussion and in literary debate Rome was not much to the front, but when the time came for voting and maintaining a vote once given, its voice carried far. Another weighty influence was that of men like Hilary of Poitiers, Eusebius of Vercelli, and after him Ambrose of Milan, mediating between the West and the East, helping to make the metaphysical argument of the one intelligible to the other, and in return supplying to the combined resistance the force that comes from character, tact, and experience in dealing with men. Tact was not exactly the strong point of Lucifer of Cagliari, but his dour fanaticism was an element of another kind that counted in the struggle.

And, lastly, we cannot help noticing that the ultimate decision was in accordance with the silent gravitation of the main body of the Church. The instinctive tendency of the great mass of Christians was in its favour. The same sort of law appears to obtain in spiritual things as in physiology. The processes of nature work towards a predetermined 'form'. In the history of the Church this 'form'

would seem to have been always the strong belief in the deity of Christ. Not all the intellectual distinction of the Socinian and Unitarian bodies has ever succeeded in making them more than an unexpansive minority. Such instinctive tendencies are really of no slight moment; they show the working of forces that do not take shape in tangible argument but are none the less part of that constructive whole to which the unconscious processes of the human mind contribute as much as or more than the conscious.

A large expenditure both of moral and intellectual force often has but a comparatively small result in definitely formulated propositions. The total effect of the Arian controversy was summed up in a few prominent creeds, especially the two that are now known to us as the Nicene Creed proper and the Nicene Creed commonly so called (the familiar Creed of our Liturgy), the Creeds of 325 and of 381. Beyond these creeds there was a certain restriction of the use of ancient metaphors and the gradual fixing of terms (such as those expressing 'substance' and 'hypostasis' or 'person'). The final touches may be said to have been given to this process, as far as Greek Theology was concerned, by the Cappadocian Fathers, Basil of Caesarea (ob. 379) and the two Gregorys (who died in 389 and 394). We may take the Council of Constantinople in 381 as marking the completion of this stage in the history, resulting in the affirmation of distinctions in the unity of the Godhead, distinctions which are under-

stood to be subject to and not to impair that unity, and to which is given the special name of 'hypostases' or 'persons'. These particular words are chosen, though capable of other and wider uses ; but it is understood that in theology they bear a special sense corresponding to their special object, and it is understood further that there lies behind them an element which no language can really express and which it is beyond the power of human thought to exactly define.

The criticisms directed against this construction (e.g. even by Harnack<sup>1</sup>) are surely exaggerated. It is easy to find contradictions if we drop or ignore all the qualifications which saved them from being contradictions. For instance, there is the old and cheap objection that 'one' is made equal to 'two' or 'three'. But the ancients themselves were well aware that they did not predicate 'one' in the same sense or in the same line of application in which they predicated 'two' or 'three'. They predicated unity of that which they called the 'substance' of the Godhead, duality or triplicity of that which they called 'hypostasis' or person. And again, when they used these terms they were conscious of using them for a special purpose, and not exactly in the way in which we call each other persons now. Nor can it be said that, in doing this, they had not definite conceptions before their minds. They had conceptions which were definite enough so far as

<sup>1</sup> *Grundriss*<sup>4</sup>, pp. 200 f.

they went, and which had particular facts of observation corresponding to them; but it is true that their language was affected, as all human language must needs be affected, by the consciousness that it was thrown out at an object that was really too large for it. Harnack writes as though it were as possible to get rid of mystery in speaking of the Godhead as it is in mathematics or in the classifications of natural science. Why should there not be in that abyss which we call 'God' some differentiation of being or function which does not amount to division? We look out at the history of the Son of Man. We believe that He Himself used that title in a sense which suggested and implied that He was also Son of God. But, if that was so, if One who could think of Himself as Son of God did pass through a human career in time and space, then we must naturally (according to all human standards) think of Him as a Person. That means, that we must to that extent project our ideas of Personality into the internal economy of the Godhead. We do so with all reverence and caution—so far as we are compelled but not an inch further, relatively to our own capacities and ways of speaking, but affirming nothing that is not strictly covered by these conditions.

The Cappadocians mark the end of those keen dialectical discussions which reduced the doctrine of the Trinity to the form which has become traditional. It remained for the West to broaden the base of the

doctrine in another way. The West also had its discussions of the doctrine, and these too have left a by no means inconsiderable literature. Prominent in this literature is the great treatise of Hilary of Poitiers, in which that powerful mind wrestled strenuously with the Greek ideas and struggled to present them in a Latin dress. There was also another substantial treatise, represented by the first seven books of a work *De Trinitate*, which used to be attributed to Vigilius of Thapsus but which has been recently vindicated by Dom Morin for Gregory of Elvira.<sup>1</sup> But the Latin characteristics come out most strongly in St. Augustine. It is true that a bent was given to his treatment of the subject by his Neo-Platonism. We cannot find fault with him for using the best philosophy that he knew; and there doubtless is an element in that philosophy which is less acceptable to the modern mind. The tendency in regard to which this is most to be said is the tendency to refine away the idea of God by a process of successive abstraction. There are traces of this in the stress which St. Augustine lays upon the 'simplicity' of the Godhead.<sup>2</sup> But the emotional side of Augustine's nature was too rich, and his religion was too deep and sincere, to be content with abstractions. He lifts up his eyes and lays bare his heart before God in a way that reminds us most of the impassioned language of the Psalms. A certain noble awe before

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. d'Hist. et de Litt. Rel.* (1909), p. 150.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*,<sup>4</sup> p. 365.

the majesty of God had been characteristic of Latin theology from Tertullian onwards. It had been associated (e.g. in Irenaeus) with a reverent self-restraint in speculation about the Being of God. The same self-restraint is characteristic of Hilary; but it reaches its climax in St. Augustine. His daring subtlety and intense energy and activity of mind are curbed and bridled here. It is to him we owe that great saying which ought to silence for ever misplaced taunts directed against the refinements of Trinitarian terminology, the confession that it was all invented and used only under compulsion, not from any wanton intrusion into mysteries but under the necessity of breaking silence—*non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur*.<sup>1</sup>

We must never cease to be grateful to St. Augustine for that phrase. And there are other more positive ways in which St. Augustine greatly helped to keep the doctrine upon sound lines. No other writer has done more to guard against the inevitable tendency towards Tritheism. To him pre-eminently we owe it that Christian Theology lays the supreme stress it does on the unity of God. It is really following in the steps of St. Augustine when Dr. Moberly writes so emphatically :—

To dally for a moment with any doubt or qualification of the absoluteness of the truth of the unity

<sup>1</sup> *De Trin.* v. 9. 10 *Tamen cum quaeritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen, Tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.*

of God, is to empty the word itself of its essential significance. . . . It is God, not 'a' God, nor a 'part of' God,—it is God who eternally is, who thinks, who wills, who designs, who creates, who ordains: it is God who eternally is, who loves, who condescends, who 'deviseth means', who takes hold of man, who reveals, who redeems: it is God who eternally is, who attracts, who informs, who inspires, who animates,—it is God who, in Himself, and God who, even in His creatures, physical or spiritual, makes from all sides Divine response to Himself. The personal distinction in Godhead is a distinction within, and of, unity: not a distinction which qualifies unity, or usurps the place of it, or destroys it.<sup>1</sup>

The last sentence of this quotation should hold a fundamental place in the thought of every theologian and student of theology.

It is also St. Augustine himself who goes far to correct the tendencies of his own Neo-Platonism by the way in which he brings out the religious content of the idea of God and of the Trinity. He is, I believe, the first to connect the doctrine of the Trinity with the great text 'God is Love'. We saw in the last lecture (p. 13 *sup.*) how the Valentinian Gnostics had grasped the principle that God could not be a solitary monad. They did this, however, without direct reference to the doctrine of the Trinity; they treat it rather as the basis of their system of emanations. St. Augustine goes a step

<sup>1</sup> *Atonement and Personality*, pp. 154 f. Compare the passages quoted from St. Augustine by Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*<sup>4</sup>, pp. 365–7, especially those which assert the *inseparabilis divinitas, inseparabilis trinitatis operatio*.

further: having the doctrine of the Trinity already given him, he applies it under the triple formula *amans, quod amatur, amor*; he uses this as one of the leading analogies by which he illustrates the doctrine, and we are not surprised to find him connecting it with 1 John iv. 8, 16. It was no slight service thus to find a home in the depths of the Divine nature for that which is the crown and perfection of all the endowments of man.

It was in the later phase of the Trinitarian controversy that a question came to the front which is still more strictly and properly described as Christological. We have seen that, from the time of the Apostles onwards, the watershed of discussion as it were was formed by the line which divided those who started from the divine side of the nature of Christ and those who started from the human side. For three full centuries this dividing principle had been latent rather than apparent; it lay behind the differences which separated men, but it was not consciously apprehended as the cause of the differences. And as yet the question had not been brought to a definite issue. It was not until about the middle of the fourth century that the younger Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea in Syria, one of the keenest supporters of the faith of Nicaea, directly propounded and gave his own answer to the question, Where exactly lay the principle of personality in Christ? Apollinaris had no doubt that it lay in

His deity, but at what point and in what manner did the deity combine with the humanity? He argued from the postulate that the two natures could not be each complete or perfect in itself; it seemed to him that, to suppose that they were, would destroy the unity of the Person. The logical consequence appeared to be that in that case there would be two Sons, one (the Logos) Son by nature, the other (the humanity) Son by adoption. This conception of 'two Sons' seemed to him impossible; and therefore he fell back on the alternative that one at least of the two natures was incomplete. Clearly this must be the human nature; and the point at which it was incomplete was that which represented the centre of personality or will. At first he held that the human nature of Christ was a body without a soul, the place of the soul being taken by the Divine Logos. But the idea of a body without a soul was specifically Arian, and was condemned at the Synod of Alexandria in 362. Apollinaris, who at that time was fighting by the side of Athanasius, was able to adjust his views to this decision by subdividing the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ , and explaining that the higher portion or  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  was alone absent; here it was that the Divine Logos took up its abode, and so united deity and humanity in a single Person. As the human  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$  was the seat of wisdom (*sophia*) and the Divine Logos took its place, the Incarnation involved no *Kenosis* or self-emptying of that attribute (Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*<sup>4</sup>, p. 269).

It is easy to understand the attraction which this teaching of Apollinaris exercised upon his contemporaries. He was (as has been said) a friend of Athanasius and himself a champion of the orthodox side. But the leaders on that side remained unconvinced. They shrank from the conclusion that the Manhood in Christ was incomplete: as Gregory Nazianzen pithily expressed it, if there was aught in man which Christ did not assume, that He also did not heal (*τὸ γὰρ ἀπρόσληπτον ἀθεράπευτον*). The argument has reference to a further presupposition, which we must not stay to discuss now, but which will perhaps come before us again before we have done.

Apollinaris was thrown over, and his theory was condemned in 381. And yet the lines of his thought were dominant in the next sixty or seventy years. It was a phrase coined by Apollinaris that was the watchword of the school of Alexandria, which the strong assertive character of its bishops—Theophilus, Cyril, Dioscorus—maintained in power during that period. The Alexandrians were careful to affirm the full humanity of Christ, and yet they held that the determining element in His being was the divine; their formula was *μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*. Cyril distinguished, but did not always observe the distinction, between this and *θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένον*.

The main opposition came from the rival school of Antioch. The battle was bitterly and obstinately

fought. The Antiochenes maintained a separation of the two natures which almost amounted to the 'two Sons' at which Apollinaris had taken fright. The more orthodox guarded themselves by asserting with emphasis, at least in words, the unity of the Person.

The decision came, so far as it was a decision—for the East never recovered from the shock of this conflict; the Nestorians broke away and travelled eastwards, the Monophysites sulked and offered but a feeble and half-hearted resistance to the Saracens, and the Empire was robbed of some of its fairest provinces—the decision, such as it was, came, as it had come before in the Arian controversy, from Rome, which was once more backed by the imperial court at Byzantium. Rome, after its manner, did not commit itself to speculative adventures, but asserted the even balance of the Two Natures, each retaining its proper character but united in the one Person. Although the characters were thus distinct, they were so bracketed and combined under the unity of Person that it was not wrong to speak of the Son of Man as coming down from heaven or of the Son of God as crucified and buried.<sup>1</sup>

This was the solution embodied in the formula of Chalcedon (Oct. 25, 451). According to this, Christ is at once perfect God and perfect Man, of one substance with the Father in respect of His Godhead and of one substance with us in respect of His

<sup>1</sup> Leo's Tome, § 5.

manhood, manifested in two natures without confusion, without conversion, without division, without separation, the distinction of the two natures being nowhere destroyed by reason of the union, but rather the separate properties of each nature being preserved and yet running up into a single person (πρόσωπον) and a single hypostasis.<sup>1</sup>

Once more the solution was in advance of the time, and the battle went on for more than two centuries. And, although in the end it remained unshaken and still stands on record as an ecumenical decision, it had not the same good fortune as the previous decision of Nicaea, but practically broke up the Church of the East and seriously weakened and reduced the Empire.

As the process of analysis was pressed home and distinctions were more finely drawn, it was natural that the controversy should pass from a question as to the Two Natures into a question as to the Two Wills. The ultimate formula was Two Natures, Two Energies, Two Wills, One Person. It will be seen that the dividing line between personality and will is sharp set and difficult to realize. However, that is the point at which the controversy was left. The technical refinements of John of Damascus (eighth cent.) made no real change, but only gave to the definitions a keener edge. Their true parent was Leontius of Byzantium (from about 485 to 543), the influential theologian who had the ear of the

<sup>1</sup> This is slightly condensed from the original.

Emperor Justinian. To him is really due the idea of a human nature which in itself is impersonal and has its personality only in the Divine Logos: this was expressed by the term *ἐνυπόστατος*. Probably, with the resources available at the time, no other solution was possible. It is another thing to say that as a solution it is wholly satisfactory or one that can permanently be maintained.

Modern writers, especially in Germany, have not many good words to say for the whole doctrine of the Two Natures. And yet it is admitted to have had one good effect. The resistance of Antioch to Alexandria saved, or went as far as seemed possible to save, the integrity and reality of the human nature in Christ. To do this was not a slight thing, even though it were done at some expense of logic, and although it left a gap in the theory as a whole which to the last was but imperfectly joined.

To me, I confess, the language that is often used in condemnation of the doctrine of the Two Natures seems too severe. Is it to be expected that the philosophical and theological armoury of the fifth to the eighth centuries A. D. should supply weapons that are proof against attack for all time? To demand this is no doubt to demand more than those centuries could give. To us it does seem artificial to conceive of the two natures as operating distinctly and yet, by a system of mutual give-and-take (*communicatio idiomatum*, *κοινωνία* and *ἀντίδοσις τῶν ὀνομάτων*), allow for the transference of attributes from the

one to the other. But the fair thing is, not to plant ourselves rigidly in our time and from that vantage-ground to weigh in the scales and find wanting the efforts of past generations, but to put ourselves in their place and to ask what else, or what better, they could have done. To the men of that day, with the Gospels before them taken literally as they stand, the two natures would obviously seem separable and separate : it was as obvious to refer such things as hunger and thirst, pain and death, limitation of knowledge, to the one, as it was to refer miracles and the supernatural beginning, as well as the supernatural ending of the incarnate Life, to the other. Doubtless it was just these plain facts, or facts which seemed to them plain, which moved Pope Leo and Pope Martin to take the stand they did. It is not for us to blame them ; and least of all, to blame them before we have got a coherent and consistent theory of our own that we can substitute for theirs.



### III

## MODERN CHRISTOLOGIES



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I MUST now try to sketch in outline the history of modern Christologies. And this means practically that I must try to follow the course which this subject has taken in Germany. I do indeed believe that our own race, in this country and in America, has had some not unimportant contributions to make to it. But, if they have not been exactly desultory, they might at least be described as more or less isolated or episodical. In Germany alone can the subject be said to have had a continuous history. And there the more recent phase of this history covers more than a century.

We may take our start from the Rationalism which ran over from the eighteenth into the earlier years of the nineteenth century. This Rationalism made a clean sweep of Christology altogether. For it Christianity meant the teaching as it conceived it, and especially the moral teaching of Christ. But within these limits there was little or no room for a doctrine of His Person. An average representative of this school, writing in 1813, laid it down that Christology as a dogma formed no part of the Christian faith. That faith was a religion which Christ taught, not one the object of which He was. And accordingly, all that related to the Person and

Work of Christ belonged not so much to Religion as to the History of Religion.<sup>1</sup>

It is an advance when we come to the philosophy of Hegel (1770–1831), who has at least the great merit of trying to work in Christology into a comprehensive scheme of human history. I am by no means sure that in this respect he is not even now some way in advance of many who believe themselves to have got beyond him. From the point of view of the theologian, he will naturally seem to try to express religious truth too much in terms of philosophy. In any case his formula is too predominantly intellectual. It cannot do more than indicate a single step in the great process. Hegel sought to deal with Christianity by his favourite method of the synthesis of opposites. For him it represented the meeting-point of Infinite and Finite, of Deity and Humanity. From his point of view the important thing was the idea—the idea of the union of Infinite and Finite, of God and man. This idea, however, was with him not passive but active. It was a working out of the process of the Absolute Spirit in history. His conception of the process may be too *a priori*; it may be too much imposed upon history rather than extracted from it, i. e. from the actual course of historical development. But it has, as I have just said, the great merit of comprehen-

<sup>1</sup> Faut, *Die Christologie seit Schleiermacher* (Tübingen, 1907), p. 1. In the sketch which follows I am practically following the outline in this clear and ably written monograph.

siveness ; it does conceive of history as a continuous process, and a continuously divine process ; it does not, as so much modern theology at least appears to do, take a positive pleasure in setting one age in opposition and contrast to another. It prefers to think of the ages as succeeding each other in the gradual evolution of a vast divine purpose. And this, I must needs think, whatever the defects of the theory in detail, is in its broad outline the sounder and truer view.

It is well known that Strauss (David Friedrich Strauss, 1808-74) began life as a follower of Hegel, and that in his first book he took his start from the Hegelian philosophy, though he grafted on to this a quantity of destructive criticism which constitutes his real importance in literature and in history. It was on the strength of his Hegelian Christology that he felt himself emancipated from any servile dependence upon the Gospels. So long as he remained true to the idea of the union of Godhead and Manhood, the historical facts in which that idea was supposed to be expressed were indifferent to him, and he exercised freely the most trenchant criticism upon them. He himself, at the end of his book, sums up rhetorically the outcome of his criticism :—

The key to the whole of Christology consists in this, that as subject of the predicates which the Church ascribes to Christ, an individual is replaced by an idea—but a real idea, and not an unreal one,

as in the theory of Kant. As conceived of in an individual, a God-Man, the attributes and functions which the Church doctrine ascribes to Christ contradict each other; in the idea of the Race they agree together. Humanity is the union of the two Natures, God become man, the Infinite Spirit externalized as finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude; it is the child of the visible mother and the invisible Father, of the Spirit and of Nature; it is the worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human history the spirit ever becomes more completely master of nature, within man as well as outside him, while nature is depressed as the powerless material of its activity; it is the sinless One, inasmuch as the course of its development is blameless, inasmuch as defilement ever attaches to the individual but disappears in the race and in its history; it is Humanity that dies, that rises again, and that ascends to heaven, in so far as out of the negation of its natural self there ever proceeds higher spiritual life and, out of the destruction of its finitude as the spirit of the individual, the nation, and the lower world, there arises its union with the infinite Spirit of heaven.<sup>1</sup>

Strauss was driven to this substitution of the idea for the Person by his assumption that the idea never reaches its full expression in the individual but only in the race. It is, however, not at all surprising that, after reducing Christianity to this shadowy semblance of itself, he should end by throwing it over altogether. The intense sincerity which, whatever his faults, was such a marked feature in his character, could not be satisfied with

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by Biedermann, *Dogmatik*, p. 536 n.

half measures ; and in his latest work, *The Old and the New Faith* (1872), he directly put the question, Are we still Christians? and answered it in the negative.

Into the vacant place which was thus left by Strauss stepped his great admirer, the Swiss theologian Biedermann (Alois Emanuel Biedermann, 1819-85). Unlike many of the Swiss Professors, who cross the border from Germany, Biedermann was born in the neighbourhood of Zürich, where he afterwards became Professor. He had a vigorous personality and took an active part (on the extreme liberal side) in the Church controversies of his time, being in fact one of those who helped to impress on the religious life of his canton the stamp which it still bears to-day. When Strauss, just before his death, put forth the book to which reference was made a moment ago, Biedermann exclaimed that sooner than have had it published he would have cut off a finger of his own right hand. He had, however, shortly before (in 1869) published his own *Dogmatik* which, as I have said, takes up very much the earlier position of Strauss, and—I think we may add—with some improvement. Like Strauss, Biedermann was a direct and forcible writer ; his book has considerable merits of form, and it still receives attention in Germany. Biedermann is quite as radical in criticism as Strauss ; but, although their position is virtually the same, the later writer seems

to have some advantage in his mode of statement. I would describe in this way the fact that, whereas his predecessor took as the foundation of his construction the *idea* of Christ as the God-Man, he persistently speaks, not of the 'Christus-Idee' but of the 'Christus-Prinzip'.

There are indeed in German three related terms which are used in this connexion, and I think that they may be taken as each marking a distinct step above the other. The terms are Christus-Idee, Christus-Prinzip, and Christus-Person. I would venture to distinguish between them thus. The *idea* is the expression of a general truth; in this case the general truth of the intimate mutual relation of God and man, of Deity and Humanity. It is implied, but not directly expressed, that this idea embodies itself, or works itself out, in history. The term *principle*, as compared with *idea*, lays more stress on this active working out or realization; it brings to the forefront the fact that the *idea* is not a mere abstraction of the mind but a working creative force in history. Both these terms are less heard of than they were. In their place we hear more now of the Christus-Person. I take it that this is a clear gain. We come back at last to the real Christ—historic or (as we should say) supernatural. I must leave this further distinction for the present; to me it seems to mark a yet further step in advance. I shall have to come back to this point later; for the present we are dealing with

the lower stages of the development. But I think you will find it a help as a key to all this part of the lecture to bear well in mind this triple distinction of Idea, Principle, and Person.

Strauss began as, and Biedermann was all along, a thoroughgoing Hegelian. They were of course both Hegelians of the Left, open enemies of the inherited Christian tradition. We had ourselves here in Oxford a Hegelian, not of the Left, one who was indeed quite free and fearless in his acceptance of all that it seemed right to accept in criticism, and yet was at the same time not only a Christian but an intense Christian, for whom Christianity meant a great deal more than it means for the average man. I refer to the late Professor Thomas Hill Green (1836-82). It happened that just at the time of his mature activity the influence of Strauss and F. C. Baur was at its height. The Germans were taking a lead in scientific theology. We had not much in England that could be exactly called by that name. The great body of the Anglican clergy was staunchly conservative. A few, mainly Oxford students, were feeling their way with the help of the Germans, and put forth their views in *Essays and Reviews* (1860). At Cambridge the great trio Westcott, Hort, and Lightfoot were writing; and their theology was scientific in the best sense. But it was also very cautious, and as yet touched for the most part the fringes of the great subject. It was inevitable that a man like Green should seek for

guidance from the Germans, and from those who stood out most conspicuously in Germany. In Philosophy he was an expert; his theology he was obliged to take at second hand. But, in so doing, he mixed it with his own remarkable personality. One of his friends said of him after his death, 'We shall never know a nobler man.' I knew him only a very little, but enough to echo the same thought in the same words. He was a unique compound of Hegelianism in philosophy, Liberalism in politics, and Puritanism in religion. He said of himself (characteristically, we are told, and I can fully believe it) that the Bible was the only book that he knew really well; and yet his mind was also stored with the graver and austerer kinds of literature—Shakespeare, Milton, Bunyan, Wordsworth. And though his nature too was somewhat austere upon the surface, beneath the surface there lay a deep affectionateness and power of restrained feeling. All this unusual combination comes out in the two lay sermons which are printed among his *Works* (iii. pp. 230–76), and are among the most striking utterances of their kind in the last century. I will permit myself a single quotation of some length. And, as I must economize, I will choose a passage which I think will be specially worth bearing in mind for our present purpose. It is indeed little more than a condensed summary of salient features in New Testament teaching, but of those features with which the writer was most in sympathy and

which he was able with a minimum of substantial change to work into the structure of his own philosophy. The reader will make what allowance he thinks well for the peculiar views implied, whether of philosophy or of criticism.

There came One who spake as never man spake, yet proclaimed Himself the son of man, and was conscious in the very meanness of human life, in its final shame of death, of the communication of God to Himself, and through Him to mankind. There came another, who, bringing with him certain 'metaphysical' conceptions, the result of the philosophy of the time, found them in this Man, whom death could not hold, suddenly become real; who in spirit, yet with a light above the brightness of the sun, saw manifested in Him that which Philo and the Stoics knew must be; even the heavenly Man in whose death all barriers were broken down, that all in the participation of His life might be equal before God. . . . In a generation or two the intuition of the present Christ, which Paul even in his lifetime seems to have been unable to convey to others as it was to himself, had faded away. . . . Yet, when it might be thought that the life of Christ must already have ceased to be a spiritual presence and become a wonder of the past—more, probably, than two generations after St. Paul had gone to his rest—there arose a disciple, whose very name we know not (for he sought not his own glory and preferred to hide it under the repute of another), who gave that final spiritual interpretation to the person of Christ, which has for ever taken it out of the region of history and of the doubts that surround all past events, to fix it in the purified conscience, as the immanent God. The highest result of ancient

philosophy had been the conception of the world as a system of thought, related to God as His word or expression, i. e. as the spoken thought is related to the man. This conception, however, great as it was, did not present God under moral attributes, nor did it bring Him near to the conscience of the individual. But in Christ, the writer whom the Church calls St. John, saw this divine thought manifesting itself in human life as Truth and Love, and that not merely or fully through a past visible existence—though such existence had been vouchsafed as a ‘sign’—but through a spirit which should dwell in men, drawn out of the world, won from sense and the flesh, for ever. The presence of this spirit was the presence of the Son, so that the perfect knowledge and love which subsisted from eternity between the Father and the Son might be reproduced in men as the knowledge of God and love of each other. . . . He thus comes, as the context explained, in the spirit of truth. In this spirit they are with Him where He is, even in the presence of God (xvii. 23), and the love wherewith God has loved Him is in them, even as He is in them. Those who have been able to receive this saying, in the spiritual sight of Christ have seen the Father; in worshipping Christ they have worshipped God under the attributes of personal intelligence and love. . . . Such believing love, once wrought into the life and character, ‘not in word but in power’, can survive all shocks of criticism, all questions as to historical events. . . . It needs no evidence of the presence of God, or the work of Christ the Spirit, for it is that presence and work itself. It is the crucifixion of the flesh, it is the new life, it is the resurrection of the dead.<sup>1</sup>

With every possible qualification which may be

<sup>1</sup> Op. cit. iii. 241–3; in the separate edition (1883), pp. 26–31.

due either to the transference of these ideas from their ancient dress into their modern or to any reservations, critical or otherwise, in the mind of the writer, I will make bold to say that one who could use this language as sincerely as the writer used it, even though there may have been a good many things that he could not accept as many of us accept them, yet must have had a strong grasp on the very essence of Christianity.

It was still under the Hegelian stimulus that in the middle of the last century an elaborate attempt was made by Dorner (Isaac August Dorner, 1809–84) to mediate between the old and the new (i. e. the new conception as it then was). Dorner also started from the idea of the God-Man, Deity and Humanity not as opposed to but as implying each other, a humanity which is *capax deitatis*. But, with this scheme in his mind, Dorner worked it out much more on the lines of the Bible and Church Doctrine. His chief work is a very massive *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ* (ed. 1, 1839; ed. 2, 1845; E. T. 1872). Towards the end of his life he returned to the subject in his systematic *Glaubenslehre* (1879–80). Whatever may be thought of the success of his theoretic construction, in any case the *History* was a thorough piece of work, and remains a standard book on the subject. And yet the execution rather breaks down between the tendencies of two periods. In spite of his Hegelian starting-point and qualified use of Hegelian language,

we can see that Dorner had a feeling of the necessity of finding a real basis not in metaphysics but in religion. Accordingly, the Incarnation is no longer for him a moment in the evolution of the Absolute, but it has its motive in the Divine Love. Man is created for communion with God. God, by the impulse of His own being, communicates Himself to man. Lesser revelations may be made by inspired men, but the perfect revelation must be made by one who is God as well as man. It is true that the necessity is not *a priori*; but when it is given to us as a fact, we can see that it is reasonable. Sin has caused a breach between man and God, and it is the work of the Sinless to heal this breach. This called for a new act of creation. The Divine Logos, which is the appropriate organ of this mediation, takes to Itself human nature. There is no double personality; but there is development in the penetration of the human by the Divine. It is characteristic of Dorner to insist on this development; and he rather breaks away from his patristic authorities by making the complete union of the two natures come at the end of the process rather than at the beginning.

It is also characteristic of Dorner to lay stress on the single personal Head and Representative of humanity; and his critics point out that this is by no means required either by his philosophical or by his religious premisses. It is not required by the conception of the relation of the Infinite to the

finite ; and God may as well be thought of in direct relation to many souls as to one.

Under the head of 'mediating theology' would fall the theory commonly known by the name of *Kenosis* or 'self-emptying' of the Divine Nature of Christ. This theory began really in Germany about the time of which we have been speaking, the middle of the last century. It was adopted rather freely by continental theologians ; but just as it seemed to have run its course and to be dying out there, it was taken up and vigorously pressed in this country, where it has indeed had a fuller and more eventful history than any other form of Christological doctrine.

This rough outline of the history I must try to fill in with somewhat more detail.

The theory took its rise among a group of theologians who were predominantly orthodox and desired to be orthodox, but who found themselves in need of some reasoned explanation of certain phenomena in the Life of our Lord on earth, especially those which appeared to imply a restriction or limitation of His divinity, such as His own explicit statement as to the limit to His divine knowledge (Mark xiii. 32) and St. Luke's description of His advance 'in wisdom and stature and in favour with God and men' (Luke ii. 52). All the examples of this kind were brought under the general head of the language used by St. Paul in the

famous passage Phil. ii. 5-8, and summed up in the word *kenosis* or 'self-emptying', formed from the principal verb in the sentence (ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν).

Both in patristic and in more modern times there had been occasional suggestions pointing in the direction of some such theory, though it no doubt ran counter to the main tenor of Christian thought. It was first definitely put forward as a theory by Thomasius (Gottfried Thomasius, 1802-75, Professor at Erlangen). His main work, *Christi Person und Werk*, was first published in 1853-61 in three parts. In order to remove the objection that his theory involved change in the Godhead, Thomasius drew a distinction between the essential and immanent (or inherent) attributes of God, which include His moral attributes, and such 'relative attributes'—attributes arising out of His relation to the universe—as omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence. Some writers speak of these as 'physical attributes' (e.g. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, pp. 476, 477). The writer whose statements on the subject of the Kenosis are most sweeping and unguarded is Gess (Wolfgang Friedrich Gess, 1819-91), the first edition of whose *Lehre von der Person Christi* was contemporary with the work of Thomasius (1856), and who maintained his views in the later form of the book (1870-87). Another continental theologian who is better known in England, Frédéric Godet (1812-1900), Professor at Neuchâtel, a thoughtful and devout rather than an

exact and methodical writer, also took up an extreme position similar to that of Gess.

Certainly there is a sense in which the Incarnation involved a *kenosis*. The great act of divine condescension could not but carry with it a putting off at least of the external circumstances of majesty and glory. Phil. ii. 7 is not the only New Testament passage which refers to this. Other conspicuous places are 2 Cor. viii. 9 ('Though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor'), John xvii. 5 ('Now, O Father, glorify Thou me with Thine own self with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was'). But the general objection to building a formal theory on such foundations is that they are not really qualified to sustain it. The most expressive passages are largely incidental and metaphorical. It is a mistake to seek to harden them into dogma. Really the tendency of recent years has been all the other way, not so much to multiply definitions and distinctions as to reduce them, not to complicate doctrine but rather to simplify it as much as possible. I believe that this is distinctly the more wholesome tendency of the two.

So far as I can see, the formal theory of Kenosis rests upon an altogether insufficient basis, both biblical and historical. The best criticism with which I am acquainted is that by Loofs, s. v. 'Kenosis' in the new edition of Herzog (1901). But the subject is one to the discussion of which this country has made some contributions of value.

I am afraid it is, or at least has been, one of our characteristics that, before we really grapple with a subject, especially a difficult subject, we are apt to need the stimulus of controversy. If that is so, there is, on the other hand, this to be said for our controversies, that usually something worth having is struck out in the course of them. Controversy is as a rule our chief way of securing thoroughness of treatment. When a prolonged controversy has passed over a subject, that subject is held in the national consciousness—not only in the consciousness of scholars but in a certain degree in that of the general public as well—in a much more solid, digested, and clarified form than it would have been otherwise. We are not at all a people of system: knowledge with us is much more like a country in process of reclamation, in which certain tracts are far more thoroughly broken up and tilled than others, just because the ploughs and harrows of controversy have passed over them.

Such has been the case with this doctrine of the Kenosis. The impulse to the discussion of the Kenotic Theory which has taken place in this country, with special activity during the decade 1889–99, came in the first instance from the side of Biblical Criticism. The protagonist at first was Dr. Gore (now Bishop of Birmingham). In his *Lux Mundi* (1889) essay which made so much stir, on ‘The Holy Spirit and Inspiration’, he was compelled to refer to the question as to the knowledge of our

Lord as Man in its bearing on such points as (e. g.) the authorship of Ps. cx ; and the subject was taken up again in his Bampton Lectures for 1891 and yet again in the *Dissertations on Subjects connected with the Incarnation* (1895). It happened that Dr. Rashdall in a sermon preached in the same year (1889) appealed to the same doctrine for the same purpose, though not committing himself to any particular kenotic theory. Similarly, Bp. Moorhouse of Manchester in his *Teaching of Christ* (1891), Dr. Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology* (1893), Dr. A. J. Mason, *The Conditions of our Lord's Life on Earth* (1896), Dr. Ottley, *Doctrine of the Incarnation* (1896). All these writers may be ranged on the same side as insisting to a greater or less degree on the Kenosis. On the other hand a steady opposition was maintained all through the period by *The Church Quarterly Review* in articles dated respectively October 1891, January and October 1896, July and October 1897, January 1899. To the same effect was a weighty charge by Bp. Stubbs of Oxford delivered in 1893; an elaborate work by the Rev. H. C. Powell, *The Principle of the Incarnation* (1896); Dr. Gifford, *The Incarnation: a Study of Philippians ii. 5-11* (1897); a survey of the whole subject by Dr. F. J. Hall of Chicago, *The Kenotic Theory* (1898); and a number of incidental allusions in writings by Dr. W. Bright, e. g. *The Incarnation as a Motive Power* (2nd edition, 1891), *Morality in Doctrine* (1892), *Waymarks in Church History* (1894). A great deal of this literature was

of real value. Dr. Bright was our foremost patristic scholar—one of the greatest that the Church of England has ever possessed, and all his utterances on the subject were marked not only by commanding knowledge but by great precision and carefulness of language. Dr. Gifford's little book was confined to the discussion of a single passage, but was quite a model in its kind, i. e. in its treatment of the data supplied by N. T. Exegesis, and is likely to remain the highest authority possible so far as it goes. Mr. Powell's work was most thorough and exhaustive in its way; it was only rather a misfortune that it mixed up much excellent learning with rather disputable philosophy. I should also like to add to the list of books mentioned from the penultimate decade a single book from the last decade, Canon (now Bishop) F. Weston's *The One Christ* (1907). I am proud to claim Dr. Weston as an old pupil of my own, and his book, written in the isolation of Zanzibar, shows great freshness and originality. It treats the subject from the point of view of high dogmatics; and I shall have occasion to refer to it again, when I come to offer something constructive in relation to Christological doctrine.

The most thoroughgoing and the boldest in language of those who lay stress on the Kenosis is Dr. Gore. His position generally seems to be similar to that of Thomasius; and he does not hesitate to speak of the 'abandonment', 'real aban-

donment', or 'surrender' of some of the divine attributes, where a writer like Dr. Bright would speak of voluntary self-restraint in their exercise. I do not think that I shall be far wrong if I were to describe the general effect of the controversy as a lesson of caution in the use of language and in the drawing of dogmatic inferences. Bp. Gore deserves full credit for the directness and boldness with which he grasped a difficult problem; and I for one believe that both he and Dr. Rashdall were justified in refusing to prejudge questions of criticism on the ground of an abstract doctrine as to our Lord's Person. Nor should I question their right to base this refusal on a doctrine of Kenosis, if they prefer to call it by that name; in other words, to bring it under the head of the conditions assumed by our Lord in His Incarnation. But it seems to me that of the two practically simultaneous utterances, Dr. Rashdall's was the more judicious in keeping to general terms and declining to press them into the mould of a particular theory. I should like, if I may, to take the opportunity of expressing a hope that Dr. Rashdall's volume, *Doctrine and Development*, may not be forgotten, as occasional volumes of sermons of that kind are apt to be. I believe it to be specially fitted to place in the hands of a layman who desired to see Christian doctrine restated in a fresh, independent, and untechnical way. And, although I should perhaps go further on some points myself, it would be

ungrateful not to recognize the amount of clear and positive teaching which the book contains.

What I have just been saying about the Kenotic Theory has been of the nature of a digression which will detract somewhat from the symmetry and proportion of the treatment of my main subject. It seemed impossible to break off without bringing it down to the present time; and the English controversy comes in as rather an excrescence upon the direct history of the development of Christological doctrine. We branched off at the appearance of Thomasius's book in the middle of the fifties, when the Hegelian philosophy was still in the ascendant. It was not much later that that philosophy began to decline, especially in the influence which it had upon theology, and a new set of forces began to make themselves powerfully felt. These are associated with the name of Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89) and his school. Ritschl had already in 1857 brought out the second edition of his *Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche*, the epoch-making work which not only marked his complete breach with the Tübingen School but more than anything else really gave the death-blow to that school and its theories. Much, no doubt, was contributed by the cumulative work of the great Cambridge trio; but that was later in date, and it did not come with quite the concentrated and nervous originality of this single early work of Ritschl's. The Cambridge

influence was rather that of a different type and direction of scholarship; that of Ritschl seemed due to the mental thews and sinews of a single scholar outgrowing his own surroundings.

Ritschl himself began as a follower of Baur and of Tübingen; but to understand his place in history we have to go further back and to a collateral line of development. Tübingen was the theological application of Hegelianism; the more distinctive features in the theology of Ritschl are rather in the line of descent from Schleiermacher (Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, 1768–1834). Philosophically, I suppose that Ritschl drew not a little of his inspiration from Kant (1724–1804); but his conception of religion came more from Schleiermacher. It is to Schleiermacher that we must really trace the emancipation of theology from that dominant intellectualism which culminated in Hegel. Schleiermacher saw that religion was by no means a matter only of the pure intellect, as the Rationalists as well as the Idealists made it. He saw that it was not only a doctrine but a life, and a life even more than a doctrine; the emotions and the will had an even larger part in it than the intellect. Schleiermacher thus takes his start, not from dogma, not from metaphysical theory, but from religious experience. This is the great revolution, in which later theology has so largely followed him. At the same time it was not to be expected that so great a change should reach its final expression all at once. Schleiermacher

gathered up in his own person a large part of the best culture of his time. He was open to influences from many quarters ; and he built up his system with the discursive play of a many-sided genius. It was but natural that there should linger on in it some features derived from the past. For instance, he makes much use of the conception of the relation of the finite to the infinite, and makes religion arise out of the feeling of utter dependence. The consciousness of God includes with him a sense of the order of nature. Accordingly, he rejects the idea of miracle as a breach in that order, and generally reduces the miraculous element in the Life of Christ. Christ is for him the embodiment of the ' Urbild ' or Ideal of Humanity. This ideal is to be judged, not by the empirical standard of the extent to which it has been actually reproduced in the Church, but rather by its boundless possibilities of reproduction. Christ is the organ for the indwelling of God in humanity ; He communicates that indwelling from Himself to the race, not (as it would seem) supernaturally, but in the same kind of way in which one man influences another. Measured by the distance which separates Him from the average of mankind, His appearance on earth is a miracle ; but it is better regarded as the meeting-point of God's creative act and the evolution of Man. Schleiermacher would restate Christian doctrine in some such terms as these.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kirn in Hauck-Herzog, *RE.*<sup>3</sup>, xvii. 605.

Speaking for myself, I should be inclined to describe this as rather an effort towards the expression of a truth than the successful expression of it. I cannot see in Schleiermacher's view more than a stage on the road. He is still too much infected by the philosophies around him; there is still too much of the 'idea', and not yet enough of that direct analysis of religious experience to which he had himself called attention.

Schleiermacher leaves upon us the impression of a keen and quick intelligence, cultivated and receptive on many sides, containing in itself the seeds of many distinct movements and full of suggestiveness for the future, but with its visible products not quite completely fused and harmonized. Compared with this the mind of Ritschl seems slowly moving and heavily moving; but it impresses us by sheer weight of brain power, by its independence, and by the closely knit structure of the thought. He is plastic, but not with the plasticity which adapts itself to the varied configuration of the data; the leading quality with him is rather a masterful strength and tenacity of purpose, which bends even unpromising materials to its will.

Ritschl made his system culminate in the God-head of Christ, though his correspondence<sup>1</sup> shows that even in the act of doing so he was aware that he would not conciliate his opponents either on the right hand or on the left. He used the phrase, and it

<sup>1</sup> *Albrecht Ritschls Leben*, ii. 149.

was natural to him to use it, but its content was not quite the same as that which it bore in the doctrine of the Church. At the same time he was accused of unworthy accommodation. He did not deserve this charge, because he really meant to convey much that the Church does, but he approached it differently, and he places his positive teaching in a different setting. Ritschl was a Biblicist, and he works out his ideas in the form of Biblical exegesis; but when his texts do not suit him, he overrides them.<sup>1</sup> He treats Luther even more eclectically than the Bible, content if he can find support from some passages, though he has to confess that there is different teaching in others. His method is to ignore or minimize everything of the nature of metaphysics, and to assert and build upon all that is concerned with the moral and practical side of religion. Ritschl will not separate the Person of Christ from His Work; it is rather in the work that we are to seek for the expression of the Person. The following summary is given by his son O. Ritschl.

Ritschl's whole doctrine of the Godhead of Christ amounts to this, that in Christ as Man God Himself may be known as He is (*in seinem Wesen*). The Manhood of Christ is here no longer opposed to His Godhead, as in the formula of His Two Natures. For Christ as Man is not regarded as possessing human nature in the abstract, but altogether in the concrete

<sup>1</sup> There is a rather conspicuous example of this in *Rechtf. u. Vers.*<sup>4</sup>, iii. 80.

as the individual Man Jesus, who has faithfully fulfilled His special and peculiar mission in perfect love and perfect patience. And in the whole of this life's achievement of His Christian faith at the same time recognizes Him as the self-revelation of God (*Leben*, ii. 216).

We may see sufficiently from this how Ritschl's doctrine differs from the traditional. At the same time Ritschl is thoroughly in earnest in the stress which he lays on Christ as revealing the Father. The two favourite texts which he applies in this connexion are John i. 14 ('We saw his glory . . . full of grace and truth'), and Matt. xi. 27-9 ('All things have been delivered unto me of my Father . . . Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart'). 'All things have been delivered unto me of my Father' marks the victory over the world; and the meekness and lowliness are shown especially in the patient self-surrender of the Cross.

In his exposition of the doctrine Ritschl makes use of the ordinary categories of Prophet, Priest, and King. But I do not know that there is anything in his treatment of these that would differentiate him much from any other writer.



#### IV

### TWO TYPES OF CHRISTOLOGY



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WE have traced a certain progress in the theologizing of the last century, so far as it centres in the doctrine of the Person of Christ, which for the sake of clearness we connected with the three landmarks described in those expressive German phrases, the *Christus-Idee*, *Christus-Prinzip*, and *Christus-Person*—as we might say, the doctrine of Christ considered as an idea, considered as an active principle, and considered as the influence of a person: that is, supposing that I am right in taking ‘*Prinzip*’ as compared with ‘*Idee*’ to mean just an operative idea, an idea expressed or realized in act. In this case the two terms would go closely together, and the second would be only a more complete form of the first; as a matter of fact the use of it did come later in order of time, and may be regarded as just an improvement in expression. The three landmarks of which I have spoken would represent one short step and one longer step; for many purposes the first two might be bracketed together.

The *Christus-Idee* or doctrine of Christ considered as an idea may (as we have seen) be specially identified with Hegel. And no doubt recent years have seen rather a reaction against Hegel. I should

not be at all surprised if many of my hearers dismissed from their minds at once the notion that Christ could be described in terms of an *idea* as simply the explaining away of substantial Christian truth as a mere abstraction. I should myself at one time have done so. But there is really more in it than this. Hegelianism in the hands of its best representatives, in the hands of those who are not only Hegelians in philosophy but are also steeped in the language and thought of the New Testament, has shown great powers of adaptation and approximation to New Testament ideas. I have already quoted one admirable passage from the late Professor T. H. Green which seemed to me—with one or two slight modifications, not at all affecting its essence—to express as well as we could wish the real teaching of the New Testament. And I must give myself the pleasure of quoting another passage for the double purpose, both of confirming this impression and also of putting before you thoughts, concisely and aptly stated, which I believe it will be useful and helpful to bear in mind. The following, I venture to think, is not only good Hegelian theology but also good Biblical theology as well; and it anticipates a great deal of more recent teaching to which I shall have to come back presently.

A death unto life, a life out of death, must, then, be in some way the essence of the divine nature—must be an act which, though exhibited once for all in the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, was

yet eternal—the act of God Himself. For that very reason, however, it was one perpetually re-enacted, and to be re-enacted, by man. If Christ died for all, all died in Him: all were buried in His grave to be all made alive in His resurrection. It is so far as the Second Man, which is from Heaven, and whose act is God's, thus lives and dies in us, that He becomes to us a wisdom of God, which is righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. In other words, He constitutes in us a new intellectual consciousness, which transforms the will, and is the source of a new moral life (*The Witness of God*, p. 8; *Works*, iii. 233).

Once again it is difficult for me to bring myself to stop; Prof. Green was a most attractive exponent of ideas of this kind. And I would ask you to observe that not the slightest exception can be taken to such a statement as that which I have just read from the point of view of the strictest orthodoxy. If exception were taken to it, it would be far more likely to come from what I may call the dominant school in Germany, of which I shall soon be speaking, and perhaps from some quarters among ourselves.

With such writing before my mind, I should not feel that I could dismiss the attempt to express either the person or the work of Christ in the terms of an idea. Along with the tendency to move further away from Hegel at the present time, there is also a tendency here and there among us to something of the nature of a return to him. It is in such a region as this that philosophy and theology

most tend to meet; and if some student of philosophy should feel disposed to experiment in this direction, I should be sorry to dissuade him.

We have so far traced the development of modern Christology down to Ritschl. He may be regarded as inaugurating the latest phase in the history of the subject, the phase of which the watchword would be, neither Idea nor Principle but Person. There is a great deal that is very wholesome in the movement out of which this development has sprung. It arose from and has been sustained by a great desire to look at the reality of things, to put aside conventions and to get into close and living contact with things as they really are. It came to be seen that—whether or not it has some partial justification—in any case as a complete philosophy of religion Hegelianism was too purely intellectual. It did not correspond to the true nature of religion, in which the emotions and the will are involved quite as much as the intellect. Along with the reaction in this sense against Hegelianism, there was also something of a reaction against the body of doctrine inherited from the Ancient Church. It was felt that this too was just as predominantly intellectual, and therefore also a departure from the true ideal of religion. A good deal of dissatisfaction was felt with the old metaphysics in the forms of which Christological doctrine had clothed itself. The doctrine of the Two Natures in particular, as

embodied in the writings of St. Leo and partly sanctioned at Chalcedon, was sharply criticized. There was also not a little tendency to revolt against the later idea of a human nature which had not a proper personality of its own but which took its personality from the divine nature. It seemed to promise a great simplification all round when Ritschl proposed to discard metaphysics altogether, and to take his stand on what he called 'judgements of value', i. e. judgements constructed with a view, not to their absolute truth or falsehood, but to their bearing upon practical life.

It must not be thought that dissatisfaction with some of the ancient formulae was confined to the Germans or to quarters hostile to orthodoxy. Dr. Westcott writes decidedly enough in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (p. 66): 'It is unscriptural, though the practice is supported by strong patristic authority, to regard the Lord during His historic life, as acting now by His human and now by His divine nature only. The two natures were inseparably combined in the unity of His person.' It is true that this note is criticized in *The Church Quarterly Review* for Jan. 1899, p. 345. But on the other hand it is endorsed by Bp. Gore (*Dissertations*, p. 166), who, after illustrating the tendency to regard the divine and human natures in our Lord as simply placed side by side, and to speak of Him as acting now in the one and now in the other, expressly dissociates himself from this

mode of speaking. He himself prints the sentence in which he does this in italics. 'This is a point on which—it must be emphatically said—accurate exegesis renders impossible to us the phraseology of the Fathers exactly as it stands.' Dr. Gore has a careful note (p. 163) on the difference in degree of authority between the actual decision of a Council and a writing (like Leo's Tome) approved by a Council. The latter may well be regarded as illustrative rather than dogmatically defining. It would certainly be wrong to press all the incidental expressions used in this sense. Or we might put it in this way: the language of St. Leo was very intelligible and very natural for the purpose for which it was used, and there was a broad sense in which it was not really wrong; but it must not be taken as laying down a formula unalterably for all time.

Dr. Moberly is another writer whose language diverges somewhat from that of Pope Leo. For instance, he writes thus:—

The phrase 'God and man' is of course perfectly true. But it is easy to lay undue emphasis on the 'and'. And when this is done—as it is done every day—the truth is better expressed by varying the phrase. 'He is not two, but one, Christ.' He is, then, not so much God *and* man, as God in, and through, and as, man. He is one indivisible personality throughout. In His human life on earth, as Incarnate, He is not sometimes, but consistently, always, in every act and every detail, Human. The Incarnate never leaves His Incarna-

tion. God, as Man, is always, in all things, God *as man*. . . . There are not two existences either of, or within, the Incarnate, side by side with one another. If it is all Divine, it is all human too. We are to study the Divine in and through the human. By looking for the Divine side by side with the human, instead of discerning the Divine within the human, we miss the significance of them both (*Atonement and Personality*, pp. 96 f.).

Dr. Du Bose is no less explicit. 'Jesus Christ Himself', he says, 'is not God in some acts and man in others, but equally God and equally man in every act of His Human life.'<sup>1</sup> I hope to make a suggestion on this head before I have done.

It is not perhaps necessary to place ancient language and modern language in opposition to each other on another aspect of the doctrine of the Two Natures—the question as to the centre of personality in our Lord. Dr. Moberly writes:—

Christ is, in fact, a Divine Person: but a Divine Person not merely wearing manhood as a robe, or playing upon it as an instrument; but really expressing *Himself* in terms of Humanity. . . . There was in Him no impersonal Humanity (which is impossible); but a human nature and character which were personal because they were now the method and condition of His own Personality: Himself become Human, and thinking, speaking, acting, and suffering, as man (op. cit. p. 94).

This is in strict agreement (although the idea of

<sup>1</sup> *The Gospel according to St. Paul*, p. 37.

an 'impersonal humanity' is pronounced impossible) with Leontius of Byzantium, John of Damascus, and the Council of 553. And yet, when Dr. Du Bose comes to touch upon the same point he seems to feel himself compelled to assume a double personality, a divine personality and a human personality, which he regards as a difficulty that is perhaps insoluble.<sup>1</sup> It is a little remarkable that he should do this and that Dr. Moberly apparently should not, because both hold the same view of personality. We seem to understand why Dr. Moberly should not find a difficulty in one personality doing duty for two natures, because for him the consummation of human personality is to be sought in its interpenetration by divine. Dr. Du Bose agrees in this, and yet he seems compelled to postulate a double personality. On such a view no question need be raised as to the *perfectus Deus* and *perfectus homo* of

<sup>1</sup> 'Yet, assuming, as we must, that our Lord's temptations were to their utmost limit our own temptations and not those of one other than ourselves, are we not involved in the difficulty of a double personality in our one Lord ; a divine personality in which He is the very Word of God Himself uttered or expressed in humanity, God self-fulfilled and self-fulfilling in the nature and under the conditions of us all ; and on the other hand, too, a human personality which alone can be the real and perfect expression of God humanly self-realized and manifested ? . . . The time may come when we shall better state to ourselves this paradox or seeming contradiction, and better too perhaps adapt and fit ourselves to its acceptance ; it can never come when we shall be able either to solve it or to reject it' (op. cit. p. 300).

the *Quicumque*; the rock ahead is *Unus omnino, non confusione substantiae sed unitate personae*. Dr. Moberly escapes this; but the difficulty in his case would be as to the *perfectus homo*. And I am afraid that this difficulty attaches to the whole patristic position. I do not mean to leave the dilemma in this state; but the solution which I hope to suggest must be deferred for the present.

These are examples of the strain put upon the modern mind when it tries to follow out problems of this kind to their last issues. The least we can do is to recognize the utter relativity of our own language. It is not only subject to limitations and conditions that we can see, but to much more that we cannot see. And we can well understand when (e. g.) Dr. Bigg pronounces that 'the later Councils were too inquisitive, and attempted to solve problems which need not be set and cannot be answered. Even of the third and fourth Councils this may be said. They went beyond their authorities into regions where we may hardly venture to intrude, and therefore they both led to permanent national schisms' (*The Spirit of Christ in Common Life*, p. 144). It was a more sweeping movement of the same kind when Ritschl tried to banish metaphysics altogether. Even philosophy is attempting much the same thing in the case of Pragmatism. I doubt if these more extreme measures can ultimately succeed, because the mind of man is irresistibly impelled towards a theory of

things, and even a negative theory is still a theory. But in any case we have learnt caution; we have learnt to speak with far greater reserve than we did. And if we regard Ritschl as expressing a tendency rather than a rigid and absolute position, as a tendency it is wholesome enough in its way.

On this particular subject of Christology I believe that the tendency represented by Ritschl and his followers is wholesome. It is a good thing that our attention should be drawn to the Person of Christ, and that it should be kept fully in view in any construction of Christological doctrine. So much I should be willing to grant. But I should decline to affirm either that the introduction of metaphysics had never been justified in the past or would never be possible in the future. The human mind will not permanently renounce the attempt to find a theory of the universe which shall include all being, even the highest.

We may in any case take the Ritschlian standpoint as characterizing the present stage of inquiry. Even where the Ritschlian or the Pragmatist theories are not held, there is a widespread tendency to look for moral and religious values rather than for metaphysical definition. The immediate object before us must be to discriminate more closely between the different views that are capable of being held on this general platform.

The longer I study the course of contemporary

thought, and especially contemporary Christian thought, in relation to religion, the more distinctly does it seem to crystallize in two main types. I will call the one 'full Christianity', and the other 'reduced Christianity'; and each of these, as it seems to me, has a Christology of its own. No doubt there are many intermediate shades and degrees; and yet I should be inclined to say that even these shades and degrees distinctly trend in the one direction or the other; there is a tendency to gravitate towards one or other of the two main types, and it is not difficult to say which, even in cases where the prevailing tendency is subject to not a little qualification.

I must try to describe these types as objectively as I can. I have no doubt which of the two I lean towards myself; but I can feel at the same time the attraction of the other. Indeed I am perhaps conscious of a certain call to offer to mediate between them—at least so far as to help to bring about a mutual understanding. If two sides so clearly understand each other as to know what the other is aiming at and what it is not aiming at, if prejudices and mistakes and misrepresentations are cleared away as far as possible, then at least the first step is taken towards mutual respect.

There is the more reason for an effort to mediate in this case, because the difference between the

two types presents itself to a rough and general view as almost international. When I speak of 'reduced Christianity', I have before my mind more especially the kind of view that I believe to be dominant in liberal religious circles in Germany. When I speak of the 'fuller Christianity', I am thinking of the type that still prevails in religious circles, even on the whole in liberal religious circles, in this country. I do not for a moment deny, either that there are in Germany many other religious circles besides those which I have described as liberal, or that in this country there are not many scattered types of Liberalism. It is difficult to speak of that which is unexpressed; but I have the feeling that there is amongst us a great amount of diffused but silent Liberalism which would correspond more nearly to the German type than to our own. I will go so far as to say that I should be glad to think that it did conform to this type. I say so because I think that I am conscious of its excellences; and I would a great deal sooner that it conformed to this type than to other inferior types, and still more so than that it should escape beyond the bounds of what can be called Christian at all.

This type that I have called 'reduced Christianity' has one immense advantage. It aims at being, and I believe that it is, strictly scientific. In saying that I do not mean to admit that the other type, which I shall call my own, is unscientific, in the

sense of being contrary to, or excluded by, science. But, whereas there is in this case a large fringe of debatable ground where the question may be raised whether particular views are consistent with science or not, in the other case it seems to me to be a reasonable claim that the whole of the ground maintained has the positive support of science, and that as against opposing negative views a sound scientific method will be found favourable rather than otherwise. The German position (if I may call it so for short) seems to me like a compact fortress, small but well found in every respect, with arms and ammunition of the latest pattern and capable of offering a prolonged resistance to any attack that can be brought against it.

If the only purpose of the Christian faith were self-defence, I too should acquiesce in such a position. We must not be backward to recognize its advantages or the virtues that go along with it. It is impossible not to admire the scrupulous care with which the scientific ideal is kept in view, and the steady refusal to go beyond it. I must only qualify this admission. I must only speak with some reserve on the subject of the science. That of course may from time to time be open to question; the best of principles are apt to fail in the application. Allowing for defects of this kind, we must still ungrudgingly recognize the excellence of the intention. That is the strong point: the strength of the scientific interest, and the logical persistence

with which it is followed out, no matter what the consequences.

And yet, even so, the spirit that I am describing seems to me to come some way short of the ideal. It is science pursued with a certain lack of balance. It is too apt to ignore considerations that ought not to be ignored.

Why is it that in so many quarters 'orthodoxy' has come to be a term of reproach? It ought not to be so in the nature of things. And again, why is tradition and everything that can be called 'traditional' looked upon so much askance? That is not the right attitude, however inveterate it may have become. It is really a reaction from one extreme to another. Many virtues went to the original opposition to orthodoxy and tradition. It arose, on its better side, out of an impulse of sincerity, the warm pursuit of freshness and freedom. But the proverbial risks lay near at hand. One generation persecutes, and the next erects monuments to the persecuted. An orthodoxy of fashion succeeded to the older orthodoxy, which had at least a nobler sanction; the shibboleths of opposition were applied—at least have often been applied as rigorously as those of faith. And the total result has been a want of sympathy and a want of justice in the study of the past, a perverted view of history, a series of discordant notes where there should rather be harmony.

I shall have occasion shortly to illustrate what I mean. It is not that side of things on which

I desire to insist at present. I am speaking of two typical conceptions of Christianity, which have as their correlatives two typical Christologies. And I do not wish the antithesis to seem greater than it is. It is almost sure to do so, if each side is not judged in complete connexion with its context; I mean, if we look only at results, and not at the conditions which have led to the results. I have called one a 'reduced Christianity' and the other a 'full Christianity'; I might call the one a 'minimum Christianity' and the other a 'maximum Christianity', meaning by that of course a relative, and not an absolute minimum or maximum. But you will see how at once the whole situation is altered if we regard the opposing types as (from the point of view of those whom they represent) deliberately 'minimum' and 'maximum'. When I say this, I do not mean that the two sides consciously and of set purpose aim respectively at a minimum and a maximum, but rather that the whole bent of their antecedents and character impels them in the direction of minimum and maximum. The important point is that in any comparative estimate of the two types allowance has to be made opposite ways. Those who hold the form of Christianity which I have called 'reduced' practically isolate themselves here in the twentieth century and ask, What verifiable facts can we lay down? What demonstrable propositions can we commit ourselves to as modern men? The others

do not feel that they can isolate themselves in this way from their predecessors in time or from the corporate teaching of the body to which they belong. They are conscious of an organic connexion or solidarity with the Church of the past, and they desire to maintain this connexion. They are not individualists, and they do not wish to be. They have a respect for science, and they are prepared to put their opinions to the test of science; but in certain cases where the continuity of old and new is involved they are content with lower degrees of proof if higher are not to be had.

I hope this is not an unfair description of the two leading types of opinion of which I have been speaking. If I call the one German and the other English, I do so mainly for convenience and with the full knowledge that the labels are accurate only in the roughest and most general way. I have (as I said) the impression that the type which I have called German has spread considerably beneath the surface and is spreading among ourselves. And at the present time and during the last two or three years there has been a rather vigorous reaction in Germany on lines parallel to though not identical with those which prevail among ourselves. I refer to the movement which goes by the name of 'Modern Positive', with Reinhold Seeberg of Berlin at its head and with no lack of energetic supporters. The other attitude is, however, still on the whole dominant in the Universities.

I have dwelt at some length and in some detail on this survey of the situation for a reason which will be understood as soon as I come to speak more directly on the subject of Christology. It is in the Christology that the difference between the two types culminates. Christology is the strongest dividing line between the Modern Positive school in German theology and the Liberal. It is also the strongest dividing line between German Liberalism and ourselves. And yet I am anxious that the difference should not be exaggerated. Stated baldly and without regard to the contexts in each case, the gulf will seem impassable. Ritschl put the doctrine of the Godhead of Christ in the forefront: not all, but by far the greater part, of his followers, and all the more pronounced Liberals who are independent of them, would deliberately put it on one side. I say 'put it on one side'; and I think that is the most accurate expression I can use. The Ritschlians generally would say, when they were questioned, that there was a sense in which the doctrine was true. But they do not like to affirm it for fear of being misunderstood. It is the scrupulous scientific conscience that comes into play. Most Englishmen, I believe, in the like position would affirm it. I have little doubt that, if I held the Ritschlian premisses—as a matter of fact I do not hold them, but if I did—I should affirm it myself. You see, the difference is this: I should be anxious to keep in agreement so far as I possibly could with the Church

Universal. In order to maintain that agreement, I should be willing to strain so far—if it were really a question of straining, and I do not think it is—my conscience on the side of science. The Ritschlian, the German, takes the opposite line to this. He is very sensitive on the subject of science, and he is comparatively indifferent to the Church Universal. And therefore, sooner than incur to himself or to others the slightest suspicion of yielding anything on the side of science, he will shelve the whole question, or (if he is pressed) will even deny what upon the same premisses I should be prepared to affirm.

That, I think, is how the matter stands. And now, you will naturally wish to know precisely how far the Ritschlian—I have in view especially the Ritschlian—is prepared to go with us. The formula on which he insists, and will insist as much as we please, is contained in those words of St. Paul's, 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself' (2 Cor. v. 19). His assent to this is whole-hearted. By 'God' he means the Almighty who rules the universe. The life of Christ upon earth was a manifestation of true Godhead. The inference might be safely drawn that the character which He manifested on earth was the character of God. If we had been left entirely to ourselves, we might not have known, we should never have been quite sure, that God was really Love, that love was the ultimate motive with which He made and sustains the world. But not only so ;

to find Christ or be found of Christ, is to find God or be found of God ; to be in touch with Christ is to be in touch with God, and to feel His presence in the soul.

That is the religious nucleus of Ritschlianism, in regard to which, as I said just now, it is quite whole-hearted. And I confess that to me this profession of faith, brief and guarded as it is, is of immense value. I am not sure that it is not really the essence of everything. We can all go together so far. And, while we are in the way together, I am not disposed to count up too carefully the other items that are dropped. I really think that in regard to these other items I at least could come to an understanding. I know that I mustn't take myself too much as a standard ; I only throw out this as a possible point of view. But, for instance, I believe that if a Ritschlian were questioned he would admit that such a doctrine as that of the Trinity had a relative and historical justification ; it was a natural and appropriate form for the doctrine to take ; it was a form that the men of the early centuries could understand so far as it was capable of being understood. It safeguarded for them, as nothing else could, that one fundamental tenet of 'God in Christ'. I should add myself that it was not only a doctrine for that day, to be afterwards abandoned. Even now, I do not think that we have any other better formula to put in its place. Rightly guarded—guarded as the ancients guarded it, with

due discrimination as to the use of the word Person—I do not think that we can improve upon it. And then, for me, it has the immense advantage of linking the centuries together, of forming a bond of union between the early centuries and our own. If the Ritschlian thinks that I have too much to say about the early centuries, that I do not distinguish sufficiently between the twentieth and the fourth or fifth, perhaps I should ask him to consider whether after all the men of the fourth and fifth centuries, the leaders of the Church in those days, were not really contending for that principle which he values, the principle of God in Christ. And I would ask him whether that is not a justification that is still valid. It may be said perhaps that the doctrine of the Trinity is not verifiable on the ground of religious experience in the same sense in which (e.g.) the principle of God in Christ is verifiable. I might reply that it is at least remotely verifiable as a safeguard to that principle. But I would go further, and I would say, that the doctrine of the Trinity was built up in the first instance on a basis of experience. It was a certain way of describing the ultimate details, the theological details, involved in a given set of experiences. All theology is after all only a way of describing in connected and systematic terms groups of experiences that are in the last resort religious, and that apart from the religious experience which underlies them would be of no value.

On some such lines as these I believe that I could come to terms with the Ritschlians. By which I mean that, if I were to say that I saw what they meant and respected their motives, I believe they would be willing to return the compliment and to say that they saw what I meant and respected my motives. Ideal truth would probably include us all. In any case I should agree with Dr. Du Bose that the Gospel can be broken up into parts, and that each of the parts so far as it goes is a Gospel. 'I hold', he says, 'that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is so true and so living in every part that he who truly possesses and truly uses any broken fragment of it may find in that fragment something—just so much—of gospel for his soul and of salvation for his life' (*The Gospel in the Gospels*, p. 4). Certainly that applies to the Ritschlian fragment as well as to others.

But the Ritschlians themselves do not always go the right way to work to make converts or to conciliate opponents. I have in my mind a particular book which may be considered to be among the classics of the party, Prof. Wilhelm Herrmann's *Communion with God*.<sup>1</sup> I doubt if any other book produced by it has a wider reputation. And a great deal may be forgiven to Prof. Herrmann. He so evidently has the root of the matter, and so evidently knows in his own person what communion

<sup>1</sup> Curiously enough, the English translation of this book gives the author's name as Willibald; but this appears to be a mistake.

with God really means. But just on this ground one is the more surprised that the book should be so disfigured by perpetual polemics. Fortunately for myself, I only possess the English translation made from the second edition, from which we are told that a good deal of this element has been removed. I hardly like to guess what the first edition must have been. The author has two bugbears against which he is continually tilting: orthodox dogma is one, and Roman Catholicism is the other. All his piety goes out towards Luther. We can see that it is a real pleasure to him whenever he can find Luther in the right; and he does produce many excellent sayings, which really tend to warm our hearts towards the man. But he is not less bent on putting the other things I have named in the wrong. To insist on putting the best construction on your own side, and the worst construction on your neighbour's is not the way to ingratiate yourself with a reader who has any wish to be impartial. There are, no doubt, extenuating circumstances: the book was written a good many years ago (in 1886), when the position was different from what it is now. The 'Kulturkampf' was still fresh in men's minds, and the awakening that has since come over the Church of Rome, and especially over Roman Catholic scholarship, was still in the future. The more generous spirits in Germany look upon their old antagonists with different eyes. But there is still not a little to be done. With us, half—or

perhaps a third—of the thinking classes in the nation have been converted, but a good deal of the old fanaticism still survives. However, things are moving in the right direction, and the next generation will see a marked change. The time is, I hope, not far distant when Roman and Anglican and Free Churchman and Lutheran will only emulate each other in good works and in the search for deeper truth side by side.

Besides the two opponents that I have mentioned, Prof. Herrmann has yet a third in Mysticism. Here he touches a point that is important for our more immediate subject. But I must reserve the discussion of this for the next lecture.



## V

### COMPARISON OF THE TWO TYPES



## V

### COMPARISON OF THE TWO TYPES

At the end of the last lecture we were left with two distinct types of Christology confronting each other. They might be described in many different ways. I have called one the 'fuller type' and the other the 'reduced type'. The first is really the present-day expression of traditional Christianity. The other might be considered to be, in different degrees according to the form it took, a product of Modernism.

Most English or British or Anglo-American teaching in what are sometimes called the orthodox bodies conforms more or less to the first type. The other is represented mainly in Continental Protestantism. By this I do not mean that this particular type of Christology and Continental Protestantism are at all co-extensive; but only that in certain characteristic and influential circles—influential especially from the point of view of theological teaching in the Universities—that type of Christology has a certain predominance.

Towards the close of the lecture I took upon me to express the hope that we in England, notwithstanding our own preferences, would not undervalue this other teaching. I hoped that we should look

at its positive side, which is very real ; and I hoped that we should make full allowance for its context, or for the habits of thought that go with it, which in some ways differ considerably from our own.

From this latter point of view—from the point of view, that is, of an improved mutual understanding between the various bodies concerned—I should attach considerable importance to a book recently published by Dr. James Denney of Glasgow. Dr. Denney's name will be well known to many here as Professor in the United Free Church College, Glasgow, and as one of the ablest and most influential of Scottish Presbyterian theologians at the present time. He is distinctly and strongly on the conservative side on most of the questions of theology and criticism which he discusses. I imagine that I should not be wrong if I were to describe his position as before all things *Biblical*. The historical and traditional element in opinion has not the same interest for him that it has for most Anglicans, though he is by no means opposed to tradition as such. At the same time he has an intelligent knowledge of modern criticism, and takes full account of critical views, while his own attitude is usually on the defensive. Perhaps the book by which he would be best known is one on *The Death of Christ*, which is now in its 6th edition, and which is nearer to the standpoint of the late Dr. Dale than any of those lately published on the same subject. The work of his to which I have just referred has

for its full title *Jesus and the Gospel: Christianity justified in the Mind of Christ* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1908): it is an energetic defence of the full deity of our Lord as implied in the New Testament generally, and as required by the Synoptic Gospels (studied in the sense of a moderate criticism) as much as by the writings of St. Paul and St. John. Dr. Denney has, however, this in common with the Ritschlian School, that he looks throughout especially at the religious value of the doctrine involved. He has evidently, for his own part, no wish to challenge the theology of the Creeds; but he puts Christian experience and Christian life before metaphysical formulae, and would be prepared to reduce these within the limits necessary to sustain Christian practice. He is not in favour of subscription to theological creeds, but he goes so far as to suggest that the essence of the Christian faith might be expressed in brief terms: 'I believe in God through Jesus Christ His only Son, our Lord and Saviour' (p. 398). Dr. Denney himself would take each term of this confession in a pregnant sense. For instance, the title 'Lord' would include a reference to the Resurrection as being properly applied to Christ exalted and glorified.

<sup>1</sup> With Dr. Denney's book may be mentioned, as similar to it in character, though not quite its equal in strength, the sober and well equipped work of the Rev. C. F. Nolloth, *The Person of Our Lord and Recent Thought* (London, 1908), and an able book from the other side of the Atlantic, *The Lord of Glory*, by Prof. B. B. Warfield of Princeton (London, 1907).

I am afraid we are still a long way from having before us for our consideration the conditions of the complete reunion of Christendom. But no harm is done by such very tentative anticipations of the time when that great question may be more directly raised. And I cannot help pointing out how far such a formula as that suggested would go towards supplying a meeting-ground between the two Christologies of which I have been speaking. The mere contemplation of such a meeting-ground, wholly apart from any question of practical politics, would be of no slight value.

There is another light in which the Ritschlian watchword of 'God in Christ', with the whole body of positive teaching of which it forms as it were the apex and summary, may be of use, and even great use, to us for whom that teaching as a whole would be inadequate. We may take it as an 'irreducible minimum' of what Christianity means for us. In all those questions that are connected with or arise out of intercourse with others it is helpful to have an irreducible minimum before one's mind.

And there is yet another way in which Ritschlian teaching may be useful to us. Our minds are full of beliefs which in the aggregate form our conception of Christianity. But these beliefs are not all in an equal degree *verifiable*; some are more verifiable, and others less. Now I think it may be said that Ritschlianism, and the allied forms of opinion, while

they are no doubt eclectic, do as a matter of fact bring together those parts and aspects of Christianity which are most verifiable. And it cannot but be a real advantage for us, however much further our own beliefs may extend, yet to have that which is most verifiable in them collected and brought together in a compact body.

And there is an additional advantage for us in England. If we set ourselves deliberately to look at Ritschlianism and its allies in this light, viz., as embracing the most verifiable portions of our own beliefs, we shall approach these external forms of teaching in a more sympathetic and friendly spirit, and with a higher expectation of deriving benefit from them for ourselves. My own conviction—and I may say, experience—is that they are capable of being of the greatest benefit to us.

There is a body of literature in Germany that cannot be easily matched in this country. At the head of it would be a comprehensive work like Wernle's *Einführung in das theologische Studium* (Tübingen, 1908), and it would include many books, large and small, by Bousset, Jülicher, von Soden, Johannes Weiss, and Harnack, whose famous lectures on *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1900) set an example in one class, as his recent critical studies, from *Lukas der Arzt* (1906) onwards, have done in another. In these writings there is, on the one hand a workmanlike completeness of scholarship, and on the other hand a warmth and freshness of

treatment in close touch with reality, to which we find it hard to attain. There are indeed just at this moment encouraging signs among us, especially in our younger scholars, of the combination of these qualities; but, if we take the literary output of the last ten years, we are as much behindhand as the Germans have been conspicuously ahead of us.

What I wish to suggest is that, if we approach this literature, not as competing with or directed aggressively against our own beliefs but rather as co-operating with us in the presentment of the most verifiable portion of those beliefs, we shall make it available for our own purposes and enjoy its admirable qualities with less of the reserve that is due to the feeling of friction and antagonism.

Having now, as I hope, done something to mitigate the opposition between the two types of thought between which we have more or less to make a choice—for they are really two types of thought, which, while they culminate in Christology, are by no means confined to it, but spread out over a wide surface—I can with a clearer conscience go on to state the other side, or in other words to set forth the differences which separate the more contracted position from our own.

In regard to Christology, the first and most obvious difference is the difference of method, the much broader basis on which the higher Christology (if I may so describe it) rests. On the other side the

tendency has been more and more to withdraw within the lines of the Synoptic Gospels, and even within them to restrict the standpoint to the oldest documents that are critically ascertainable. The endeavour has been to elicit from these as much as can be discovered of the self-consciousness of Christ, and to take that as the whole and sole criterion of any constructive doctrine as to His Person. Both sides would agree that the appeal must be made to this. No doctrine can hold good that can be proved to be inconsistent with what is revealed to us of the consciousness of Christ; our estimate of His Person cannot go beyond His own. But we must not be too ready to assume that we possess anything like a complete knowledge of what that estimate was. If we had been in possession of an autograph document by our Lord Himself, setting down in plain terms His own account of His relation to the Father, that of course would have been final and we should have needed nothing else. But the materials that we have in the Synoptic Gospels, or in the documents so far as they can be reconstructed which underlie those Gospels, come very far short of this. It is doubtless our duty to make the most we can of these materials, to collect all the hints and indications which they supply. But after all they are hints and side allusions, rather than anything in the way of direct statement; and we must use them as such. That means that our data are very partial, and we must not treat them as though they were

complete. The arguments which critics draw from the extant data are very largely arguments from silence ; and such arguments must in this case be specially precarious. It is an old story that the eye sees and the ear hears what they bring with them the power of seeing and hearing. We are really dependent not only on such fragments of narrative and discourse as time and chance have left to us, but we are also dependent on the limits to the intelligence and insight of those who originally set down those fragments in writing. The more we realize what are the conditions under which this part of our knowledge comes to us, the more we shall feel how inadequate it is to erect a solid edifice upon, and the more we shall be driven to utilize any further evidence that has survived.

As a matter of fact, besides the Synoptic Gospels, we have all the rest of the New Testament. And the difference between the two positions I have been describing is that one does, and the other does not, make a substantial use of this further evidence. It is true that critical writers from time to time speak of the impression which Jesus Christ made upon His contemporaries as an element in the estimate which must be formed of Him. But our complaint is that on one ground or another they explain this away, or at least do not give it the weight that it deserves. It is really the case that, broadly speaking, all the rest of the New Testament, with more or less of emphasis according to circum-

stances, *θεολογεί τὸν Χριστόν*, treats of Christ as God; and the Church Universal has done the same from the time of the Apostles until now. I do not think that the weight of that evidence can rightly be explained away. It (or rather the Biblical part of it) is set out at length impressively by Dr. Denney in the book of which I have spoken.

No doubt these other New Testament writers, beginning with St. Paul, express this common belief of theirs in categories of the time; and those categories are no longer as living as they were. But apart from any such temporary expression, we can see that there was a very great force at work, and I find it difficult to think that the language used to describe it overshot the mark.

I do not wish to invoke writers like St. Paul and St. John merely as authorities who are not to be questioned. I am content to take them as witnesses to the effect upon their own minds and upon those around them. And I doubt if this effect can be understood without introducing factors that would be called mystical.

St. Paul uses language that is extremely strong. He was evidently conscious of a great transformation that had taken place in himself. He refers this transformation to the exalted Christ or the Spirit of Christ. He felt an immense change from his old self to his new self (Gal. ii. 20); and he does not seem to have any doubt that this change was produced in him by spiritual action from without.

He also assumes that a like change could be operated in others. He uses a remarkable metaphor: in Gal. iv. 19 he speaks of Christ being formed as an embryo within the soul. He (St. Paul) has himself set the processes in motion which are to have this extraordinary result; but he does not himself do more than set them in motion. Clearly he is projecting his own experience into the consciousness of others. He assumes that the effect wrought within himself will be repeated in them; and the strangely vivid metaphor that he uses seems alone adequate to his purpose.

It might be thought that we were pressing a metaphor too hard if these two passages of St. Paul's had stood alone. But in the writings of St. Paul himself they are very far from standing alone; they are only salient expressions of an experience to which he is constantly referring. In fact, the whole of the eighth chapter of Romans may be taken as an exposition of this experience. There is nothing more fundamental in the Pauline psychology. And then, with a little variation of phrase, a like experience and a like psychology are implied in the writings that bear the name of St. John. This is one of the most remarkable points of contact between the Gospel and the Revelation. Thus we read in the Gospel (xiv. 23), 'If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him'; and in Rev. iii. 20, 'Behold, I stand at

the door and knock : if any man hear my voice and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me.' And the metaphor of indwelling or abiding is a well-known connecting link between the Gospel and the First Epistle. In the New Testament language of this kind is strongly established and deeply ingrained ; and the New Testament has in this respect furnished a model which the experience of Christians has followed all down the centuries. Many of the examples have left a deep mark on devotional literature. One of the most important recent books is a searching examination of a case of this kind — *The Mystical Element of Religion as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends*, by Baron Friedrich von Hügel (London, 1908).

Now I am aware that a higher and a lower interpretation may be put upon these experiences. But I am more and more inclined to think that the lower interpretation is an instance of the mistaken attempt to unduly narrow and restrict both the aspirations of the human soul and the modes of divine response in which they find their satisfaction.

There are many ways in which the question of what I have called comprehensively 'Mysticism' comes in.

We have, I think, most of us the feeling that there is something *inclusive* in the life and mission of our Lord ; we cannot in His case lay stress on 'the single life', 'the single soul', as we can in our

own. We feel sure that it was no accident that the title which he habitually chose for Himself, 'Son of Man,' meant strictly in the usage of the time 'Man', i. e. man collectively or in the abstract. There are places in the Gospels where we could almost substitute Humanity for the Son of Man; as conspicuously in that well-known passage, 'The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath: so that the Son of man is lord even of the sabbath' (St. Mark ii. 28). I do not indeed go with those critics who think that in this passage, and in others like it, as originally spoken our Lord meant man collectively or in the abstract without reference to Himself. I believe that He meant Humanity as gathered up in Himself. I take it that such a passage as this is an intimation of the kind of outlook with which the title was used. Antecedently we might have inferred that it must have associations of this kind. I have said elsewhere that I have little doubt that our Lord made what in one of ourselves we should call a profound study of all the places in the Old Testament where this phrase 'son of man' occurs. I agree with most scholars at the present time that the most direct line of suggestion came to our Lord, ultimately at least, from Dan. vii. 13. But the choice of the title and its personal application were one thing, and the meaning read into it was another. One of the most prominent passages which helped to determine that meaning was Ps. viii. 4, 'What is man that thou art mindful

of him? And the son of man that thou visitest him?' The original subject of the psalm was Man in the sense of Mankind or Humanity. But the significant way in which the psalm is discussed and applied in Heb. ii. 6-9 shows how easy it was to pass from Man in the abstract to the one representative Man. And there is much in the Gospels to show how conscious our Lord was of His own representative character; notably the great passage (which is beyond the reach of invention and in close harmony with other language of Jesus, though too many critics have cast doubt upon it) Matt. xxv. 31-46, 'Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren,' &c.

Another important set of passages would be those in which St. Paul speaks of the First and Second Adam (Rom. v. 12-19; 1 Cor. xv. 20-22, 45-49). In all these places the exact nature of the representation or inclusion is left open; and it is interesting and instructive to compare the interpretations which recent writers have given of them. Some are especially noteworthy.

This, for instance, is Dr. Denney's comment on Rom. v. 12 ff.:—

This is the conception which lends itself most readily to what are usually called 'mystical' interpretations of Christ's life and work. What is most important in it is the truth which it embodies of the kinship of Christ with all mankind, and the progressive verification of that truth which comes with the universal preaching of the gospel. Paul was

convinced of the representative character of Christ and of all His acts ; the death that He died for all has somehow the significance that the death of all would itself have ; in His resurrection we see the firstfruits of a new race which shall wear the image of the heavenly man. It may indeed be said that any man is kin to all humanity, but not any man is kin in such a sense that men of all races can find their centre and rallying-point in Him. The progress of Christian missions is the demonstration in point of fact that Christ is the second Adam, and while His true humanity is asserted in this, as it is taken for granted everywhere in the New Testament, it leaves Him still in a place which is His alone. When Paul thinks of Christ as the second Adam, he does not reduce Him to the level of common humanity, as if He were only one more in the mass ; on the contrary, the mass is conceived as absorbed and summed up in Him. It is not a way of denying, it is one way more of asserting, His peculiar place (*Jesus and the Gospel*, p. 34 f.).

That is not mysticism, but it shows the approach made towards mysticism by a mind to which it is not naturally congenial.

Not less striking—indeed in any case very helpful—is Dr. Edwin A. Abbott's paraphrastic expansion of the passage in Heb. ii, in his recent book *The Message of the Son of Man* (London, 1909), p. 83 :—

Such a 'chief-and-leader' of the sons of man, not ashamed to call them brethren, might carry his fellow-soldiers with him in a way impossible for any angel. Placing himself at their head, he might make them feel that they are his limbs, his body.

Or he might be said to draw his followers into himself, or to breathe his spirit into them. Whatever metaphor we may choose to express the deed, the doer makes them one with himself. Then, being himself Son of God, and one with God, such a son of man draws the other sons of man into unity with his Father and their Father in heaven. Such appears to be the argument of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And it seems to be in conformity with Christ's doctrine and with our own experience of the links between human beings. It is expressed in the Fourth Gospel by the words 'I ascend unto my Father and your Father', that is to say, 'unto my Father, whom, through me, you have been led to recognise as your Father'.

Observe the subtle and skilful way in which the meaning of leadership is so drawn out to the uttermost as virtually to amount to union. This is done by the help of a variety of metaphors, all of which are Biblical. But I am not quite sure whether or not Dr. Abbott intends to commit himself absolutely to the doctrine that is commonly called 'mystical union'.

The two writers about whom there can be no doubt whatever in this respect are Dr. Moberly and Dr. Du Bose. There are one or two passages in Dr. Moberly's *Atonement and Personality* that have become almost classical on this subject (see especially pp. 86-91, 254 f., 281-286). I must allow myself one or two short extracts from these pages, to show how absolute is the union assumed between humanity and Christ, and how absolutely the key to

that union is sought in the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, which is the Spirit of Christ and of God.

To think of [Christ] merely in the light of the ordinary possibilities of others, to think of the significance, or power, of His humanity as limited to His sole individual self-hood, is incompatible with the very existence and meaning of the Church. He alone was not generically but inclusively man [i. e. He is not to be classed among men, but in some sense embraces or includes them]. . . . That complete indwelling and possessing of even one other, which the yearnings of man towards man imperfectly approach, is only possible, in any fulness of the words, to that Spirit of Man which is the Spirit of God: to the Spirit of God, become, through Incarnation, the Spirit of Man. No mere man indwells, in spirit, in, or as, the spirit of another. Whatever near approach there may be seen to be towards this, is really mediated through the Spirit of Christ. . . . As it is, the very essence of the Christian religion is the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ. . . . If there is one corollary from the Deity of Christ, which, more than another, we may defy any man to eradicate from New Testament theology, without shivering the whole into fragments, it is the truth of the recapitulation and inclusion of the Church, which is, ideally at least, as wide as humanity, *in Christ* (pp. 87-91).

And again:—

For the reality of our own relation to the atonement, which is its consummation in respect of each one of us, everything unreservedly turns upon the reality of our identification, in spirit, with the Spirit of Jesus Christ. In proportion to our essential distinctness, and remoteness from Him, is our

distinctness, and remoteness, from the consummation of Atonement. . . . Even if, in a sense, we may consent to speak of vicarious *penitence*; yet it is not exactly vicarious. He indeed consummated penitence in Himself, before the eyes, and before the hearts, of men who were not penitent themselves. But He did so, not in the sense that they were not to repent, or that His penitence was a substitute for theirs. He did so, not as a substitute, not even as a delegated representative, but as that *inclusive total of true Humanity*<sup>1</sup>, of which they are potentially, and were to learn to become, a part. . . . It is not by becoming like Him that men will approach towards incorporation with Him: but by result of incorporation with Him, received in faith as a gift, and in faith adored, *and used*, that they will become like Him. It is by the imparted gift, itself far more than natural, of literal membership in Him; by the indwelling presence, the gradually disciplining and dominating influence, of His Spirit—which is His very Self within, and as, the inmost breath of our most secret being; that the power of His atoning life and death, which is the power of divinely victorious holiness, can grow to be the very deepest reality of ourselves. . . . It is the Spirit of Christ which constitutes the Pentecostal Church. The Church means nothing but this. It is the perpetuity of the Presence, it is the living Temple, of God Incarnate—no longer in the midst of, but within, men (pp. 283–285).

In my last book, *The Life of Christ in Recent Research* (Oxford, 1907), I ventured to reprint a review in which I had pointed out that on the subject before us the teaching of Dr. Du Bose

<sup>1</sup> These italics are mine, all the others are in the original.

entirely coincides with that of the Oxford Professor. I made the mistake of saying (op. cit. p. 310) that Dr. Du Bose, in speaking of the 'universal humanity of Christ' (which is his equivalent for Dr. Moberly's 'inclusive humanity'), implied rather than expressed the explanation of it by reference to the Holy Spirit. It happened that I had before me at the time only the second volume of Dr. Du Bose's trilogy, *The Gospel according to St. Paul* (New York and London, 1907); and I believe it is true that in this volume the reference to the Holy Spirit is understood and not expressed. But in the earlier volume, *The Gospel in the Gospels* (1906), the point had been abundantly anticipated. I ought just to illustrate this:—

That Spirit was His own without measure, not only to have but to impart. Of His fulness we all received, and grace for grace. Through that eternal Spirit He offered up Himself without spot to God, and the selfsame Spirit in us is the inspiration and the power of all love and service and sacrifice. The Spirit was the distinctive promise of God in the Gospel . . . If the objective fact of Christianity culminated on Easter, Pentecost was marked by a subjective revolution in relation and in response to that fact that was quite its complement and most effectually its completion . . . The Word, as I have frequently said, is the principle and medium of objective revelation. The Spirit is that of subjective apprehension, comprehension, and appropriation. Deep answereth unto deep. The deep of God without us and above us is inaudible save as it is answered by the deep of God within us. There is

no gospel or salvation for us which does not come by the Word through the Spirit (op. cit. pp. 242-246).

And a little later:—

All the reality in the universe can be no Gospel to us so long as it remains objective, or until it enters into living relation with ourselves . . . What is necessary within ourselves to give effect to all that is true without us is a corresponding response, or a response of correspondence, on our part. That correspondence is, I repeat, not a fact of natural relationship, but an act of spiritual communication or self-impartation. When the Spirit bears witness with our spirit, that we are sons of God, it is not only God who communicates the gracious fact, but it is God who awakens the humble and grateful response, and puts it into our heart to say, Abba, Father. . . . It was in this eternal Spirit that the whole creation in humanity offered itself without spot to God in the person of Jesus Christ; and in that consummate act fulfilled His relation to it through realizing its own relation with Him. It is through this eternal Spirit, which is God's and Christ's and ours, that we pass from ourselves into Christ and through Christ into God (pp. 286, 287).

It would be impossible to have a more direct, comprehensive, and emphatic assertion of the doctrine that we call Mysticism, than that which is found in these two writers. There was a time when I should have very much hesitated to give any kind of endorsement to this teaching myself. But now it seems to me to be after all nothing more than a Christian application of the belief for

which philosophy prepares us in the Divine Immanence. The doctrine is strictly Biblical; indeed it gives the deepest and fullest meaning possible to Biblical language. It is no less thoroughly in accord with the main lines of ancient orthodoxy. It might perhaps be supposed by any one not theologically instructed that difficulties might be raised in connexion with the doctrine of the Trinity; but that is not the case: the theory is perfectly consistent with that doctrine accurately stated. From various quarters of late warnings have come that the popular view of the doctrine verges dangerously upon Tritheism. It is this tendency which has given to the doctrine an appearance of rigidity which does not really belong to it. I should rather expect opposition in this country from writers like Dr. Denney, and from the German theologians, most of whom are averse to mystical solutions.

If, however, there is truth in the doctrine of Divine Immanence—if, that is, there is implanted in us a seed, that is capable of indefinite expansion, of the truly divine—then we have put in our hands an analogy which may go some way to explain other difficulties of the Incarnation. The presence of this divine element, whatever it is—the Christian would say, the working of the Holy Spirit even in its highest degree—is seen to be no wise incompatible with the fullest humanity; it operates deep down at the roots of being, and leaves the external expression in speech and action, not less

thoroughly and completely, but only more perfectly human.

The full recognition of this fact will determine the shape of that constructive attempt at a modern Christology that I hope, if all's well, to offer next term. I shall aim at doing justice to both sides of the problem; I believe that, when we come to the point, it will be seen to be not only possible but natural to do justice to both sides of it—to assert at one and the same time the full humanity of our Lord without detriment to His deity, and the real deity without detriment to the humanity.

Events move fast. Only within the last few days I have been reading the supplement to *The Hibbert Journal* discussing the question *Jesus or Christ?*, which might be taken as a summary description of those two types of Christology of which we have been speaking. I hope to return to this in more detail next term. My first impression is that the volume carries us distinctly a step forward. We see in it a great variety of minds approaching the subject in a great variety of ways. There is of course not a little negation mixed with what is positive. And yet, if I am not mistaken, the total outcome seems to me both helpful and hopeful. It seems to me that we can put the negations into their proper place, and at the same time plant our feet upon our own ground more firmly than before.



VI

PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A MODERN  
CHRISTOLOGY



## VI

### PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A MODERN CHRISTOLOGY

IN recent years considerable attention has been paid to a department of Psychology which in previous times was hardly recognized as coming within the range of Psychology at all. Sir W. Hamilton defined Psychology as 'the Science conversant about the phaenomena or modifications, or States of the Mind, or Conscious Subject, or Soul or Spirit, or Self or Ego'.<sup>1</sup> It will be observed here that the phrase 'Conscious Subject' has slipped in—and we cannot be surprised that it should do so, as the conscious states of the mind were the first that presented themselves for analysis and it might naturally seem as though Psychology were confined to these. That, however, is not really the case ; and it is more and more coming to be seen that the unconscious and semi-conscious states are also of great importance and deserve all the study that can be given to them. Prof. W. James uses more unqualified language than I have ventured to do, and writes as though the inclusion of these states were a discovery made at a comparatively recent and definite date. He says (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 233):—

I cannot but think that the most important step

<sup>1</sup> *Metaph.* I. viii. 129 ; see Murray, *New Eng. Dict.* s.v. 'Psychology'.

forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery, first made in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious<sup>1</sup> facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most important step forward, because, unlike the other advances which psychology has made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of human nature. No other step forward which psychology has made can proffer any such claim as this.

For us in England the recognition of this wider field of psychology is chiefly associated with the late F. W. H. Myers and the Society of Psychical Research; and indeed I am not sure that the precise date given by Prof. James is not really referable to the same source. For a number of years the conception of which I am speaking, if it was not confined to, had its principal focus in the more or less private transactions of the Psychical Society. It was employed especially in the discussion of the particular class of phenomena to which the Society devoted itself. Prof. James himself gave it a wider application and introduced it before a wider public,

<sup>1</sup> The use of this word does not seem to be quite consistent—it certainly includes facts some of which would be described as sub- or unconscious; the phrase corresponds to the 'more comprehensive consciousness' of the next quotation.

especially in his Gifford Lectures published in 1902. In the next year followed the posthumous publication of an elaborate work in two volumes by Mr. Myers under the title *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*. The author had died on January 17, 1901; but his book was practically complete, and set forth his ideas in full, with a special nomenclature of his own. An abridged edition was published in 1907.

Mr. Myers possessed a literary gift of a high order, and it is worth while to quote in his own words a few of the sentences which express the way in which the subject presented itself to him and in which he presents it.

The 'conscious-Self' of each of us, as we call it—the empirical, the supraliminal Self, as I should prefer to say,—does not comprise the whole of the consciousness or of the faculty within us. There exists a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder faculty, which for the most part remains potential only so far as regards the life of earth, but from which the consciousness and the faculty of earth-life are mere selections, and which reasserts itself in its plenitude after the liberating change of death. . . . The idea of a *threshold* (*limen*, *Schwelle*) of consciousness—of a level above which sensation or thought must rise before it can enter into our conscious life—is a simple and familiar one. The word *subliminal*,—meaning 'beneath the threshold'—has already been used to define those sensations which are too feeble to be individually recognized. I propose to extend the meaning of the term, so as to make it cover *all* that takes place beneath the

ordinary threshold, or say, if preferred, outside the ordinary margin of consciousness;—not only those faint stimulations whose very faintness keeps them submerged, but much else which psychology as yet scarcely recognizes; sensations, thoughts, emotions, which may be strong, definite, and independent, but which, by the original constitution of our being, seldom emerge into that *supraliminal* current of consciousness which we habitually identify with *ourselves*. . . . I find it permissible and convenient to speak of subliminal Selves, or more briefly of a subliminal Self. I do not indeed by using this term assume that there are two correlative and parallel selves existing always within each of us. Rather I mean by the subliminal Self that part of the Self which is commonly subliminal; and I conceive that there may be—not only *co-operations* between these quasi-independent trains of thought—but also upheavals and alternations of personality of many kinds, so that what was once below the surface may for a time, or permanently, rise above it. And I conceive also that no Self of which we can here have cognizance is in reality more than a fragment of a larger Self—revealed in a fashion at once shifting and limited through an organism not so framed as to afford it full manifestation (*Human Personality*, 1907, pp. 13–15).

This is an interesting statement of the theory by its real author. For us, from our present point of view, the main drawback is that it was conceived from the first for a particular limited purpose and that the whole form which it assumes was guided by that purpose. Mr. Myers had constantly before his mind a certain set of phenomena, which it was his chief interest to digest, correlate, and, so far as

possible, explain. The limitation was perfectly natural and legitimate, and I can only be glad that such an examination of phenomena that are often simply despised and ignored should have been undertaken. But for the purpose at present before us these phenomena must be regarded as for the most part abnormal, or at least peripheral rather than central.

I am myself inclined to believe that the question of what we may follow his example of calling subliminal consciousness and subliminal activities is destined to be of much importance and (I would even hope) of much value in the future of theology as well as of psychology. It ought, however, to be worked out on the ground of psychology first by the disinterested methods of psychological science, and then on the foundation thus laid the theologian may build. As yet, so far as I can gather, a great deal remains to be done.

My attention was caught by a book on *The Subconscious* (London, Boston, and New York, 1906) by Professor Joseph Jastrow of the University of Wisconsin, and I hoped that this might produce something. So it does to some extent, but I found the outcome disappointing. There is a certain air of alertness and intelligence about the book; but the style is painful. It seems to consist almost wholly of metaphor, and the metaphors crowd in one on the top of another, while there is a general lack of scientific precision (want of exact references

and the like). The book that has been to me most really helpful is Prof. William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* (London, 1902).

It should be noted that the terms I have just used cover much the same ground as the older term 'unconscious cerebration', which appears to have been coined by Dr. W. B. Carpenter about the year 1853<sup>1</sup> to express that unconscious action of the brain which produces the same kind of results as conscious thought. It is just the deepest and the most far-reaching mental activities that appear to do their work in this way. I can well believe that there have been many anticipations of the train of thought that I am about to follow at different times in the past; but its more direct antecedents in my own case are those of which I have spoken.

Besides the upper region of consciousness there is a lower region into which the conscious mind cannot enter. It cannot enter, and yet it possesses a strange magnetic power by which the contents of the lower region are as it were drawn upwards and brought within the range of its cognition. This lower region is a storehouse of experiences of the most varied kinds, in fact of all the experiences that make up human life. It is filled with images left by the senses—not only with the images of sights and sounds, but with those left by the other more restricted senses of touch and taste and smell.

<sup>1</sup> See *New Eng. Dict.* s.v. 'Cerebration'.

Not only is the lower region of which I speak filled with these to an extent that seems incredible—it seems incredible that room can anywhere be found within this little organism of ours for the endless multitude of sensible impressions—but, in addition to these and intermingled with them, there are the more complex experiences of past thought and past emotion. In some form or other they must be there, and from this inner cornucopia one never knows what will come forth—whether it will be weighty memories of the greater shocks of life, its deepest tragedies and its highest joys, or whether it will be things the most trivial and insignificant. And—most wonderful of all—these impressions, experiences, inferences, principles, which so crowd and jostle each other down below, are not so many passive and disconnected items (like dried peas in a bottle) but they are endowed with an active power of combining and recombining, of modifying and being modified, so that when they come up to the surface again it is often in quite different shapes from those in which they sank beneath it.

All these things are latent. The door of that treasure-house, which is also a workshop, is locked, so far as the conscious personality is concerned. For it there is no ‘harrowing of hell’, no triumphant descent into the nether world, followed by a release and return of captives on any large scale. The door is locked against any such violent irruption. And yet, in some strange way, there seem to be open

chinks and crevices through which there is a constant coming and going, denizens or manufactured products of the lower world returning to the upper air of consciousness and once more entering into the train and sequence of what we call active life, though indeed the invisible processes of this life are just as active as the visible.

It appears to be the function of the subconscious and unconscious states to *feed* the conscious. There is that continual movement from below upwards of which I have been speaking. A never-ending train of images, memories, and ideas keeps emerging into the light. But only in part are they subject to the will and conscious reason. Only in part do they come *at call*. And only in part do they come in fully organized form.

The phenomena of sleep and dreams seem to belong to a sort of midway condition. They are in part organized and articulated. They present a succession of pictures, which as pictures are like those which occur in the waking state; but they are wanting in method. They are like a faggot of sticks without any band to hold them together. There is no connected meaning in them. The controlling power is dormant, and does not shape them to any practical end.

And yet the region of the unconscious and subconscious is no mere chaos. The processes that go on there must be to a large extent processes of differentiation and combination. Problems that

baffle the waking mind often seem to find their solution, or to make steps towards solution, in ways that are beyond its ken. The next time that the intractable problem comes up into thought, it is with its worst tangles wholly or partially unravelled.

The lower region corresponds to the upper in not being all of one moral colour. It contains the same potentialities of good and bad. If the dominant impulses and influences in conscious thought and life are good, then the dominant impulses and influences in the unconscious state will be good also; and vice versa. The under-world is a repetition or reflexion of the upper-world. In the one, not less than in the other, character is moulded. And, though the processes are not seen and cannot be followed, their results appear in the conscious responsible acts and thoughts of the waking man.

The wonderful thing is that, while the unconscious and subconscious processes are (generally speaking) similar in kind to the conscious, they surpass them in degree. They are subtler, intenser, further-reaching, more penetrating. It is something more than a mere metaphor when we describe the sub- and unconscious states as more 'profound'. It is in these states, or through them, that miracles are wrought—especially those connected with personality. They doubtless played the largest part in the historical miracles of the Gospels, just as they are to this day most active in what we are still inclined to call miracles, the more successful

examples of efforts that often fall short of success,

The high that proved too high, the heroic for  
earth too hard,

The passion that left the ground to lose itself  
in the sky.

It was evidently this 'supernormal' character, or these supernormal possibilities, which caused Mr. F. W. H. Myers to have recourse to the 'subliminal self' in order to explain such phenomena as telepathy or hypnotism. To us too it offers itself—but quite as much within the normal as the supernormal sphere—as, if not exactly furnishing an explanation, yet at least pointing where an explanation is to be sought, of many of the phenomena of religion.

I had written so far without any conscious reference to Prof. William James; but I find myself practically taking up the inquiry very much at the point where he had left it. Towards the end of his *Varieties of Religious Experience* (pp. 511 ff.) he wrote as follows:—

The *subconscious self* is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity; and I believe that in it we have exactly the mediating term required. Apart from all religious considerations, there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of. The exploration of the transmarginal field has hardly yet been seriously undertaken, but what Mr. Myers said in 1892 in his essay on the Subliminal Consciousness is as true as when it was first written: 'Each of us is in reality an abiding psychical entity far more exten-

sive than he knows—an individuality which can never express itself completely through any corporeal manifestation. The Self manifests through organism; but there is always some part of the Self unmanifested; and always, as it seems, some power of organic expression in abeyance or reserve.' Much of the content of this larger background against which our conscious being stands out in relief is insignificant. . . . But in it many of the performances of genius seem also to have their origin; and in our study of conversion, of mystical experiences, and of prayer, we have seen how striking a part invasions from this region play in the religious life.

Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its *farther* side, the 'more'<sup>1</sup> with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its *hither* side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary theologian lacks. At the same time the theologian's contention that the religious man is moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take on objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external control. In the religious life the control is felt as 'higher'; but since on our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our own hidden mind which are controlling, the sense of union with the power

<sup>1</sup> Compare p. 508: 'He becomes conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a *more* of the same quantity, which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck.'

beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally true.

This doorway into the subject seems to me the best one for a science of religions, for it mediates between a number of different points of view. . . . Disregarding the over-beliefs, and confining ourselves to what is common and generic, we have in *the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self, through which saving experiences come*, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, *is literally and objectively true as far as it goes*<sup>1</sup>. . . . Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose. So far as our ideal impulses originate in this region (and most of them do originate in it, for we find them possessing us in a way for which we cannot articulately account), we belong to it in a more intimate sense than that in which we belong to the visible world, for we belong in the most intimate sense wherever our ideals belong. Yet the unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. When we commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for we are turned into new men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow in the natural world upon our regenerative change. But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical world unreal.

God is the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the name of God. We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to His influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. The universe, at those parts of

<sup>1</sup> The italics are in the original.

it which our personal being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the worse or for the better in proportion as each one of us fulfils or evades God's demands. As far as this goes I probably have you with me, for I only translate into schematic language what I may call the instinctive belief of mankind: God is real since He produces real effects.

So far Prof. James. I am glad to have the statement of a philosopher to build on, and all the more glad to be able to call as witness a philosopher who tells us expressly (p. 379) that he has no bias in favour of mysticism. In spite of this want of sympathy he lays down 'that personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness' (ibid.), and also that 'mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come' (p. 422). It is true that he goes on to add that these states have no authority for those who do not share in them, and true also that he seeks to weaken the consensus in their favour by pointing to the diversity of opinion with which they are accompanied. I cannot say that this argument weighs with me strongly, because the same central belief is quite compatible with different contexts and different inferences. It is this central fact of Mysticism that seems to me to be so abundantly attested.

I should explain that by 'mysticism' I mean the belief in the union of man with God and by 'Chris-

tian mysticism' I mean the union of the human spirit with the Spirit of Christ, who is also the Spirit of God. There is this specific character about Christian mysticism that it is not so vague and indeterminate as other forms, but that it starts from the full conception of Christ; the belief in the Spirit of Christ—i. e. in the exalted Christ as Spirit—never forgets its origin; there are blended with it the features of the historical Christ, which impart to it a richness and power of human appeal, which other more abstract forms of mysticism do not possess.

A recent paper by Prof. Lütgert of Halle (in *Theol. Litteraturbericht* for April, 1909) calls attention to the revived interest in mysticism and study of its phenomena. Dr. Lütgert points out that (in Germany at least) this revived interest and study is not so much in the narrower circle of professed theologians as in the wider circle just outside of but in touch with these; and he makes it clear that the mystical view of things will have to be taken account of more seriously. This conclusion would have been considerably strengthened if the writer had had before him the English and American theological literature of the last decade as well as the German. In this country and in America the movement has been more central and more directly connected with the Theological Faculties. The chief impulse to it was given by Dr. Moberly's *Atonement and Personality* (London, 1901). But this had been to some extent

anticipated by Dr. W. R. Inge's *Christian Mysticism* (the Bampton Lectures for 1899); and the same gifted writer has since kept recurring to the subject, especially in his *Personal Idealism and Mysticism* (London and New York, 1907). Another powerful reinforcement has come from a connected series of works by Dr. W. P. Du Bose of the University of the South (*The Gospel in the Gospels*, 1906; *The Gospel according to St. Paul*, 1906; *High Priesthood and Sacrifice*, 1908). There is also another recent work by an American writer, Dr. Rufus M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion* (1909). And the year before last (1908) was marked by the elaborate work of Baron Friedrich von Hügel, with its impressive combination of scholarship, criticism, and philosophy, *The Mystical Element in Religion as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends*. All this literature bears a stamp of unusual weight and distinction, and the movement which it represents and leads is both strong and deep.

Can we define any more closely the meaning of Christian Mysticism? In other words, can we present to ourselves more sharply what we mean by the union of the Christian with Christ? It is difficult, and especially difficult because of the inadequacy of the metaphors of which we are compelled to make use. We are speaking of the union of spirit with spirit; and yet we are compelled to describe it in terms that are taken from matter and from space. We are speaking of the union of

person with person ; and yet we hardly know—in any case we cannot assume—how far union is possible between person and person. Some of the writers I have named push this conception to its furthest limits (so Dr. Moberly and Dr. Du Bose).

We may take two verses of St. Paul as typical in this connexion. One is that great text in Galatians (ii. 20): ‘I have been crucified with Christ ; yet I live ; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me.’ And the other is in the same Epistle (iv. 19): ‘My little children, of whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you.’ Nothing can be more vivid. But the last passage is in any case strongly metaphorical ; and it compels us to ask the question whether the former passage must not also contain an element of metaphor. And if there is an element of metaphor, how large is that element ? One is tempted to fall back upon an answer which is in principle like the famous answer of Queen Elizabeth :—

What that word doth make it,  
That I believe and take it.

We leave a margin of reverent agnosticism, for that which we cannot wholly fathom. And yet we desire our words to have the full meaning which they ought to have. In any case this is the least that we are justified in saying. We are justified in saying that there is a reality corresponding to the language which speaks of divine indwelling. And the tendency

of thought at present is rather to strengthen than to weaken the sense of this reality.

The main difficulty and question turns round the conception of personality. Are we to think of personality as a hard fact, an ultimate fact, or not? There is no doubt one form of philosophical theory which would answer that we are; that personality represents a point beyond which analysis cannot be carried; that just as a short time ago the atom was held to be an ultimate unit in the material world, so personality is an ultimate unit in the spiritual world. Perhaps the use of this analogy supplies something of an augury against the particular view of which I am speaking. I suppose it is the case that recent physical research has completely broken up the old conception of the atom, that what used to be called an atom is now known to be made up of an immense number of much smaller units called electrons.<sup>1</sup> In like manner the old view of the person as not less impervious and impenetrable than the material atom also seems to be giving way.

We may note approximation from the two sides. On the one hand a writer like Dr. Moberly, who takes a very high view of the extent to which the human spirit is capable of penetration by the Divine Spirit, yet insists strongly upon the 'response' which the human spirit makes to the Divine, and is in this way guarded against Pantheism. On the other hand a well-known passage of Browning states

<sup>1</sup> Sir O. Lodge, *Electrons* (1906).

in very striking terms the possibilities of interpenetration even by ordinary human personalities. Here are two stanzas from 'By the Fireside':—

My own, see where the years conduct !  
 At first, 'twas something our two souls  
 Should mix as mists do ; each is sucked  
 In each now : on, the new stream rolls,  
 Whatever rocks obstruct.

\*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*

Oh I must feel your brain prompt mine,  
 Your heart anticipate my heart,  
 You must be just before, in fine,  
 See and make me see, for your part,  
 New depths of the divine !

The note struck by the last line shows where we are to look for the meeting-ground of human spirit with human spirit, and suggests *a fortiori* the yet further point which may be reached when the penetrating force is the Divine Spirit.

We are thus prepared for another step in the process of our inquiry. I do not know what will have been the experience of others, but for myself it would be understating the facts to say that I have been led to realize far more vividly than I had done before the fullness of meaning which the language of mystical union conveys and is intended to convey. We have so far been speaking of states of consciousness. The descriptions incidentally given of these states all have reference to them as conscious. But that is far from being the whole of the matter, or

perhaps even the most important part of it. In one sense we may say that whatever enters into consciousness, by the fact that it does so, is more important than that which does not. That which is latent must in some ways yield to that which is apparent. But from another point of view causes are more important than consequences; and it is the invisible part of the process which takes us nearer to the cause. The deepest truth of mysticism, and of the states of which we have been speaking as mystical, belongs not so much to the upper region of consciousness—the region of symptoms, manifestations, effects—as to the lower region of the unconscious. The roots of that of which we are conscious strike down deep into the unconscious. It is there that the forces are generated which enter into our conscious and active lives. But the fact that they are thus generated as it were underground withdraws them from observation; we cannot experiment upon them or analyse them as we can with that which comes more directly within our ken. All that we can know or guess about the subconscious and unconscious is derived by inference from the conscious. The states of which we are aware are resultant states; it is another thing to penetrate to the original forces of which they are resultants.

Here lies the source of the element of mystery in mysticism. I accept Dr. Moberly's account of what we may perhaps call normal (as compared with abnormal or eccentric) mysticism:—

It is comparatively easy to say what the real truth of Christian mysticism is. It is, in fact, the doctrine, or rather the experience, of the Holy Ghost. It is the realization of human personality as characterized by, and consummated in, the indwelling reality of the Spirit of Christ, which is God (*Atonement and Personality*, p. 312).

But then, the 'fruits' of the Spirit we can see, the work of the Spirit we cannot see. It is however, I cannot but think, a clear gain if we firmly grasp the fact that the work of the Holy Spirit, the true and proper work, the active divine influence brought to bear upon the soul, does belong to this lower sphere. It is subliminal, not supraliminal. We know it only by its effects.

Now the subliminal region is as it were divided into zones; and in proportion as we go down deeper through these zones our power of understanding and describing what goes on there diminishes; the processes become more complex and more remote from common experience. Between the upper strata of the subconscious and the lower strata of the conscious the paths are numerous, broad, and easy. In these upper regions are stored the simple impressions of outward objects, the record of remembered facts, the outlines of past events, which are recalled to consciousness with more or less of the vividness and intensity, but in very much the same guise in which they vanished below the horizon of consciousness. The recollection of things past is only a fainter image of the things past themselves,

and the language which describes them as past is a repetition or revival of the language used to describe them when they were present.

But these surface impressions are one thing, the deeper storage of thoughts and emotions and the deposits of past thought and emotion are another. However we are to think of these more permanent and grouped phenomena, or of the mental states in which they inhere, in any case we must remember that these states are alive and active, and their activity is communicated to their contents. The deposits left by vital experience do not lie together passively side by side, like so many dead bales of cotton or wool, but there is a constant play as it were of electricity passing and repassing between them. In this way are formed all the deeper and more permanent constituents of character and motive. And it is in these same subterranean regions, and by the same vitally reciprocating action, that whatever there is of divine in the soul of man passes into the roots of his being.

The reflexion in consciousness of these profounder movements is by no means a mechanical reproduction. Impulses towards good and impulses towards evil come flickering up from below. Very often they come lightly and go lightly. They do not themselves amount to any solid basement of character. They are only an index of the real basement. And the index is but light and flickering, like the finely poised needle on the face of

a dial. The really important thing is not the index, but the weight or the pressure that moves the index. And that, in the case of moral character and religious motive, is out of sight, down in the lowest depths of personality.

The difficulty for us is to read the full significance of these messages from below. There are all degrees of directness and clearness. Sometimes the message can hardly be deciphered at all; the needle seems to play aimlessly backwards and forwards; the most that can be made out is the single fact that there is a message. At other times we are left in no doubt that the message has a meaning; and in part the meaning is sufficiently plain, while in part it is so wrapt up in symbol and metaphor that as a whole we are baffled by it. But, again at times, the ear is so attuned to the message, the listener is so endowed with a special gift, that what is obscure to others is revealed to him. To such gifted individuals, in their moments of clairvoyance, God seems to speak 'face to face, as a man speaketh with his friend'. There are these differences of degree, but I must not now stay to dwell upon them; neither must I attempt to apply all this of which I have been speaking. I shall seem perhaps to have been beating about the bush too long. I have said nothing so far on the subject of Christology. The connexion with this has still to be made good. But I can perhaps show you the relevance, and even the importance, of this preliminary matter, if I first sum

up the result of what I have been saying in one proposition, and then go on to anticipate what I am about to say in another.

The first, retrospective, proposition is: that the proper<sup>1</sup> seat or *locus* of all divine indwelling, or divine action upon the human soul, is the subliminal consciousness.

And the other, anticipatory, proposition that I shall try to work out is: that the same, or the corresponding, subliminal consciousness is the proper seat or *locus* of the Deity of the incarnate Christ.

<sup>1</sup> Some stress is laid upon 'proper', for which I might almost have written 'primary'. I do not of course mean to deny that this divine element makes itself felt, and at times directly felt, in consciousness. But it seems *to come up* (as it were) unto consciousness, as if from some lower and deeper sphere.



VII

A TENTATIVE MODERN  
CHRISTOLOGY



## VII

### A TENTATIVE MODERN CHRISTOLOGY

IN the last lecture we found ourselves led to the conclusion that the proper seat or *locus* of whatever there is of divine in man—by whatever name we call it, ‘immanence,’ ‘indwelling,’ ‘mystical union,’ or the like, and whatever the extent of the real experience corresponding to those names—is that part of the living organism of man which we are learning to call the subliminal consciousness. Perhaps we ought in this instance to use an even stronger term, and to speak of ‘infraliminal’ instead of ‘subliminal’. But no; I am inclined to think that ‘subliminal’ is better. It is true that the proper seat of the really divine—as well as, I am afraid, the really diabolical—in man is that part of the living self which is most beyond his ken. And yet, as I shall have occasion presently to point out in greater detail, although this divine element lies so deep, and in its quiescent state is so far withdrawn from our contemplation, it is by no means always quiescent, but sends up impulses from time to time which—if they elude us still in their deeper roots themselves—nevertheless produce effects which come within the field of consciousness, so that they can be rightly called subconscious.

That which comes to expression is for the most part not so much the divine itself (though this too appears sometimes, in the great mystics, to reach direct expression) as indications of the presence of the divine.

If we look into ourselves, this is what we shall see. There is an impulse to right action, and we act; there is an impulse to prayer, and we pray; there is an impulse towards thanksgiving, and we give thanks; there is above all that central impulse of faith, the impulse as it were to take hold of God in Christ and cling fast to Him, so that no outward deterrent, no other conflicting attraction, can loosen the hold. We feel that all these promptings come from a hidden source within us. We can say with St. Paul 'the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity: . . . the Spirit Himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered' (Rom. viii. 26). We know enough of what goes on within us to be able to trace it to its source, but we cannot go beyond this; we cannot in any more explicit way describe or define the ultimate cause of these abysmal motions. Not only the ordinary life but the highest life of the saintliest of men is conducted upon the human plane; to all superficial appearance he leads just the same kind of life as his neighbours. He knows, and we know, that that is not a full account of the matter—that he really has 'meat to eat' that we others 'know not of'; but, however true that may be, however deep the source of this

inward sustenance, his outward acts, so far as they are outward, are subject to precisely the same laws, and present the same generic appearance, as those of other men. It would take some time before we should discover that the saint or the mystic was what he was; and we should discover it, not by direct inspection, but by inference—or rather, by inference within inference, as by a cunning arrangement of mirrors the surgeon is able to see further into the interior of the body than is possible to direct observation. It is literal truth to say that the inner life of the spirit is ‘hid with Christ in God’; but the medium through which that inner life is manifested—so far as it is ever manifested—is the common workday life of men.

Now it seems to me that the analogy of our human selves can at least to this extent be transferred to the Incarnate Christ. If whatever we have of divine must needs pass through a strictly human medium, the same law would hold good even for Him. *A priori* we should expect that it would be so; and *a posteriori* we find that as a matter of fact it was so. We have seen what difficulties are involved in the attempt to draw as it were a vertical line between the human nature and the divine nature of Christ, and to say that certain actions of His fall on one side of this line and certain other actions on the other. But these difficulties disappear if, instead of drawing a vertical line, we rather draw a horizontal line between the upper human medium, which is

the proper and natural field of all active expression, and those lower deeps which are no less the proper and natural home of whatever is divine. This line is inevitably drawn in the region of the subconscious. That which was divine in Christ was not nakedly exposed to the public gaze ; neither was it so entirely withdrawn from outward view as to be wholly sunk and submerged in the darkness of the unconscious ; but there was a sort of Jacob's ladder by which the divine forces stored up below found an outlet, as it were, to the upper air and the common theatre in which the life of mankind is enacted.

The advantage of this way of conceiving of the Person of Christ is that it leaves us free to think of His life on earth as fully and frankly human, without at the same time fixing limits for it which confine it within the measures of the human ; it leaves an opening, which in any case must be left, by which the Deity of the Incarnate preserves its continuity with the infinitude of Godhead.

The great gain from the recognition of the subliminal activities of consciousness lies in the fact that it reduces the conscious self to its proper proportions, and makes us realize in a way in which we hardly did realize before how much larger the Whole Self is than this limited part of it. And, in like manner, the application of this analogy to the Life of Christ enables us to realize it much more in its true proportions—in the proportions, that is, which the human life as lived on earth really bore

to the whole transcendent manifestation of the Son of God.

On the one hand, we think of the human consciousness of the Lord as entirely human; we make no attempt to divide it up and fence off one part of it as human and another part as divine. Whatever there was of divine in Him, on its way to outward expression whether in speech or act, passed through, and could not but pass through, the restricting and restraining medium of human consciousness. This consciousness was, as it were, the narrow neck through which alone the divine could come to expression. This involves that only so much of the divine could be expressed as was capable of expression within the forms of humanity. We accept this conclusion unreservedly, and have no wish to tamper with it. The Life of our Lord, so far as it was visible, was a strictly human life; He was, as the Creeds teach, 'very Man'; there is nothing to prevent us from speaking of this human life of His just as we should speak of the life of one of ourselves. Over this we can shake hands with those continental theologians who insist on taking the humanity of our Lord in real earnest, and as no mere matter of form.

But, on the other hand, we no less emphatically refuse to rule out or ignore or explain away the evidence which the Gospels and the rest of the New Testament afford that this human life was, in its deepest roots, directly continuous with the life of

God Himself. If St. Paul could quote and endorse the words of a pagan poet claiming for the children of men that they are also God's offspring; and if they are this notwithstanding the fact that they are confined in the body as creatures of perishable clay; if in spite of these limitations it may still be said of them that in God they 'live and move and have their being', might not the same be said in a yet more searching and essential sense of Him who was Son in a more transcendent and ineffable mode of being than they? Whatever the Homousion means—and in the last resort it remains a symbol rather than a term of direct description, because it is a corporeal metaphor applied to Spirit—whatever it means, can it be doubted that on this view there is ample room for it? Indeed, whatever room there is in the universe is at our command, and we can fill it as we will. That which stays our hand in the freedom of theorizing is not any external condition but only the reverence which does not seek to be wise beyond that which is written. There may well have been a self-determination of the Godhead, such as issued in the Incarnation, as far back as thought can go. I add that as perhaps a tenable modern paraphrase of the primary element in the doctrine of the Trinity. This doctrine, in its essence as in its origin, turns upon the recognition of the Incarnation of the Son. But in these regions the modern thinker will desire to walk warily, and not to intrude further than he is compelled.

In a previous lecture I mentioned a work which appeared about three years ago, *The One Christ*, by F. Weston, B.D., at that time Canon and Chancellor, and now Bishop, of Zanzibar. I believe that its very merits have stood in its way, and that it has received less attention than it deserves. But those who have read it will I think agree with me that it is a remarkable book. Written in mental solitude and isolation only a little less than we might suppose—the dedication shows that the isolation was not quite complete,—‘in a country where books are few and which is far away from all centres of theological thought,’ it is concerned with high themes and treats them with marked originality and with sustained earnestness and elevation. The book starts from a different side of approach to mine—not from modern thought and psychology, but from Dogmatics in the highest sense of the word. And yet I am glad to think that we meet in the middle to such a large extent as we do. Dr. Weston’s purpose is to vindicate the one consciousness of the Christ; and with him too this consciousness is strictly human. His main point, if I understand aright, is that this human consciousness was assumed by a single act of will anterior to the Incarnation, not by a succession of acts repeated during the Incarnation. I must let Dr. Weston speak in his own words:—

With the Incarnate [this suppression of certain powers] is not an act of forgetfulness. Rather it is

an act of supreme divine power that so orders the life of the Logos that within a certain sphere He wills to have no consciousness of Himself that is not mediated for Him by His human soul. . . . Looked at from above, as from the standpoint of the Logos Himself, His consciousness as man must surely bear the marks of self-sacrificing love, of powerful self-restraint. It is the result of the self-emptying of the Son ; of His determination to accept, within certain relationships, the fashion of a man and the form of a slave. He willed so to relate Himself to the Father and to men that within these relationships He could not know Himself as unlimited Son of God.

But looked at from below, from our standpoint, His consciousness as man is that of the perfect Son of Man, who at every moment, in ever-growing clearness, realizes in and through manhood His divine Sonship ; who knows Himself as God at every moment just in the measure that such self-knowledge can be mediated by the soul as it passes from perfect infancy to perfect childhood, from perfect childhood to perfect youth, and from perfect youth to perfect manhood. And in this it is really human ; the self-consciousness of the Man Christ Jesus, the self-consciousness of God in manhood.

It is in the light of such a theory as this that we best understand the saying of our Lord that His Father is greater than He is. For the Incarnate speaks of Himself as He was on earth in His Incarnate state, within the relationships made concrete by His assumption of flesh. He speaks not of His manhood, but of His Incarnate being and state. As Incarnate He is less than His Father. As touching His manhood, and the conditions that it has imposed upon His person, He is inferior to His Father.

The importance of arriving at a conception of a single consciousness of the Christ cannot be over-

estimated. The popular teaching that assumes in the Incarnate a full consciousness of divine glory side by side with a consciousness of certain occasional human limitations cannot be too strongly deprecated. We must not allow ourselves to speak of the Babe of Bethlehem as ruling the universe from His mother's knee; nor of the sacred Heart of Jesus as consciously embracing the whole race from the first moment of its existence. To do so is to require three states of the Logos: the first in which He is unlimited and unincarnate; the second in which He is incarnate, and unlimited except when He wills to allow some merely human condition to prevail over Him; and the third in which He is self-limited in that human condition. And the result of such a conception of the Incarnate is to make His manhood unique not only in the degree of its perfection, but also in kind. It makes it utterly unlike ours, and also removes it from all part in the mediation of His self-consciousness.

And, on the other hand, the Kenotic theories are equally to be deplored. For they picture the Incarnate as of a dual consciousness in the sense that they require two centres of activity in the lower state; a centre of self-abandonment, and a centre of His divine-human or human activities after the self-abandonment has taken place.

For myself, the daylight shines most fully at the point in which I am able to assign to the universal sphere of Logos-activity all the self-limitation that was necessary for the mediation of Christ's consciousness by His manhood. The child Jesus was able to be a perfect child, not because He as Incarnate restrained divine powers lest they should overpower His boy-nature, but because as Incarnate He is at every moment observant of and obedient to a law of self-restraint which He as unlimited

Logos wills should be imposed upon Himself. The child in Joseph's shop is the concrete expression of those relations of the Incarnate, Godward and manward, which depend for their reality at every moment upon the action of the Logos Himself in His universal sphere of activities. The Logos as able to limit Himself and as conscious of that ability is to be regarded as in the sphere of the universal and eternal relationships; the special, incarnate relationships are to be conceived as those of the Logos self-limited, who knows Himself only as Logos limited in manhood (pp. 156-159).

This long quotation will I hope have made clear the position taken up. The writer says at the outset that his task would make great demands alike upon courage and faith. I believe that he has met all these demands. He is a devout son of the Church, and has written throughout with absolute loyalty; but at the same time he has followed his thought where it led him. He has stated his views as explicitly as possible; and yet I do not think that he has really come in conflict with any catholic doctrine. It is important to observe that his contemplation is focused upon the *Consciousness* of Christ. I do not think that there is any real contradiction even with a popular statement such as that in a lovely sequence published by Dr. Neale.<sup>1</sup>

Patris Unigenitus,  
Per quem fecit omnia,  
Hic degit humanitus  
Sub matre paupercula :

<sup>1</sup> *Sequentiae ex Missalibus* (London, 1852), p. 11.

Ibi sanctos angelos  
 Reficit laetitia :  
 Hic sitit et esurit  
 Degens in infantia.  
 Ibi regit omnia ;  
 Hic a matre regitur :  
 Ibi dat imperia ;  
 Hic ancillae subditur :  
 Ibi summi culminis  
 Residet in solio ;  
 Hic ligatus fasciis  
 Vagit in praesepio.

The substance of what is said here has of course higher authority than the sequence. But the language used by Dr. Weston does not refer to the fact, but only to the consciousness of the fact. If I were pressed myself and called upon to give account at the bar of modern thought, I should content myself with speaking of the consciousness of the Christ. I should not deny what the Church has ever said. I do not like such denials, and will not make them unless I am (intellectually) compelled. And in this case I do not think that I am compelled. I would rather keep silent. I should feel that I was out of my depth when I began to go beyond the limits of the consciousness of Christ. The mystery of the relation of the Son to the Father stretches beyond our ken. The Deity which rules the universe is in the last resort the same Deity which took human flesh. So much I believe ; and that belief seems to me enough to connect the faith of the patristic age with our own.

The consciousness of our Lord, as I have been trying to describe it and as I conceive that it is presented to us in the Gospels, is a genuinely human consciousness. But I shall doubtless be asked : If that is so, what ground have we for thinking that there was in Him a root of being striking down below the strata of consciousness, by virtue of which He was more than human? My reply is, that we know it by the marks which have been appealed to all down the centuries in proof that in Him Deity and humanity were combined. All those little incidental sayings which have so long been noted in the Gospels, although comparatively slight singly in themselves, nevertheless in their accumulated force convey a distinct impression ; and to that impression justice is only done when we proclaim Him God as well as man. The conscience that has sunk itself in Christianity cannot stop short of this. It refuses to think of Christ merely as man. If it were to do so, it would feel that half of Him was unexplained, that there were features in Him that were otiose, ineffective, and without meaning.

The most definite, the most comprehensive and the most exalted (according to the current ideas of exaltation) of all the titles which our Lord took to Himself was the Jewish title Messiah. This title certainly included for our Lord Himself, as for all who ever used it, the idea of vast dominion. The Messiah was to be the vicegerent on earth of God Himself ; the kingdom of God on earth was

His kingdom. It included the idea of a vast restoration, redemption or salvation—according to the Jews' notion in the first instance for their own people, but through them for the human race. And the outlook of our Lord was, we are sure, grander than theirs. Lastly, the title Messiah included the functions of the Judge—the Judge of all mankind. And we cannot doubt that our Lord thought of Himself as destined to hold this great assize.

The incidental expressions of which I spoke are really grouped round this central idea; they all converge inwards upon it. When our Lord assumes the right to forgive sins; when He lays down a new Law like a second Moses; when He allows it to be seen that He thinks of Himself as greater than Jonah or than Solomon; when He pronounces blessing on acts done to His disciples as acts done to Him—in all these cases His Messianic consciousness is the moving cause.

This Messianic consciousness was central. But to say that it was central is not by any means the same thing as to say that it was adequate. It was very far from being this. The most we can say for it is that it was the nearest idea and the nearest expression that offered itself at the time. Whenever our Lord used it—and we know that, although He presupposed it always, He used it seldom and with great reserve—He strained it almost to bursting.

In particular, He fused with it two further conceptions; first, that contained in the prophetic ideal

of the Servant of Jehovah, an ideal that was never far away from His thoughts ; and secondly, the sense of closest intimacy with God, a sense which He expressed by speaking of Himself as 'the Son' and of God as 'the Father'.

Even so—even when it was enriched in these deeply significant ways—still the idea of Messiahship was inadequate. But we are not to think of the inadequacy as at all surprising or different from what was to be expected. Let us go back to our psychology, and consider the essential conditions of the case.

I have described our human consciousness as a kind of 'narrow neck' through which everything that comes up from the deeps of human nature has to pass. It may help us to think of the consciousness as a sort of porous material stretched entirely across this neck and closing the orifice. The orifice is closed, but not absolutely or imperviously ; the material is so porous that it permits a great deal of that which comes up to pass through. The process is like that of filtering : certain particles, very many particles pass through the pores and come to the surface. In other words, dropping or varying the metaphor, a certain proportion of the hidden contents of human nature enter into consciousness, and through consciousness find expression. But in what relation do these stand to the remainder that is left behind, that does not enter into consciousness and never finds expression ? How much of 'the vision

and the faculty divine' has no accomplishment of phrase corresponding to it?

The poets are perpetually reminding us of this. Perhaps Wordsworth most of all, for it is one of his leading ideas. He sums it up in the famous line,

We feel that we are greater than we know.

If we are to paraphrase this in the language of philosophy, and of present-day philosophy, we should say that the unconscious processes of cerebration are richer and more productive than the conscious; the subliminal activities of the human mind are subtler and more various than the supraliminal. Wordsworth is constantly aiming at this, and in many of his best-known passages: as when he speaks of the 'something far more deeply interfused', or of the

Blank misgivings of a creature  
Moving about in worlds not realized.

But of course he does not stand alone. We think of Tennyson, with his 'Higher Pantheism' and 'Flower in the crannied wall', or of Browning's

fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,  
A chorus-ending from Euripides,

with the train of thought which such things set in motion. Or again we think of Blake's

To see a World in a grain of sand,  
And a Heaven in a wild flower,  
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand,  
And Eternity in an hour.

Feats of which the conscious soul is not capable become possible with the help of the subconscious.

The narrow-necked vessel has an opening at the bottom, which is not stopped by any sponge. Through it there are incomings and outgoings, which stretch away into infinity and in fact proceed from, and are, God Himself. That is the ultimate and most important point. I have said already that, whatever there may be of divine in man, it is in these deep dim regions that it has its abiding-place and home. And I feel sure that we may make use of this analogy when we speak or think of the divine Person of our Lord.

Perhaps I may remind you of another metaphor to which I had recourse in the last lecture. I spoke of the upper consciousness as a kind of dial-plate, with an index needle moving lightly backwards and forwards before it. The deepest movements of the human mind cannot be read upon the dial; they can only indicate their presence, and through some faint symbol or other hint at their nature. Our Lord Jesus Christ, when He became Incarnate, assumed such a disability as this. He could not—by His own deliberate act of self-restraint He could not—wear His Deity (as it were) upon His sleeve. He knew that the condition which He was assuming permitted only degrees of self-manifestation. He knowingly condemned Himself, if the phrase may be allowed, to that inadequate expression of which I have spoken. But just as in the man the whole

Self, conscious, subconscious, and infraconscious, is indefinitely larger than the conscious Self taken alone, so even in our Lord the manifested Life was only, as it were, an index to the total Life of which the visible activities were but a relatively small portion.

We may venture then to picture to ourselves the working of our Lord's consciousness in some such way as this. His life on earth presented all the outward appearance of the life of any other contemporary Galilean. His bodily organism discharged the same ordinary functions and ministered to the life of the soul in the same ordinary ways. He had the same sensations of pleasure and pain, of distress and ease, of craving and satisfaction. Impressions received through the senses and emotions awakened by them were recollected and stored up for use by the same wonderful processes by which any one of us becomes the living receptacle of personal experiences. His mind played over all these accumulated memories, sifting, digesting, analysing, extracting, combining, and recombining. Out of such constituent elements, physical, rational, moral, and spiritual, character was formed in Him as in any one of ourselves, though with unwonted care and attention. Not that we need suppose that the actual process of character-forming was more self-conscious with Him than it is with us. The forming of character is the unconscious automatic effect of

particular decisions of judgement and acts of will. Conscience discriminates between right and wrong ; in His case it invariably chose the right and eschewed the wrong. But out of the midst of all these moral decisions and actions, out of the interplay of social relations, under the guidance of observation and reflection, there gradually grew up a sense of deliberate purpose, a consciousness of mission. Of all the shaping influences from without doubtless the most important was the study of the Jewish Bible, the sacred scriptures of the Old Testament. It would be by the help of these, suggesting ideas and forms of expression, that the mind of our Lord singled out for itself by degrees those particular terms of which I have spoken as best fitted to describe the character and the mission of which He was conscious in Himself—Messiah, Son of Man, Son (i. e. of God).

I do not think we can doubt that in order of time the last of these came first. The Child Jesus, like any other Jewish child, first learnt to think of God on His mother's knee. But the thought soon took possession of Him as it did not take possession of other Jewish children. And then, what could be more natural than that He should extend and apply to the Heavenly Father the content of the nearest and most familiar to Him of all earthly relations ? The thought of God as His Father grew with His growth and strengthened with His strength ; indeed it seems as though it absorbed all other thoughts beside ; other thoughts affected Him only as they stood in relation

to this. To be Son of God : what an idea ! What heights and depths were contained in that single Name ! Everything else that Jesus of Nazareth ever thought about Himself was but an explication of it, was but an incident or episode involved in it from the first, though only taking outward expression in course of time. The oldest historic use of the title Son of God was for the Davidic king, as an agent of the theocracy ; and then next, by an easy transition, for the Messianic King, of whom the earthly king was a type. Hence, when the voice came at His Baptism, 'Thou art My beloved Son, in Thee I am well pleased,' or possibly (as in the Western text of Luke ii. 22) 'Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee', Jesus at once knew what it meant ; He at once knew that He was to regard Himself as the Messiah of prophecy. This led to much searching of heart, of which the (symbolic) story of the Temptation gives us a glimpse. It was as a last outcome of those solitary wrestlings that Jesus chose for Himself that other title, already stamped with Messianic meaning, though with other associations wider still, the title Son of Man. By this title He chose to be known, speaking of Himself with wonderful delicacy, nearly always in the third person. What was the mission, what was the course marked out for one who knew Himself to be in a sense indefinitely deep the Son of God ? Why was He placed upon the earth in human guise ? What was to be the end of His

human career? And—still more important—what destiny was in store for Him, and for the human race through Him, when that career was ended? Once more, the Messiah could not be in doubt. He knew—every Israelite knew—that in Him all the nations of the earth were to be blessed. We may well believe that at first Jesus went upon His way wondering how those ancient prophecies were to be fulfilled, by what precise means the tide of blessing would spread from Palestine outwards and onwards. It would seem as though at first, while waiting to have this more fully revealed to Him, He simply did the work that lay to His hand, teaching and healing. That would in any case prepare the way for the Kingdom of Heaven; and in any case He knew that blessedness was to come through the Kingdom of Heaven. It was His chief mission to bring about the coming of that kingdom. Was He to do so as manifested King? Was the theocracy to be restored as a true theocracy? By degrees His eyes were opened, and He came to see what was really awaiting Him. If there was to be a kingdom, it was not kingdom from a throne, but kingdom from a cross. This too He faced; and its meaning became clear to Him when He thought of the Servant of Jehovah in the latter part of Isaiah. Here was another rôle that He felt that He was to play. He felt, and He understood, and became obedient unto death. But He knew that, for all this—for all the suffering of death, the prophecies of

blessing were not abrogated. Still they remained in force, and they would certainly be fulfilled; but how? When that question came to be asked *How?* our sources leave us in some ambiguity. The solution that lay nearest at hand was that of the Jewish Apocalypses. And it would be very natural and very probable that our Lord would at least at times have recourse to this solution; He would express Himself in the familiar language; and His disciples were evidently allowed to fall back to a large extent upon that language.

But the Apocalyptic teaching itself branched off in two main directions. There was the part to be played by the Messiah Himself as King and as Judge. But another characteristic of the Last Days was to be the great outpouring of the Spirit, conspicuously foretold by the prophet Joel. As a matter of fact the Church witnessed such an outpouring. A new and a powerful influence took up the work begun by the Incarnation—took it up so promptly and so continuously that to writers like St. Paul and St. John it seemed to be the Incarnate Himself still at work through His Spirit. Already in St. Luke's evangelical narrative (Luke xxiv. 49, cf. Acts i. 4, 8) this further working is represented as predicted by Jesus. How did Jesus Himself think of it? I conceive that here, if anywhere—here, most of all—that subliminal consciousness of His, to which I have been referring, came into play. We speak of a 'reserve of power' in ordinary men, i. e. of

*latent* powers that from time to time, on great occasions, assert themselves in them. With Jesus, these latent powers had throughout His life been more abundant and nearer at hand than with others. It was they which gave an extraordinary aspect to the whole of His ministry. It was they which fed His consciousness as Messiah and as Son. He had never made any parade of them. He had treated them with a certain irony, rather minimizing their presence than magnifying it. It was with Him as it has been with the saints of all ages—that which they had of deepest and most divine has never been obtruded upon the public gaze, but rather hidden away out of sight and known only by its fruits. But now that the end was nigh, now that the moment of release from the burden of the flesh was all but come, I do not doubt that the Lord felt these latent powers, so steadily restrained and so sparingly used, surging up within Him, gathering all their forces for an outbreak, crowding, as it were, towards the exit and ready to burst out upon the world. Still the human thought and tongue even of Jesus—and it was only through human thought and human speech that even He could communicate with His disciples who were also His brethren—could only express themselves in terms of current meaning, could only express themselves with that inadequacy and relativity of utterance which attaches to all that is human. The language of Apocalypse, in one or other of its forms, was almost the

only language available. What applies to language applies also to thought ; and I can well believe that in the human thought, as well as in the language, of Jesus there was an element that was vague, approximate, and undetermined. We ourselves have the vantage-ground, not only of nearly nineteen centuries of retrospect, but also of a terminology more adapted to the thought of our own time ; and it is no abuse of our rights if we prefer to employ that terminology in describing the historic consequences of the Incarnation as best we may.

But the one thing that has to be realized is that, just as in one of us the conscious self is but a small portion of the true self and such imperfect description as we can give of the history of the conscious self most inadequately represents the real fortunes of a soul travelling between two immensities, so *a fortiori* does the written record that has come down to us utterly come short of the real history of the Son of Man. We must bear this in mind and never allow ourselves to forget it, but carefully adapt both our language and our judgements to these conditions.



## VIII

### THE PRESENT POSITION



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THE appearance of the *Hibbert Journal Supplement* for 1909, entitled *Jesus or Christ?*, is an event of some importance. It came out about the same time as the volume of *Cambridge Biblical Essays*; but the two books, although consisting of nearly the same number of essays (in the one case eighteen, in the other case sixteen), are of very different character and purpose. There is of course no comparison as to the amount of labour expended upon them or as to the weight of authority which they command. The Cambridge book had been upon the stocks for several years; it was prepared with an educational object, to gather together within moderate compass the more or less authenticated results of prolonged research and study, and to do this as a step in the process of mental discipline at one of our foremost seats of learning. The essays in the other book were evidently thrown off at comparatively short notice; they were not written with the same consciousness of responsibility; but up to a certain point they make amends for this by greater freedom of experiment.

This latter aspect of the book is the most significant. Whereas in the Cambridge volume we

see one of our leading Universities carefully taking stock of progress already made with a view to its methodical extension, the *Hibbert Journal* venture is not only spread over a much wider area—it includes three contributions from the Continent and one from America—but it evidently aims more deliberately at breaking new ground, not over the whole field but over one very central portion of it. This tentativeness and freedom of suggestion is just that which gives it interest and attraction. I myself believe that it will be a distinct help to the movement of reconstruction which is going forward.

I shall not attempt to review the whole volume, which reflects in its variety the ferment that is going on in the public mind, but I shall try to single out some of the points which have the most direct bearing upon the subject of the preceding lectures. In more places than one it appears to cut across the particular construction which I have been propounding.

The point at which the coincidence is greatest is in the brief essay, of barely five pages, by Sir Oliver Lodge. If this essay does not suggest exactly the same solution that I have suggested, it at least seeks for it in the same direction. It seeks a solution in the same direction, and it dwells rather more upon one aspect of it than I have done. As most of what I had to say was already written before I had read Sir Oliver Lodge's contribution, a rather full comparing of notes may be desirable. There are

several expressions to which I think that exception may be taken, but my wish is rather to draw attention to the general drift of the essay as a whole. It is headed 'A Divine Incarnation'; and it begins by asking,—

What is the meaning of Incarnation? Surely the manifestation in time and place of something previously existing—the display in bodily form, for a limited period, of some portion of an eternal spiritual essence.

Existence itself is illimitable and perennial, but its manifestations are local and temporary. Nor is the whole of a spiritual existence ever manifested,—only that which the material employed can be made to subserve. . . . The idea of an oak tree, with its various phases, its ancestry, its future potentialities, is far larger than any actual manifestation, whether in winter or in summer. A 'flower in a crannied wall' is an incarnation which is in intimate touch with the whole universe. And shall not the spirit of a man be larger and greater than that which animates his body and enters his consciousness? (p. 115).

At this point a question is raised which I did distinctly contemplate, but did not discuss:—

It is customary with a certain not perfectly orthodox school of psychology to speak of the non-incarnate (?) and supplementary portion of a human being as his 'subliminal self,' the portion which is beyond or beneath or above the threshold of his ordinary consciousness. I do not say that 'self' is the right term; 'self' may best designate the conscious and individualised portion only, and not the hypothetical whole.

I have little doubt that we cannot afford to debar ourselves from using the word 'self' in this connexion. I do not know of any other word that we can use. We mean by 'self' in these contexts 'the whole man', all that is embraced within the range of his personality, the unconscious part of him as well as the conscious. We know that there is an unconscious region which in the strictest sense *belongs* to him, because from time to time influences—or 'uprushes' as they are often called—make themselves felt in the conscious region, coming up out of the unconscious. At the same time it is no doubt well to remember that the word 'self' has to do double duty, sometimes for what we call the centre of personality, and sometimes for the whole circumference to which personality can be said to extend.

Sir Oliver Lodge goes on :—

But it is to the thing, rather than to the term used to denote it, that I direct attention, to a larger and dominant entity, belonging to us in some sense, or rather to which we belong, which is still behind the veil so far as planetary existence is concerned—the self which has not entered into the region of present consciousness,—an accumulation of powers and insight, of which the ordinary uninspired man is unaware, but to which the genius has moments of access. The existence of this larger and permanent self, of which what we ordinarily know as ourselves is but a fragment,—not anything divine, but greater than humanity,—is the working hypothesis to which facts have driven psychological experimentalists.

Much of this language is evidently tentative. I could not adopt all of it. I fully believe in the 'larger and dominant entity'; but that entity makes itself felt in many more ways than its relation to genius. And I should not like to put upon it the limitation, 'not anything divine, but greater than humanity.' I would beware of attempting to define too far; I prefer to leave a margin, which perhaps philosophers or psychologists may narrow down later. And therefore I have as a rule made use of a vaguer phrase, 'whatever there is of divine in man,' or the like; not by this implying that the unconscious self consists only of this divine, or diviner, element; there is in any case a vast amount that is purely human in it as well. But man is certainly conscious of divine influences within him; and these influences do not live in the consciousness but come up into it from time to time; always bearing with them evidence that their origin is deeper and larger than themselves.

We resume our quotation. In the first part Sir Oliver Lodge speaks in an interesting way as a man of science. In the latter part he writes rather as a speculative layman than as a theologian. And I will not intrude theology upon him, though I do not think that the passage would lose anything substantial if I did so:—

Given this hypothesis as a working clue, the episodes of birth and death present no fundamental difficulty. . . . Each of us is greater than we know.

We have our roots in an infinite past, not only in the bodies of our ancestors, but in the region of mind or spirit as well; we claim a transcendental existence, some part of which began to assume a temporary and local habitation at conception, and so gradually entered more and more fully into relation with matter, as the organism developed into fitness for it and harmony with it. No sudden entrance into flesh need be supposed, nor need the exit be sudden. Gradual bodily decadence, as the soul gradually begins to resume its immaterial existence, is the normal and healthy condition. Terrestrial life remains an episode of surpassing interest and importance, but is not begun and ended by anything of the nature of creation and destruction, merely by organisation and disorganisation; it is an episode of individualisation through bodily growth and experience; it is the attainment of personality, of a definite kind of association with matter, with reminiscences of bodily life and activity never thenceforth to be effaced.

This is the experience through which every son of man must pass. It is this which transmutes any spirit into a human being. It is the process by which any spirit must enter into relation and sympathy and corporate union with humanity.

Christianity tells us that a Divine Spirit—that the Deity himself, indeed—went through this process in order to make himself known to man, and also in order fully to realise the conditions and limitations of the free beings which, through evolution, had gradually been permitted to exist. It teaches us that, among all the lofty Spirits which ever became incarnate on the earth, one supremely Divine Spirit entered our flesh and walked on the planet for a time, was born, loved, suffered, and died, even as one of us.

And this individualised and human aspect of the eternally Divine Spirit we know as Jesus of Nazareth, a man like ourselves, save that the glory of that lofty Spirit shone through the fleshly covering and preserved it from the load of sin which follows from inadequate knowledge, imperfect insight, animal ancestry, and an alien will? (p. 118 f.).

This is not quite theologically 'correct'; but it is easily corrected. In any case the main drift of it is clear; and I believe that it throws real light on what we may conceive to have been the mode or method of the Incarnation. It also, I venture to think, fits on well with, and supplements, the views that I have been trying to expound in the two preceding lectures.

If it had no other result, the collection of essays has at least had this, that it reduces to their true dimensions the objections brought in the original article by the Rev. R. Roberts. These had indeed been sufficiently answered in the two articles contributed to the July number of the *Hibbert Journal* by Mr. G. K. Chesterton and Prof. J. H. Moulton. On its best side Mr. Roberts's paper was a reaction from the somewhat vague and unreal panegyric that is so often met with, especially in sermons. His criticisms of this were probably prompted in the first instance by a certain sincerity, which was however soon lost in perverse inference and rhetorical exaggeration. In these respects the article was only a more cultivated version of the tirades of secularist

lecturers. This side of it was easily and effectually exposed. In the Hibbert volume I think we should assign a special value to the refutations supplied on the one hand by writers like Dr. Drummond and on the other hand by two of the foreign contributors, Profs. Weinel and Schmiedel. These come with all the greater force because they are written from a point of view that is not fundamentally very different from that of Mr. Roberts. Prof. Weinel's is the more conservative, approximating to the position taken up by Harnack, while Dr. Schmiedel is quite explicit and rather severe in his negations (see for instance pp. 59, 66, 76 f.). But both writers afford a conspicuous illustration of what I said in a previous lecture. Although they both adopt what I have called a 'reduced' Christianity—I am afraid this must be said of the Jena Professor as well as of his colleague from Zurich,—they yet make the fullest possible use of so much as they accept. By means of close, careful, sympathetic study they extract from it more than we should probably succeed in extracting. An example will show best what I mean. Professor Weinel, I think, nowhere commits himself to the dogmatic confession of Christ as we confess Him. But from the contemplation of the historic Jesus he draws out almost as much of spiritual value<sup>1</sup> :—

<sup>1</sup> We are tempted to ask whether all this spiritual value is quite legitimately obtained, whether the language used (to be fully justified) would not require a background of more orthodox doctrine.

So did Jesus live his own life in the first instance, and in that life is contained the strength which is flowing forth from him down to the present day. And he who cannot define it scientifically may yet *feel* it in the sayings of Jesus, and in his whole attitude towards men, as revealed by the brief stories which have been preserved concerning him. Everybody may feel this Divine inwardness and fulness, this certainty and clarity, this purity of a life wholly lived in God.

These last words explain why we cannot detach the person of Jesus from this ideal, as Roberts wishes, and as others have wished. This is no doctrine, but a life in God; it cannot be put into dogmatic statement, but merely described, or much rather felt; nor can it be handed down otherwise than in precisely these sayings and stories of a person. It can be attained only by seeing it lived out in a human life, especially in that of its exponent. One of the earliest disciples of Jesus has quite correctly said that this life is like the wind: 'Thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth.' Its seat is in the indefinable and subtle realm of personality, in the unconscious regions of the soul, which cannot be apprehended by theories and dogmas, but only by a spiritual experience. . . . It is Jesus himself, and not an ideal that can be detached from him, who is the fulfiller of the moral religion of Judaism, which he developed to its uttermost and transformed into the religion of moral redemption (pp. 38, 39).

That is, I think it will be admitted, a very attractive passage. It shows how much may be done with what we should consider imperfect tools; and here again we observe the same feeling after

the unconscious as containing the key to modern problems.

The disjunctive question 'Jesus *or* Christ?' expresses well the issue which runs through the whole volume. The essayists, as might be expected, take different sides. Profs. Weinel and Schmiedel may be taken as accepting the first half of the alternative, and not the second. The English writers for the most part, though not entirely, accept both. Perhaps the most striking representation of this latter point of view comes from Professor Percy Gardner :—

Up to a certain point the statements of Mr. Roberts seem to me not only true but incontrovertible. The picture drawn in the Synoptic Gospels is of one who partook in every way of human nature, and was bounded by human limitations. . . . But we have next to turn to another range of facts, facts of history and facts of experience, which are as undeniable, and have as good a right to demand explanation, as those on which so far we have dwelt. And they are from the historic point of view even better attested. . . . The Pauline writings amply prove that in his time a most remarkable movement was taking place in the spirits of men. . . . We can best judge of it from its working in the mind and heart of St. Paul, though no doubt he was but one among many who felt the same enthusiasm. . . . He was also the progenitor of a long line of Christian saints and heroes who have lived in the faith of Christ, and carried on in the world the propaganda begun by Paul. They have lived in conscious relation with a divine power,

they have been members of a great spiritual communion, and they have all declared that this life had its source not in themselves, but in the divine spring of power and light which from age to age inspires the Christian Church, and makes it capable of redeeming the world from sense and sin. Now, the first range of phenomena of which I have spoken is summed up in the word Jesus: the second range of phenomena is summed up in the word Christ. The existence of the Church has from the first depended on the possibility of bringing the two sets of facts into relation one with another. The Church is the Church of Jesus-Christ: and a lover of paradox might say that it is built upon a hyphen (pp. 45-50).

That is certainly to put a fine point upon it: the Christian faith 'built upon a hyphen'! Of course the meaning is that the two significant halves of that significant Name must not be separated but combined. What proof have we of this?—

What we want to know is what basis in fact and reality there is for the hyphen of which I have spoken. Is there a historic connection to be traced between the life of Jesus on earth and the life of Christ in the Church? It appears to me that such connection cannot be proved to a sceptic, for the historic data are insufficient, and may be interpreted in various ways. We cannot prove the spiritual resurrection as we can prove the assassination of Julius Caesar or the beheading of Charles I. It must be accepted as an article of faith, not as the result of intellectual research.

It is in the nature of all faith—not Christian faith alone, but of faith in our fellow-men and in

the divine government of the world—that though it has a basis of fact and experience, it strains beyond fact and experience into the realm of the ideal. . . . The real question which lies before modern Christians is not whether a continuity of spiritual power can be rigorously proved to run from the human life of Jesus on into the life of the Christian Church, but rather whether such a view can be reasonably held, whether it is in contradiction with the ascertained results of historic investigation. If not, then it is a sufficient basis for a reasonable faith, if faith is called for by Christian experience, and the demands of the higher life.

Any person who should maintain that history disproves such continuity of life would be a most arrogant dogmatist. We know more, much more, in regard to our psychical conditions and spiritual surroundings than did our fathers. But yet our knowledge is strictly limited. It certainly behoves us, in dealing with such subjects as inspiration, divine action in history, the nature of the world of spirits to which we belong as members, to speak with extreme caution. Above all things, to make dogmatic denials where evidence is defective, is certainly not the part either of a wise man or of a really scientific man.

It is a fatal aberration to make the human life of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels in any way unreal: we must be content to see in them the memorials of a human life, but without sin, and governed by a unity of will with the divine purposes which makes it quite unique. Yet we in no way transgress the canons of reason and of history if we connect that life with the outpouring of a fresh tide of spiritual life upon the world, which took form in the perpetuation of the spirit and the obedience of Jesus in the inspiration of the Christian Church.

He who came to the earth as Jesus has dwelt there to our days as Christ. The Christian consciousness of our day is one with the consciousness which has set apart the followers of Christ from the world since the day when the Apostles first realised that though their Master was hidden from sight he was with them until the end of the world.

And when contemporary Christians claim that they, like St. Paul, have learned to live in communion with, and in dependence upon, the heavenly Christ, we are compelled to take the claim seriously (pp. 54-56).

Professor Gardner writes with great caution and moderation ; but he also writes with welcome open-mindedness and a wide recognition of the range of spiritual possibilities. After all, he is only interpreting the experience of Christians as thousands and tens of thousands have interpreted it for themselves. And this interpretation goes back without a break to the first generation of all. Let us listen to Canon Scott Holland :—

For them, and for him [St. Luke and his readers], there was no hint of variance or of conflict between the Eternal Christ who offered the sacrifice to God, and the Jesus of Nazareth who was done to death by wicked men. On the contrary, it was faith in the Christ that lent its breathless significance to every tiny detail in the facts of the human tragedy. Because they believed in Him as Christ, the Son of God, therefore they found a priceless value in the narration of each accident that befell the Son of Man.

Now, it is this fusion of the double interests that constitutes our riddle. . . . Do we feel as if the two conceptions are in hopeless collision, as Mr. Roberts,

in his article, vehemently argues? Then that only shows how far we must be from understanding the mind of those who wrote and read our Synoptic Gospels. To stop short in this apparent collision is, simply, to confess that we can find no answer to the riddle that we are set to solve. For the riddle is—Why did those who wrote those Gospels *not* feel the collision which afflicts us? They passed smoothly from one conception to the other. They looked for the Christ in the Jesus, and found what they looked for (p. 128 f.).

So Canon Scott Holland; and another very instructive discussion of the subject, which I am specially glad to see, is by Prof. B. W. Bacon of Yale (pp. 218–224). This is too long to quote, where so much has been quoted already; but it is an exposition of—

the essentially dual aspect of the Christian faith, which began as a gospel preached by Jesus in Galilee to publicans and sinners; but which experienced a new birth in the resurrection as a gospel *about* Jesus proclaimed to every creature . . . . The Church has followed Peter in a more or less vacillating and illogical, but practically salutary, attempt to occupy both poles of doctrine, that which centres in the earthly Jesus, and that which centres in the heavenly Christ.

I am not sure that I quite understand what Prof. Bacon means by the epithets ‘vacillating and illogical’. I should have thought that the testimony of the Church was solid, so far as it went—that it did consistently claim ‘to occupy both poles of doctrine’. I should have thought that, at least for

many centuries, the only substantial limitation to this was that some minds are naturally averse to everything that can be called 'mystical', and that the Church included specimens of this type, as well as of its opposite.

I am glad to think that there is room for both types, far removed as they are from each other. I must not ignore the fact that there is an alternative view to that for which I have just been citing witnesses. Dr. Schmiedel has a page of important comment which ought not to be overlooked, and which expresses his views with his usual uncompromising precision:—

If we now say 'Jesus is my life', we are not referring to the historical Jesus, as including characteristics which to us are unacceptable, but we are referring to an ideal for which the historical Jesus has supplied only the essential features. That this kind of attachment to Jesus should cease, in order to satisfy the demands of veracity, is surely not the wish of Roberts. In such an event, religion would certainly lose something which is essential to its nature. Religion always unfolds itself with the greatest vitality in the intercourse of a person with a person. For that reason it thinks of God as a Person with whom communion can be held, and greatly prefers to commune with a Person who at the same time comes nearer to the soul in the guise of humanity. In discussion with theologians, the truth must be most deeply emphasised that *it is impossible to hold a real communion with Jesus as a man of the past; what appears to be such a communion consists entirely in self-identification with the mental*

*attitude of Jesus, and in producing in oneself thoughts which are believed to be called into being by Jesus in a kind of conversation.* Such a proceeding, however, is richly fraught with blessing to the soul, even though it involves intellectual error. And naturally it leads to a lofty reverence such as is rendered to no other hero, however great, to no other benefactor of mankind, however eminent. To all these we look up with awe, with the feeling of littleness in comparison with them, with heartfelt gratitude for what we have received from them, and with the consciousness of still being by them helped forward on the path of victory. But towards none of them do men stand in relations of such intimate spiritual communion as towards Jesus, because the region in which they feel he is helping them is more central than in the case of the rest ; and because from none else as from him do they receive so deep an impression that he has a heart of love for every human being who approaches him—thanks to his image as depicted in the gospels (p. 78).

I have italicized a passage which is evidently very deliberate, and which deserves close attention. It may be described as the minimum construction that can be put upon the facts to which it refers. Dr. Schmiedel is, of all the writers that I know, the most austere rational ; and in this passage he has taken pains to ward off from himself the least suspicion of Mysticism. That being so, it is interesting to note how he goes on to rescue as much as possible of the sentiment of Christian devotion.

This is, as I have already remarked, characteristic of his essay all through. I must allow myself to

quote one or two more passages, which will enable us, I think, to do still more justice to this really remarkable position. I will again take the liberty of emphasizing points which seem to me specially noticeable :—

The further we go back into the beginnings of Christianity, the more must we recognise that the effort to rank Jesus on an equality with God was a noble effort, and a natural expression of the value which was attached to the Christian religion. The blessings which it brought were received, it is true, from God ; but they were received through Christ, and thus gratitude and veneration were also directed towards him. Paul makes him, in the first stage, an instrument in the hand of God (Rom. iii. 25, viii. 32) ; and yet Paul cannot avoid ascribing grace to Christ himself (2 Cor. viii. 9). *It is a very serious question whether we to-day should possess Christianity at all if Jesus had not been interpreted as a divine being.* In any case, this presentation of Christ, which corresponded to heathen modes of conceiving the gods and the sons of gods, has greatly contributed to the diffusion of Christianity. Thus it was in its own time a source of many blessings, and for that very reason if for no other we ought to be ready to pass a just estimate on the unfavourable after-results which it is producing to-day (p. 65).

In the essential matter of genuine piety what has come down to us from the religion of Jesus has proved itself to be of infinite value. His fundamental principles have actually permeated the world like leaven, and are permeating it more and more ; and so far, no prospect exists that anything better will be able to displace them (p. 75).

On Prof. Schmiedel's premisses we could not wish

for anything more clear-sighted or more just. But is there no reaction from the admissions made in the text back upon the premisses? Can the universe really be explained on such narrowly restricted lines? Are we to think of history as a tissue of self-deception? Are we to suppose that the natural and necessary forms of human thought at one period melt into mere mirage at another? Are the spiritual influences which seem so powerful and so deep merely cases of the human soul talking to itself, or talking in its sleep? The proper answer to Prof. Schmiedel surely is:—

There are more things in heaven and earth,  
Horatio,

Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

It is the philosophy that needs to be altered and enlarged, and not the world that is to be cut down to the measure of the philosophy.

Far more congenial is the essay of Prof. Henry Jones. The assumptions of Prof. Schmiedel seem to be very like those of eighteenth-century Deism. Prof. Jones, on the other hand, starts by assuming that ‘such conceptions as those of the divinity of man and the immanence of God are becoming commonplaces of religious thought’ (p. 92). He follows out the consequences of this assumption in a way that is perhaps onesided, but that at least within its limits has more affinity to the teaching of the Bible and historical Christianity. The warmth of the language with which Prof. Jones works out

the implications of the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God reminds us forcibly of more than one New Testament passage: 'For whom he foreknew, he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren' (Rom. viii. 29); 'For it became him, for whom are all things, and through whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the author of their salvation perfect through sufferings. For both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one: for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren' (Heb. ii. 10, 11). The chief point of difference is that the Biblical writers emphasized the 'leadership' no less than the 'brotherhood'.<sup>1</sup> And Prof. Jones does not ignore this; he says:—

I can well believe that [Jesus] felt that he stood alone in his mission; and that the revelation had come to him with a fulness and power with which it came to no other, I do not doubt: but if it could

<sup>1</sup> Cf. an excellent criticism in *Journ. of Theol. Studies* for January, 1910, p. 304; the writer is criticizing an objection brought against certain teaching of Dr. Denney's: "It is the exclusiveness of his relation to God which is at stake. Does Jesus alone stand in a true filial relation to God?" In his [Prof. Jones'] argument to the contrary it is a small matter that he seems to misunderstand Dr. Denney: but he seems also consistently to overlook certain commonplaces of Christian theology, as that in a very real sense God is recognized as the Father of all men, that the very possibility of "adoption" rests upon an original relation of "likeness"; that it is precisely where the loss incurred through practical denial of sonship has been most deeply felt that its reassertion on the

come in another way—and has it never come in any other way?—I do not believe that he would have concerned himself about the manner of its coming (p. 94).

I would not say myself that the revelation made by our Lord Jesus Christ was never made in any other way. Neither would I exactly deny what is asserted in the first two sentences of another eloquent passage:—

Jesus did not come *in order* to reveal his singularity or his isolation; nor, indeed, to reveal himself at all. The *purpose* of his coming was to show to men, not only with what love they were loved by himself, but with what love they were loved by God. 'I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare it: that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them.' It was this truth which Jesus taught; it was this that he presented in the living pattern of his life, that he ratified and exemplified by his consciousness of his

ground of fellowship with Jesus has been most triumphant. Curiously enough, Professor Jones does not (unless it is in a single parenthetical remark) raise the point which seems to be crucial, viz., that historically it has been through Jesus that men have discovered that they and the divine are "on one side", and that they have usually begun by discovering that ethically they were on the opposite side. The distinction between sonship real but not realized and sonship brought into unclouded consciousness is of vital importance for this discussion. It surely turns the edge of this criticism of Dr. Denney. For as long as men have not realized their sonship the divine must offer itself to their consciousness as "confronting them". And therein lies the simple explanation of the fact on which Dr. Denney lays stress, that "Jesus is set on the side of reality which we call divine". The truth is that this article, like some others in the volume, seeks to insert the critical knife where no joint is to be found.'

own Sonship, established and sealed by his death ; and it was this truth thus lived which gave to Jesus of Nazareth the place and the power which are all his own in the history of mankind (p. 93).

The Incarnate, as the Incarnate, 'did not come in order to reveal His singularity or His isolation.' What there was in Him of singularity and isolation was revealed incidentally in the course of His mission ; and the Church was not wrong in drawing out this and in building upon it. It is just once more a question of the 'hyphen'.

I see the difficulty. But I venture to hope that the view suggested, or the facts to which attention has been called, in these lectures may go some way to explain it. I have insisted upon the complete reality of our Lord's Manhood. I can even borrow the language of Prof. Schmiedel, and say with him :—

It is not for an instant doubtful that Jesus must be considered as man in the full sense of the term, and that anything divine may be sought in him only under the condition that his humanity is not put in question (p. 60).

The Church itself has asserted this, from Chalcedon onwards. And it does but, I think, make the whole position clearer to affirm, with Dr. Weston, that the consciousness of our Lord, in His incarnate state, was a genuinely and thoroughly human consciousness. But that does not contradict or exclude the presence beneath it of Deity one in kind with that of God who rules the universe. It did not

prevent our Lord from being aware of the presence of Deity within Him ; neither did it prevent this knowledge, especially towards the end of His earthly career, from surging up as it were within Him, and carrying with it a sense of boundless possibilities when the limitations of the flesh were removed and the Divine Spirit, instead of being 'cabin'd, crib'd, confin'd', went forth again conquering and to conquer :—

Christianity, then, found its originating impulse outside the limits of the Gospel story. Its faith was focussed on a spot beyond death. It existed to declare a fact which had its seat in Heaven. The fact upon which it built was expressed for it under the terms of Christ's exaltation to the right Hand of God. It is from that high Throne that He discharges this Power, the Holy Spirit, which men could see and hear. Without that Power there was no Gospel. For without that Power there could be no deliverance for man out of his moral impotence. The manifestation and confession of this impotence had been the sole supreme result of the preaching of the Baptist. Man could do nothing until he was baptized by the Fire of the Spirit. Until the Fire fell upon him and transfigured him, he was still arrested where the Baptist left him. And nothing that Jesus said or did, while He moved about among men doing good, set free the energising Fire. Pentecost is the actual birthday of the Christian religion (Canon Scott Holland, p. 122).

This is really to take history as it is, to give it its full value, and not to begin to explain away the facts as soon as we have got them. If it is true—

as it certainly is—that ‘the Spirit Himself beareth witness with our spirit that we are children of God’, the converse is no less true that our spirits bear witness to the working of the Divine Spirit. If we are ‘sons’, the sonship within us reflects and illustrates the Sonship of Him who is pre-eminently the Son.

The mistake made in the past has been to think of the Human and the Divine too much in contrast and opposition to each other, to think that we must needs weaken or restrict—or, if we may say so, dilute—our conception of the one in order to make room for the other. On the contrary, our real duty and our real policy is to emphasize fearlessly both sides at once: our Lord Jesus Christ is at one and the same time truly human and truly Divine. And the analogy of our own nature, as I have tried to work it out in the last two lectures, shows us, I believe, more clearly than anything else *how* this can be.

## POSTSCRIPT

IF I am not mistaken, the signs of the times are thickening which point to the urgency of such an inquiry as that which I have been undertaking and, I hope I may add, the helpfulness of the particular solution that has been suggested. As the last of the preceding lectures were being delivered there came into my hands a book by the Rev. J. M. Thompson entitled *Jesus according to St. Mark*, which has been somewhat adversely criticized and which I am aware has caused some disquietude. It is indeed a symptom of the extent to which modern problems and modern methods have taken hold of the minds of our younger scholars; and I cannot be surprised if to those who are not quite familiar with these problems and methods the effect should be at first sight disturbing. At least one review that I have seen is calculated to give a wrong idea both of the book and of its author. Mr. Thompson is a thoroughly believing and reverent writer; but he feels, as others of us feel, that if Christianity is to be restated in such a way as to carry conviction to the modern world it must be by methods that are strictly scientific and that do not involve any

assumptions. He feels that it is necessary to begin at the very beginning and work upwards step by step. This is what he has done. He has taken the oldest narrative Gospel, St. Mark, and he has sought to recover from it the first simple impression which it would give apart from all later comment and interpretation. The sum of this impression is given as follows :—

This, then, is the first conclusion towards which I am led by the evidence of the second Gospel—that Jesus is a single person, who *as a whole* lives a human life, and *as a whole* can be worshipped as divine. There is no possible or desirable division between what is human in him and what is divine. The human in him *is* divine. When he is most truly man, then he is most truly God (pp. 277 f.).

This is essentially the same conclusion that is arrived at in Dr. Weston's *The One Christ*, and also in these lectures. It is only arrived at in a different way—not from the side of dogma, nor yet from the side of psychological analysis, but by careful exegesis applied to the oldest Gospel. The convergent result of three such different inquiries seems to be in itself a fact of some importance.

It is true that the *surface* of our Lord's life is entirely human. Even the Deity in Him, on its way to expression, had to pass through, and is in this respect (i.e. in the forms of its expression) limited by, the human medium. But there is no paradox in this. On the contrary, it is what was to

be expected if there was to be any such thing as an Incarnation at all. The divine in man

dwells in deep retreats  
Whose veil is unremoved.

And the same description applies even to the God-head of the God-Man.

Another illustration tells in the same direction. Indeed I do not think that I should be wrong if I were to say that the main current of theological science has for some time past been setting this way. But the illustration which I am about to give deals directly with Christology.

When I first planned this course of lectures I expected to make considerable use of a careful and pleasingly objective article on 'Die neuesten Christologien im Verhältnis zum Selbstbewusstsein Jesu', by Prof. Dr. Karl Thieme of Leipzig, in *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* for 1908, pp. 401-72. The development of the lectures worked out rather differently, and the essay was left on one side; I had some doubt whether the details of it would be interesting to an English public, and it would not have contributed much to the particular line of construction which I was attempting. But to the broad issue now before us I believe that it does contribute.

The Christologies which Dr. Thieme passed in review were mostly from the Right or mediating parties, by such authors as Kunze, Schäder, R.

Seeberg, the two Kaftans, Häring. The first two of these writers followed traditional lines most closely, with excellent intentions but (as it seemed to me) not without some straining of language, while Seeberg seemed to combine some good and helpful remarks with others that were decidedly fanciful. I think that the construction which appealed to me most was that of Julius Kaftan. All the writers I have named wished to maintain the old doctrine of the Deity of Christ. The criticism which Dr. Thieme directed against them turned mainly round features in the life of Christ on earth, especially His constant attitude of faith, obedience, and prayer addressed to the Father. It was urged persistently that the attitude implied in these was essentially human, and therefore that Jesus was essentially Man.

Now, if the line of argument which I have taken, and which the writers whose alliance I am claiming have taken, is sound, all this may be frankly conceded, yet without any prejudice to the Deity of our Lord. We have seen that He was not only Man but thoroughly Man. Every Christian must insist that He was not only Man but thoroughly Man. Every Christian must insist that the faith of our Lord was real, His obedience was real, and the prayers addressed by Him to the Father were as real as ours. To maintain the contrary would be to revive the ancient Docetism. And it is probably true that many orthodox people do, with the best

of motives, verge upon what is practically Docetism. But if I am not mistaken, Dr. Thieme himself may help us to see how this might be. His own distinctive contribution to theology is the stress which he has laid upon, and the use which he has made of, the Christian virtue of Humility. Before writing the essay to which I have referred he brought out a book with the title *Die christliche Demut* (Giessen, 1906). The book, which is attractively written, sets forth at length that *humilitas Christi* which had been a favourite theme with St. Augustine.<sup>1</sup>

Both in the book and in the essay Dr. Thieme has studied with so much candour the unique sense of Sonship in Jesus, and the unique endowment out of which that sense arose, as almost to end in a confession of His Deity. He contemplates for a moment the conception of a Middle Being, a kind of demigod. But he rightly regards this as untenable, and the Christian instinct has always been against it. He therefore lapses back into simple Humanitarianism. In other words, with two sets of phenomena before him, he allows his ultimate conclusion to be determined by one, and leaves the other unaccounted for.

It is here that I would venture to press the alternative solution offered in these lectures. The strength of the position seems to me to be that it

<sup>1</sup> See Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*<sup>4</sup>, pp. 357, 359, 395, 399. Dr. Loofs points out (after Scheel) the presence of this thought in Hilary and Ambrose, and its subordinate place in Greek theology.

does full and equal justice to all the historical data. It recognizes at one and the same time a real Manhood and a real Godhead. And, while it does this, by its appeal to that mingling of divine and human of which we are conscious even in ourselves, it points towards a mode of Incarnation which we can within our measure realize and understand.



# SYMBOLISM

## IX

### THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF SYMBOLISM



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### THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF SYMBOLISM

IT fell to me, not very long ago, to set forth in some detail the place which Symbolism fills in the Bible.<sup>1</sup> I did this, because it was impressed upon me that a broad recognition of the extent of symbolism is necessary in any process of adjusting our modern ways of looking at things with the ancient ways. It was but natural that, while my statement of the case was so far as I know nowhere impugned, I did from one or two quarters receive a kindly hint or warning that the appeal to symbolism has its risks, that it is indeed an edged tool that may sometimes be found to cut away more than we wish or intend. I was well aware of this; indeed I had present to my mind examples of a use of the principle of symbolism with which personally I had no sympathy. Of most things there is a wrong use as well as a right, and in regard to most things there is a more or less wide extent of debatable ground as to what is wrong and what is right. My object was, on the occasion to which I have referred, to start from the solid ground of a fairly wide survey of facts. I confined myself to the Bible,

<sup>1</sup> See *The Life of Christ in Recent Research* (1907), pp. 3-34.

and I tried to form some idea, and to help others to form some idea, of the actual place which symbolism holds in the Bible. I did not then seek to press the inquiry further, or to apply the principle which I was laying down. I left the further step to be taken later; and it is that further step, or at least a part of it, that I am endeavouring to take now.

We look about for indications of some rule or principle to be followed in the use that we make of symbolism. And I do not know what others will think, but I should be myself disposed to say that the most helpful example with which I am acquainted is to be found in a poet—the one poet of all others who (to my thinking at least) has done most to help us to adjust our compass and take our bearings among the complex conditions of our modern life. Many here will be familiar with a short poem in blank verse contained in the last volume of Browning's poems, the volume which by a coincidence was published on the very day on which the poet died. It is called 'Development', and it begins:

My father was a scholar and knew Greek :  
you will remember the rest. A small boy of five  
asks his father what he is reading. He is told that  
the book is about the siege of Troy. The lad presses  
his question :

What is a siege and what is Troy?

whereupon his father piles up the nursery chairs and tables and tells him that is a town and is to stand for Troy; the boy himself is Priam, King of Troy; the cat is Helen, enticed away by wicked Paris. Achilles is the pony; the two dogs are the Atreidai; the page-boy is Hector—and so on. Two or three years later the father comes upon his son with his playmates playing their game of the Siege of Troy; he now thinks that he is advanced enough to read Pope, and he puts into his hands Pope's *Iliad*, with the further promise that he shall soon begin Greek and study the *Iliad* in the original. This the lad does, and at the age of twelve, when he finds that with the help of grammar and lexicon he can make his way through the Greek, he begins to think that he knows all about it and that there is nothing more to be known; until one fine day he hears of Wolf's *Prolegomena*, and presently of a dozen more followers of Wolf who, he is given to understand, have

Proved there was never any Troy at all,  
Neither Besiegers nor Besieged,—nay, worse,—  
No actual Homer, no authentic text,  
No warrant

for the whole story. That is the point at which Browning left it, with some little moralizing upon the father's method, what he had told and what he had not told, and the reason for his reservations; why he had not tried to teach the child everything at once but had let him into the secret piecemeal,

at intervals of time and by distinct steps and degrees. Perhaps at the present moment Wolf's *Prolegomena* is not exactly the last word. There has been, I imagine, some reaction since. Perhaps we can reconstruct rather better the process by which the poem assumed its present shape. It was a discovery—or rather, perhaps I should say, a brilliant guess—that the poem arose out of ballads recited by wandering minstrels in the halls of the chiefs. And yet the very probable view that the poem had its ultimate origin in these is not a complete account of the whole matter. Doubtless the ballads were collected together so as to form a series, and this series became more and more stereotyped. The poem passed through phases, and had a history. And yet there is a unity about it. At some point in the chain the master-hand came in and left its indelible mark behind. It may still be something of a problem exactly at what point this happened, and whether there was one master-hand or more. But these are questions of detail and perhaps in part of speculation that can never be wholly set at rest.

You will readily see to what all this is tending, and I need not enlarge at any great length upon it. Browning's poem is of course a parable. The education of this boy as he goes on to youth and manhood has its counterpart on a grander scale in the education of the world. We may think of all human progress as carrying out a comprehensive

divine design. The progress falls into periods, each of which has its appropriate method. We may call the first 'symbolical' or figurative in the narrower sense, where the sign is comparatively remote from the thing signified and associated with it by a deliberate act of naming or application. It was not so much any obvious resemblance as the father's word which made the piled-up chairs and tables represent Troy town and the cat and the dogs Helen and her pursuers. There is enough real resemblance to make the comparison natural and up to a certain point intelligible; the boy understands as much as his mental development at the time permits him to understand. He has learnt his first lesson, and the way is prepared for further lessons. Then we come to a stage which we may call 'paraphrastic', where what is written in one language and at one time is translated into another language which is also the language of another time. As the language differs, so also does the whole complex of ideas differ, and the mind is always seeking, not for identity, but for the nearest equivalents it can find. Thirdly, we come to a method which we will call 'exegetical', where the object to be understood is attacked more directly, as if by the aid of grammar and lexicon. We are coming at last to closer quarters; at the same time there is a certain literalness about this method which makes the diversity of treatment seem less than it really is.

I may note by the way that there is an

ambiguity in Browning's poem which rather interferes with the complete symmetry of its expression. Sometimes he speaks as though it were the *Iliad*, as a work of literature, that was to be understood ; sometimes, as though it were the substance of the story contained in the *Iliad*, a possible real Siege of Troy as an event of prehistoric times, dimly seen through the veil of the poem. It is quite conceivable that there was such an event ; and I gather that ethnological science at present inclines to the view that there was something of the kind, in connexion with those early racial movements which preceded the settlement of Hellenic peoples on both sides of the Aegean. Of course this cannot be more than a hypothesis ; we are peering by torchlight into an age that is dark to us. At the same time there is sufficient probability to suggest a reasonable belief, or at least the shadow of a belief.

Lastly, we have the 'critical' method, not at first timorous and hesitating but rather drastic and tending to extremes. That has been sometimes the way with criticism ; it has been a surgical process in which the operator has been carried beyond the point of discretion by the new-found pleasure in operating. By degrees the youthful zeal has been curbed and a juster balance struck between old and new.

But the point that I wish to bring out and to lay stress upon most is that, beneath all these differing modes of presentation and apprehension, there is an

underlying identity and unity. It is only a difference of presentation and apprehension ; the thing to be presented or apprehended remains one and the same. In the case of the *Iliad* as a poem, the object is a perfectly definite and tangible quantity ; in the case of the events which may be supposed to be behind the poem, the object to be ascertained is of course far more elusive, something

half-guessed, half-seen,  
Grasped at—not gained, held fast.

Of such subject-matter as this we can only speak with due caution and reserve.

There is what we might perhaps call *a system of equivalence* : the ‘critical’ method at one stage corresponds to the ‘exegetical’ at another, and that to the ‘paraphrastic’ at a third and the ‘symbolical’ at a fourth. But the change is only in the mode of presentation ; the essence of that which is presented remains unchanged. From our limited human point of view, the change of presentment may seem to cut in deep ; but it must not be allowed to cut in too deep. We need to remind ourselves from time to time that the way in which a thing appears to us does not affect the underlying reality.

This caution is perhaps especially needed in the case of Theology. The truths of theology in its different branches vary in their nature. Some are as definite as the text of the *Iliad*, and are to be

determined by methods as strictly objective and scientific. For instance, the textual criticism of the New Testament differs in no essential particular from that of the *Iliad*; it is equally a weighing of evidence, and the reconstruction of a history based on positive data as far as they will carry.

But many theological truths are more mixed in their nature. There is an element in them of direct and, if we are to call it so, scientific inference; but there is also an element of remoter inference or speculation. In regard to these mixed truths it is worth while to remember Milton's description:—

To be still searching for what we know not by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it (for all her body is homogeneous and proportional), this is the golden rule in Theology as well as in Arithmetic (*Areopagitica*, ed. Arber, p. 67).

This is a general description: but over and above any such description, it is suggested to us that certain conditions should be satisfied by any construction that is likely to maintain itself as true. If it is the same fundamental truth that assumes those different forms of which we have been speaking, then conversely, if we attempt to argue backwards from the forms to the truth behind them, we should have some assurance that the truth which we set out to discover is the same. It should have upon it the note of identity; and when we try to trace the historical process by which it assumed these varied forms one after the other, there should be upon our

reconstruction of the process the note of continuity. In other words, when we compare the forms in which a given belief presents itself at one period and at another, we ought not to see in it difference only, but likeness in difference. The comparison should end in our being able to re-affirm the old truth—modified, it may be, corrected and amended so as to suit the new conditions—and not simply in our contradicting and denying it. It is the principle which, in the sphere not so much of science as of feeling, Wordsworth expressed so felicitously long ago :—

The child is father of the man ;  
And I could wish my days to be  
Bound each to each by natural piety.

Right or wrong, this principle has either tacitly or explicitly guided all my own studies ; and I have never yet had reason to consider it disproved. On the contrary, I seem to myself to have had some reason to consider it verified and confirmed.

I may be allowed perhaps to illustrate this from the history of two conceptions in regard to which what may seem to be very different views have been held at different times.

All down the centuries, almost as far back as thought can go, there has been throughout the various races of mankind the persistent belief that God *reveals* Himself to man. The metaphor that has been most commonly used to describe this revelation has been

the metaphor of 'speaking'. One of the most primitive forms of it may be seen in the Hebrew tradition which relates how our first parents 'heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day' (Gen. iii. 8). The writer doubtless thought of a real voice, actually and literally heard. The Old Testament is full of stories of revelation conveyed directly through the senses of sight and hearing. And we may well believe that there was not a little real foundation for that belief; the men of that age really saw sights and heard sounds which they took to be, and which were for them, divine revelations.

The centuries pass, and not very long after the beginning of the Christian era we again open our Bibles and read: 'God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in His Son, whom He appointed heir of all things, through whom also He made the worlds' (Heb. i. 1, 2). There is a world of theology, a broad comprehensive view of religious history, compressed in those brief clauses. And the view embodied in them lasted on with very little change of expression all across the Middle Ages. A really new stage does not open out until we come to the Reformation. Then we are told that

Melancthon discoursing with Luther touching the prophets, who continually boast thus: 'thus saith the Lord,' asked whether God in person spoke with

them or no. Luther replied: They were very holy, spiritual people, who seriously contemplated upon holy and divine things: therefore God spake with them in their consciences, which the prophets held as sure and certain revelations (Luther's *Table-Talk*, dxlix).

That is exactly the right way to put it. When the prophets claimed that God spoke with them, they meant what they said. It was the nearest way they had of describing the process that went on in their minds. Luther does not in the least find fault with them for this, or question their veracity. He only goes on to describe the same process in a different way; in a way that was better suited to his own age. And it is again only a like adaptation to modern ideas when Professor P. Gardner, with still further insight and penetration, writes as follows:

From the present point of view the question of the inspiration or non-inspiration of a book is not primary. For how does divine inspiration act upon a writer? In two ways: first by strengthening and intensifying his natural powers, and second, by producing in him what W. James has called an uprush of the sub-conscious. I should prefer to call the last an inrush of the super-conscious. It makes a man a vehicle of deep-lying forces, so that he builds better than he knows. He may think that he is writing for a society, or even for an individual, when he is really writing for future ages, and to meet needs of which he is unconscious (*Cambridge Biblical Essays*, p. 417).

That is to place the belief in divine revelation,

communicated through human media, on the reasoned basis of modern psychology.

The point that I would ask you to notice is the absolute continuity that runs through the process. The language of Genesis is very different from that of the Epistle to the Hebrews; that again differs from the language of Luther; and Luther in turn has undergone considerable development of expression in the version of the modern psychologist. The process is one of evolution; but in this case of evolution in a straight line. We might say that the most advanced conception of modern philosophy was all contained in germ in the simple primitive belief of the writer of the early document incorporated in the Book of Genesis. At no point in the series is there anything of the nature of contradiction; there is only a fuller and more exact explication of meanings already presupposed.

In like manner, if we take a single important branch of that method of revelation which God has pursued in His dealings with men. Prophecy is such a branch, and the fulfilment of prophecy has been differently conceived at different times. In the New Testament period men were struck, and could not but be struck, by the marked resemblance between the series of events which they saw unfolding itself before their eyes and the language of ancient prediction, or what they took to be prediction. It had been as a matter of fact thrown out into the future in a vague mysterious way, but

with a kind of confidence that it would find its fulfilment in due time. The contemporaries of Christ, and—we may say it with all reverence—Christ Himself, saw in this correspondence the working out of a pre-established order and a great divine design. But they were content to note the fact. If they philosophized upon it, they did so (if we may thus describe it) in the forms of a philosophy which was not so much intellectual theory as religion. In other words, they were content to see in it and to feel in it the hand of God ordering all things according to His will. But, beyond this, they did not make the relation of prophecy to fulfilment a matter of speculation; they did not stay to analyse the process; they did not attempt to fill in the intermediate links by which beginning and end were connected together. But this abstention of theirs does not preclude us from attempting to fill in these links. The ancients found no difficulty in leaping over a gap of ages. On one side of the gap was the divine word, on the other side was the divine fulfilment; that was enough. But we have to trace the course of this wireless telegraphy. We do it through the medium of *insight into principle*. The prophets understood the principles of God's working. They expounded these principles with reference to their own time, but not without a consciousness that they were no less applicable to other times than their own. They might be even more applicable; because the

later series of events might be on a grander scale than the earlier. In this way it ceases to be a paradox to say that the prophetic word was not seldom fulfilled on more magnificent lines than they themselves intended and knew. They did not know it, in the sense of any human foresight; but they were well aware that all fulfilments were in the hand of God, and nothing that He did could ever surprise them.

I may take such examples as these as instances of what may be called the normal relation between modern thought and ancient. The modern view supplements, adjusts, and within certain limits corrects, the ancient; but it does not lift up its voice and say, We are right, and the ancients were wrong; we are they that ought to speak, and wisdom shall die with us.

This is the kind of principle that I should wish to apply in all cases of the relation of ancient and modern in the field of religion, and especially of the Christian religion.

The most urgent question of the kind at the present time has to do with the relation of private judgement to the historic Creeds. An English churchman, and especially an English cleric, may state it as a question of the relation of individual opinion to the Creeds and Articles. I desire to meet this question as directly and as precisely as I can.

Doubtless there is a marked distinction between the Creeds and the Articles; but for our present purpose they may be treated together. We only have to remind ourselves what the Creeds and Articles essentially are. The Creeds are, strictly speaking, the confession of faith of the ancient Church; the Articles are the confession of faith of the Church of England in the sixteenth century. There is a certain process of extension involved in taking either the Creeds or the Articles as confessions of faith for the present day. But our real object is to get at the *mind* of the Universal Church as lying behind the Creeds, and the *mind* of the National Church as lying behind the Articles. From this point of view it is easy to see that they are all we have to fall back upon. There are no other formulated confessions that claim our acceptance; and, under present conditions, it would be hopeless to think of obtaining any. They are the *nearest approach* to present-day confessions for the Catholic Church and for the National Church, and it is in that sense that we use them. We use the Creeds in worship as representing the mind of the Church Universal as nearly as we can come to it. We do not use the Articles in worship, but we keep them as a standard of reference when we want to know what was the mind of the National Church when it started upon its career of greater independence. The recitation of the Creeds in public worship is a corporate act, and we take part in it as a corporate act;

for the moment the individual sinks himself in the society. I may say in passing that for this reason I am less sensitive than some of my friends, and less sensitive than I used to be myself, about such a matter as the recitation of the so-called Athanasian Creed.<sup>1</sup> It is not really *I* who say it, but the Church which says it. And the Church does not say it exactly in the way of which it would most approve to-day, but we in the Church of England make use of the only form we have—or rather of this as one of the three only forms we have—in regard to which we have a definite historical guarantee that they really stand for the mind of the Church Universal. If I were to analyse my own consciousness in repeating the Creed, I should say that I repeat it, not as an individual, but as a member of the Church. I do not feel that I am responsible for it; what I am responsible for is the desire to enter into the mind of the Church. I tacitly correct the defects of expression, because I believe that the Church would correct them if it could, but it cannot. For the Creed as it stands the Church is responsible, and not I.

The use of the Creeds in public worship is one thing, and their use as a standard of opinion is another. As a standard of opinion, again, we must distinguish between their use for public purposes

<sup>1</sup> It does not follow that I am in favour of retaining the compulsory use of the Creed as it stands, which is a burden to so many consciences.

and for private. With private opinion, as I conceive, the world at large is not concerned. On this head I do not feel called upon to speak at all, and yet I will say a few words in case they should possibly be helpful to others. The way, then, in which I myself regard the Creeds, from this most individual and personal point of view, is as great outstanding historical monuments of the faith of the Church. As such I cannot but look upon them with veneration. As such I desire as well as I can to conform my own opinions to them. But the same principle comes into play that I have just been laying down. I desire to enter into the mind of the Church. I desire to the utmost of my ability to be loyal to that mind. But, at the same time, I cannot forget that the critical moments in the composition of the Creeds were in the fourth and fifth centuries, and that they have never been revised or corrected since. It is impossible that the thought and language of those centuries should exactly coincide with the genuine, spontaneous, unbiased, scientific—or that aims at being scientific—thought and language of the present day. We must modernize, whether we will or no. But, indeed, one does not aim at a mechanical coincidence. I suppose that as a matter of fact not the Creeds alone, but the whole course of history as culminating in the Creeds, looms before the mind; and the mind, not so much consciously as subconsciously, plays upon the image which it receives, and tries to reduce it to harmony

with the results of its own independent research. It is only by an effort that one can bring the process to a head in the precise formulation of detail. But all the time there is shaping itself an indefinable background of thought, which is like the indefinable background of character. This background (if we are to call it so) belongs to the subconscious rather than to the conscious region of mental activity. It constitutes what we call the 'self', and it is never at rest, but is always growing; and it is this which in the end brings about the fusion of old and new. The particular form of fusion each one of us must work out for himself. To his own Master he stands or falls.

If we believe that the world is one, and that the whole course of history is one, the working out of a single divine purpose, coherent and continuous in all its parts—whether we are able to see the coherence and continuity or not; if we have this fixed belief in our minds, then the process will not be really so difficult as it may appear. It will doubtless contain gaps—abundance of gaps; it is not to be expected that any one individual, under present conditions, should be able to work out an absolutely consistent theory of the universe from beginning to end. But the great thing is that the main outlines are marked out for us; if we come to a gap, we know why it is a gap; and we also know that it is sure to be filled up in time. But all that we need is patience; and faith is the mother of patience. If

we once have an assured hold on God in Christ, all the rest will come, when and as He wills.

The clue that guides us through this mighty maze is the principle of continuity. But, once more, we have to remember that this continuity is not mechanical. What we have to look for, and what we may expect to find, is not any rigid and formal identity of expression; it is an identity not of the letter but of the spirit. In other words, the continuous thread that we hold in our hands is *truth to type*, the genuine Christian type, manifested at sundry times and in divers manners, but preserving throughout its essential oneness and its essential harmony.



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# PERSONALITY IN CHRIST AND IN OURSELVES

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CHAPLAIN IN ORDINARY TO THE KING

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1911

HENRY FROWDE, M.A.  
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD  
LONDON, EDINBURGH, NEW YORK  
TORONTO AND MELBOURNE

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THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY  
IN CHRIST AND IN OURSELVES

I  
PERSONALITY IN OURSELVES



# I

## PERSONALITY IN OURSELVES

THE object of this lecture is to take up and continue the course which I began about this time last year and the book in which it was embodied. The leading idea of those lectures was expressly described as tentative ; it could not well be otherwise, because it sought for a solution of old questions in a rather new direction. On this side therefore the book invited criticism. When one is feeling one's way in any subject, it is always a help to see at what points questions are raised. Substantial help of this kind has been given me ; and I have also in the meantime been trying to carry my own thought one or two steps further. The net result of this process I should now like to lay before you, in the hope that with further co-operation a further advance may be made.

I would only ask you to understand that what I am going to put before you is still very tentative. I do not think there is any heresy in it—at least not so far as the theology is concerned ; I am not so sure about the philosophy. But if there is, I shall not go to the stake for it ; in other words, I am quite prepared to receive correction, and that from any side.

To prove that I am in earnest in this, I have asked leave to print as footnotes some criticisms on the rough draft of these lectures for which I have to thank a friend, Professor H. R. Mackintosh of Edinburgh, who reviewed my book very carefully and instructively in *The Expository Times*. I don't mind putting my ideas, such as they are, upon the dissecting board, if by so doing I can help you to think more clearly and more truly. I am a believer in the maxim that

men may rise on stepping stones  
Of their dead selves to higher things ;

and to be afraid of being found wrong is a foppery to which I do not mean to yield.

I was endeavouring to feel my way, with all reverence and caution, into that great mystery which we call the Incarnation. I was endeavouring to find for it an expression which might be called modern, in the sense that it was brought into relation with modern methods and ideas as in ancient Theology it had been brought into relation with ancient ideas. And the direction in which I sought to do this was suggested by a simple consideration of the conditions of the problem. The Incarnation is the meeting of Human and Divine. But have we no experience in ourselves of a meeting of human and divine? Yes, I was inclined to say, we have such an experience. And, if we

look at it steadily enough, I believe we shall find this throw some light on the higher problem.

There was one point that seemed to come out as we contemplate those divine influences which we have reason to believe are operative in ourselves. They do from time to time make themselves felt in consciousness. But when we say 'make themselves felt', the process must not be thought of too directly. We recognize them by their effects. As St. Paul says, 'The fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, long-suffering' and the like. We see the product, and we infer the cause. The 'fruits' lie upon the surface; but the working of the Spirit is beneath the surface; it takes place in regions that are beyond our observation. The influence of the Spirit plays upon the roots of our being; and that to such an extent that it does not seem too much to say that these lower regions are the proper sphere within which the Spirit of God acts upon the soul of man.<sup>1</sup> In this fact—so far as it is a fact—I

<sup>1</sup> 'When the Spirit presents and commends Christ to me, does what happens go on, properly and predominantly, in the "lower regions"? I should grant, naturally, that *all* conscious process had unconscious as its concomitant "underside"' (H. R. M.).—If I may say so, I like that expression 'its concomitant "underside"'. I am tempted to think that if my friend would develop all that he himself means by it, we might be found nearer together than we may perhaps seem. In any case, the difference between us is only that perhaps I attach more importance to this 'underside' than he does. And by 'attaching more importance' to it, I mean that I regard a larger part of the psychical process as falling within it. See the next note.

seemed to see the key to the nature of the union between the human and divine in Christ.

But I willingly admit that this suggestion that I made raises many questions, and that the discussion cannot rest at the point at which I left it.

There is indeed one objection to which I exposed myself that I should like to clear away, and that I believe I can clear away, at once. More than one of my reviewers has thought that I gave an undue preference to the unconscious and subconscious states over the conscious, that I treated these states as superior in themselves. That was not at all my intention. I was simply trying to describe the psychical processes as well as I could without any attempt to construct a comparative scale of values. But it is true that I was dealing with a particular limited group of phenomena, and if I was supposed to be doing more than this the space that I gave to these might easily seem disproportionate. But I had no mind to write a general treatise on Psychology. If I left out a great deal that might naturally come into such a treatise, it was not that I intended to deny or undervalue it, but only that I took it for granted. I meant what I had to say to be added to our current ideas, and not as a substitute for them. I do not doubt that I ought to have made this clearer. But, however that may be, I shall try now to repair the fault. The purpose of these two lectures is to fill up, as well as I can, the gap that was left, to take a wider survey and to set the processes that

I described more in their place in the whole economy of human nature.

Another cause may have contributed to the mistaken impression to which I referred. I was speaking of the action and influence of the Spirit of God upon the soul. But we instinctively give to the Divine precedence over the human; and it is quite possible that I may in that sense have used language which seemed to ascribe to processes in which this Divine action was involved something of a higher dignity. But, here again, I was not deliberately constructing a table of values. If I had been doing so, I believe that I should have been more guarded; because values stand in relation to ends, and must be judged in view of this relation. A process higher in itself, may be lower in its bearing upon human life, and especially in its bearing upon human responsibility.<sup>1</sup> From this point of view without

<sup>1</sup> My friend writes: 'The objection, as it appears to me, is not against your ascribing a higher value to process in which the Divine is involved; that, probably, all would consent to. But the question rather is: In which processes is the Divine most involved, and most valuably present; and to this I should answer, in conscious processes, as faith and love.'—Are not 'faith and love', as psychical processes of which we are conscious, strictly human? I should naturally speak of them as results or products of Divine influence, and not of the Divine influence as consciously (if I may interpolate the word) involved or present in them. In my book I spoke of the index moving over the dial-plate; and I should say that faith and love were what the index pointed to, but not the weight or force by which it is moved; that is hidden below out of sight.

doubt conscious states take precedence of sub- and unconscious. It is in the light of day that those decisions are taken which leave the deepest mark upon character.

I quite agree that character is built up by the series of moral judgements. I never for a moment meant to imply anything else. It did not even occur to me that I should be challenged on this head. Once more, I took for granted all the common doctrine on these subjects. My critics have given me credit for being more of an innovator than I proposed to myself to be. But, be that as it may, I shall try on the present occasion to place the point that I desire to state in its fuller setting. I shall try to trace more directly than I did the relation of those sub- and unconscious motions to the whole sum of human life, and especially to that central part of it that we call the Self or Person.

I cannot ascertain that even among professed philosophers there is any generally accepted doctrine of Personality. A German friend whom I can implicitly trust tells me that there is no monograph on this subject in German. The most direct discussion of the subject that I can find, from the point of view from which I am approaching it, is an essay by the late Professor William Wallace in the volume of collected *Lectures and Essays* published after his lamented death in 1898. Unfortunately, this essay was not even written for publication, and it had not the advantage of revision by its author. It is

evidently the work of a real philosopher, which is far more than I can pretend to be myself. Still I confess that the essay makes upon me the impression—and in the circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that it should do so—that it is rather what might be called the rough copy for an article, than a finished piece of work. Ideas run into each other without sufficient discrimination; and there seems to me to be a want of articulate construction about the whole. I do not doubt that the second draft would have differed considerably from the first.

I have read with much interest a volume entitled *Personalism* (London, 1908) by the late Professor Borden P. Bowne. This (if I may be allowed to say so) seems to be of great value on the general question of method in philosophy. If I understand the book aright, it is a plea for looking out upon the world from the point of view of personality as a whole, as contrasted with the method of purely intellectual abstraction that has been so much in vogue. To one who, like myself, is inclined to lay stress on the relativity of all our thinking, and who is content that his own thinking should be frankly relative, this point of view is very attractive. For a philosophical background to the considerations that I am about to offer, I would gladly go to Professor Bowne. But I do not think that he anywhere defines or analyses what he means by Person; he seems to assume the varied contents of the word.

More directly helpful for our purpose is the

chapter on 'Self as Ideal Construction' in Professor G. F. Stout's *Manual of Psychology* (2nd edition, 1907). Professor Stout is a clear and satisfactory writer; and I find most of what I want in his book—some things perhaps implied rather than directly stated. I hope I may be forgiven if I say—speaking purely as a layman and from the outside—that I doubt if this is quite one of his best chapters. Once again, the construction does not altogether please me; but that is perhaps because I come to it with questions of my own which are not exactly those that were present to the mind of the writer.

The writings of M. Bergson are full of subtle and delicate and beautiful remarks, and I have every sympathy with his point of view. It is possible that I ought to have found in these writings more that was directly to my purpose. But I have rather the feeling that in order to appreciate the bearing of M. Bergson's researches upon my present subject it would be necessary to possess a more complete grasp upon his philosophy than I have had time to obtain.

I am left therefore more or less to my own resources, and must make shift to do what I can—which I am afraid means entering upon philosophical ground without being a philosopher. I feel like the two men in Bunyan's allegory whom the pilgrim saw 'come tumbling over' a side wall of the narrow way that led to the celestial city. Their names were Formalist and Hypocrisy, and they came to

a bad end. I dare say that I too shall come to a bad end—though I hope not exactly the bad end that befitted those particular names. I feel too much like them, or—shall I say?—like David in Saul's armour. There is only just this to be said: I do not trouble myself, and I do not mean to trouble you, with the ultimate questions of philosophy—especially the great question of Appearance and Reality. I am content to take things at their face value. If I can satisfy myself as to what a thing means for us men as men, I do not ask to know what it might conceivably mean for other beings differently constituted or in the absolute standard of the universe. I speak of course only for myself in this; I am glad that others should take higher flights. I leave it for the future to determine more exactly than we can at present what is the real meaning of Spirit and what are the precise relations between Spirit and Matter. I assume that man is a responsible being, i.e. that there is something within him—however mysterious and (as yet) indefinable that something may be—by virtue of which he is responsible. I do not mean by this to take him out of the chain of causation, but only to contend that there must be an element in his nature which furnishes substantial ground for the practical assumption that he is responsible. And it seems to me that this substantial ground corresponds most nearly to the condition of which we are conscious in ourselves. We are, or at least seem to be,

conscious of a certain power of *initiating* both thought and action. No doubt that power is limited and qualified, the initiation is relative, and not absolute; we do not, at the point to which science has at present attained, know exactly what it means. It is possible, if we will, to analyse it away. But that is just what we refuse to do; because, by doing so, we should only be cutting away our own foothold. We should be stultifying ourselves; because a philosophy which by a straight and direct course landed its adherents in gaol, whatever else it was, would not be the kind of philosophy we want, viz. a guide of life.

We have such a guide, if we only take things as we find them; if we do not treat our own consciousness as utterly misleading; if we start from this apparent power that we possess of setting trains of thought and action in motion, and of judging ourselves and others by the way in which we exercise that power.

This brings me to the point more especially before me, the doctrine of the Person. I must try, if I can, to explore that doctrine a little further. I premise that I do so on the level of simple introspection—but of introspection carried out upon as wide a scale as possible. Besides the self-interrogation of the individual there is the unconscious psychology of the race. That unconscious psychology finds its expression in language. And those philosophers

are perfectly justified who, from Socrates onwards, have taken language, the common speech of the people, as their starting point. In the present case we begin by reminding ourselves of the history of the word Person. *Persona* of course in the first instance meant 'mask', the actor's mask—which covered the head and differed according to the kind of part played by the actor—and then a part or character generally. In this way the word came to denote the occupant of one character as contrasted with another, and so passed over into the law-books for the individual as distinguished from other individuals, or for 'person' as opposed to 'thing'. The slave had no legal personality. Personality as such carried with it certain rights and certain duties, the latter consisting mainly in respect for the corresponding rights of others. In the scale of being it marked the highest stage, at once of dignity and of responsibility. These two senses, the dramatic and the legal, have really had much to do with determining the later use of the word, even where its origin was forgotten. They lingered on in the background, and their presence there affected the later philosophical meaning.

In passing over to these later phases of meaning, we find ourselves brought up against a difficulty at which I have already hinted. We are agreed, I suppose, that Personality is spirit. But spirit as such is indescribable; if we attempt to describe it, we can only do so in terms of matter. We are

driven back upon metaphor and symbol. We know that we are using metaphor and symbol, and nothing more.<sup>1</sup> And yet the extraordinary thing is that we find we can do this. Our material language conveys a meaning which we recognize to be a meaning. I am going to use a metaphor which is so homely that I feel I must prepare you for it beforehand. I do not profess to be a philosopher, and therefore I may perhaps allow myself a little more latitude than would be allowed to a philosopher. I have found

<sup>1</sup> 'I can scarcely accept the position that our conception of spirit is wholly symbol. I tend rather to say it is indefinable—that is, something so *sui generis* that while we have the "feel" of its reality in immediate perception, we cannot state it in terms of anything else. In the same way "good" is really indefinable (cf. that remarkably acute book, G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*). Or once again, Bergson arrives at the conclusion that freedom is indefinable. Define it, he says, and at once you are done for; the Determinists or the pure arbitrary Libertarians have you at their mercy' (H. R. M.).—This is just the difference between a philosopher and one who is not a philosopher: *sui generis* is a phrase that I really wanted; and indeed I think that I can accept the whole of my friend's language as an improvement upon my own. He is able to speak of 'spirit' in the terms appropriate to it, where I am compelled to have recourse to metaphor, knowing it to be metaphor. I am glad to see that in substance he agrees with what I said above when I spoke of assuming 'that man is a responsible being', i. e. that there is something within him—however mysterious and (as yet) indefinable that something may be—by virtue of which he is responsible. This is the sense and the degree in which it seems to me that freedom is really indefinable; there is an ultimate element in it that *as yet* we do not understand. I do not suppose that philosophers will be permanently content with this position, but it seems to mark the point at present reached.

it conducive to clearness to state to myself what I conceive to be the chief point in the problem of Personality in some such way as this :—

Are we to think of Personality as (i) the pincushion *without the pins*? Or are we to think of it (ii) as the pincushion *with all the pins*? Or is it (iii) a big *black-headed pin* standing up in the middle of the pincushion and overtopping the other pins?

Those are the alternative possibilities that we must set ourselves to consider. And in doing so we must remember, not only that we are comparing spiritual things with material, but also that this pincushion of ours and all that is in it must be thought of as *alive*. We must think (as it were) of a perpetual series of electric currents passing backwards and forwards from pincushion to pins and from one pin to another, including the biggest.

This vital connexion, or inter-connexion, between all parts of the psychical mechanism is perhaps at least part of the reason for the ambiguity in which the discussion of Personality seems often to be involved. I spoke above of Professor Wallace's essay and I explained the disadvantages under which it was published. It was probably owing in large measure to these disadvantages that it seems to me to suffer from the ambiguity that I have just mentioned. I believe that we shall find in it the word Person or Self used in all three senses, but they are allowed more or less to run into each other, and are not clearly and definitely kept apart.

At the same time I think that it may be instructive, and that it may help us to clear up our own ideas, if we make use of Prof. Wallace's essay to illustrate the different senses of which I have been speaking. It will be at least a gain to have them discussed by a trained philosopher.

i. I take then, first, that way of conceiving of personality which I have compared to the idea of a pincushion without pins. I am inclined to think that some such idea as this lay behind the original use of the Greek word which came to be treated as corresponding to the Latin *persona* and our 'person'. The Greek word *ὑπόστασις* was not the first to be used in formulating the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; the Latin word *persona*, which goes back to Tertulian, came before it. But at a later stage in the discussions it was specially appropriated as a technical term expressive of the doctrine, and of all the terms so used (as compared with either *persona* or *πρόσωπον*) it is probably the most appropriate and the most accurate. There is a danger that *persona* should make the distinction implied too great, and that *πρόσωπον* should make it too little. As compared with these *ὑπόστασις* observes the happier mean. It does not emphasize so much the idea of 'distinctness' as that of 'special function'. The word *ὑπόστασις* meant originally 'ground of being', and so 'ground of (individual) being'; but we are free to lay upon the 'individuality' so much stress as we please, or as is right, and no more.

Now some of Professor Wallace's language appears to approach rather nearly to this conception of an abstract 'ground of being'. For instance this :

We begin with what may be termed 'psychological personality': the 'I' which 'is not a conception, but a mere consciousness that accompanies all conceptions'. Thus the 'I think' is a conception (or judgement) which is the vehicle of all concepts whatever. Or, as it is put in the *Proleg.* § 46, note, 'the "I" is no conception, but only a designation of the object of the inner sense, so far as we do not apprehend it under any specific character: it is nothing but a "sense of existing" (*Gefühl eines Daseyns*) without the least conception, and only represents to us something to which all thinking stands in relation.' Kant's point, it must be observed, is that the 'I' is not a thing or object among other things: we cannot put it before us as an object: if we could do so, the 'I' would cease to be an 'I', and become a Not-I. Or, as he otherwise puts it, the 'I' is not something of which we have a 'standing and abiding impression', a steady clear image (*Lectures and Essays*, p. 283).

Again, the following, also in paraphrase from Kant, is much to the same effect:—

Kant then seeks to show that the Ego cannot be treated on the same level as the mental or physical phenomena which it observes; it cannot be well or adequately described by such terms as 'substance', 'thinking thing', and the like. It is the perpetual concomitant of all mental acts, but not the single object of any: if it be made an object, it is of a peculiar sort—a subject-object. We may to some extent consider it in abstraction from its

special phases or attachments, but we ought not to speak of it as existing apart from them. We cannot take the 'I' out of ourselves and put it 'there' before us. It is true the consciousness 'I think' is a simple and unanalysable consciousness; whenever we go into further detail, we leave the simplicity of the condition of consciousness and descend into the detail of actual consciousness of this or that object. But a simple consciousness does not entitle us to speak of the simple nature of the subject of consciousness; consciousness cannot get behind itself and consider its own sense or principle. The Ego is only the 'form of apperception attached to every experience': an epithet noting the subject condition on which all knowledge depends. All the categories on which knowledge depends are only special and detailed forms of this ultimate power and principle of synthesis. Being itself the ultimate condition of all knowledge, we cannot get behind it to see its conditions. It is an irreducible and ultimate sentiment of reality, a feeling of being (p. 285).

These extracts, I think it will be felt, come very near 'the pincushion without the pins'.<sup>1</sup> They do

<sup>1</sup> My friend demurs somewhat: he says, 'Is this (i) after all? Wallace seems to guard himself pretty carefully. The Ego, he says, "is the perpetual concomitant of all mental acts." That is, there is always something else, to which the Ego is essentially relative.'—If by 'something else to which the Ego is relative' is meant the states or faculties of the Ego, then I think I can accept this as very much what I really intend, though it interferes with the clear-cut—too clear-cut—trichotomy of my illustration. I am quite prepared to regard this as only a temporary expedient, such as we often use in the process of education or self-education; we make things clearer to our minds by exaggerating distinctions, and then we come back to

not quite coincide with the use of the word Person in the doctrine of the Trinity, but have in them more of purely intellectual abstraction. I do not think that we shall need this exceptional philosophical use, and for our present purpose it may be allowed to drop. We shall, however, always want the Trinitarian sense of Person ; and we may keep this as meaning fundamentally 'ground of being', with a suggestion of special function verging upon individuality. 'Person', in Trinitarian usage, is a mode of being which serves as a ground or basis (a *real* ground or basis) of special function, but just stops short of separate individuality. It implies distinction without division.

ii. The Kantian use at the least points to something very like 'the pincushion without the pins'. But, from a somewhat different point of view, Personality may rather be compared to 'the pincushion with all the pins'.

Human personality is essentially a unity of oppositions. And we may even go so far as to say that its special appearance is in the visible and outward sphere. As a person, we are primarily what we are to our neighbours : we occupy a certain place and discharge a certain function in the visible world. Hence a man's personality is not his mere intellect, but *his whole being* : it is more than his

truth by rubbing out gradually the distinctions we have made. I willingly admit that my friend's language is more philosophically correct than mine.

books, more than any definite work he may have accomplished (p. 282).

And again :

No being can be called a person who is not capable of feeling and action, as well as a mere idea of the intellect, a mere object of apprehensive judgement (p. 284).

This, too, hints at the comprehensiveness of personality : it is not merely a part of the self but it includes the whole self, whether thinking or feeling or acting. It really includes not only the conscious acts or states of the self but the unconscious, which once were conscious and have about them still the potentiality of again becoming conscious.

iii. In this broad sense Personality embraces the whole man. And yet there is a third sense in which we should say that the whole of our individual nature rather *ministers to*, than *is* the Person. There is a Self within the Self. There is a something within us which is not either foot or hand or eye, which is not either reason or emotion or will, but which binds together all these various organs and faculties in one. For personality we want something more than the mere congeries of thoughts and impulses and appetites and passions which go to make up the individual man. Personality is not a chaos but a cosmos ; there must be present in it a principle of order and of unity. As Professor Wallace puts it,

a person must not be a mere drift of events upon a stage, but must also possess a power of surveying and so far controlling the stream, a power of comparison, unification, and initiative. We come back very much in this to the phrase of Leibnitz: '*Persona est cuius aliqua voluntas est, seu cuius datur, cogitatio, affectus, voluptas, dolor*' (p. 273).

We might say that the acts and states described in this definition belong to the person, but do not in themselves constitute the person. Somewhere as it were at the centre of our being there is an *imperium in imperio*, a ruling principle, which reviews, co-ordinates, directs, and combines the different constituents of our nature into a single organic whole.

This whole is built up, as we might say, in several stages; there are subordinate unities as well as the one dominating principle of unity; there is a unity of the body as well as a unity of the soul and (if we care to distinguish them by an act of mental abstraction) of the parts or faculties of the soul, such as thinking and feeling and doing. The body is unified, on its own level, by the vitality or current of life which runs through it. Each distinct state or faculty of the soul—thinking, feeling, and doing—has its own unity. But these unities are diffused and not concentrated. The real point of concentration, which is also the seat of reflective consciousness, is the Person. We will once more go to Professor Wallace for an impressive picture of that ascending scale by which the Person arrives at its completeness.

The body, like the soul, is an organism : a system of parts mutually adapted, each possessing a certain independence and proper function : which however in a healthy state never actually rises to utter severance from the general. The whole adjustment in its details in the body is governed by the laws of mechanism : at no point can we say that a special principle of life, a vital principle, steps in and directs the interaction. The principle is one with its parts, it is in each part and in the whole : it is the supposed explanation of the fact that there is this solidarity, this unity which transcends and interpenetrates the separation of parts, tissues, and organs : it is the principle of equality and fraternity in the body : and also the principle of liberty. No part can encroach on another, no part can be held less essential, no part can be treated as separable from the others, without in each case inducing a perturbation of the general fabric. Each has its own province, its own right or duty ; but none can permanently act in independence of the others ; and all must practically experience that the general law of life, of self-maintenance of the total organism, is a principle overriding particular rights.

It is equally so in the soul, the psychical range, only that here something further seems to supervene on the mere organism. The vital principle is always engrossed in its part, and can never be regarded as an independent agent. The unity of the body is a unity of co-operation, the result of factors which work in obedience to a common law. But that common law is out of sight. In the soul, on the contrary, the very essence of the whole movement is that it rises in some degree into the light of consciousness. And the peculiarity of consciousness is that it is a whole conception or form which gradually

fills itself in detail with the fullness of its partial shapes. The unity, however implicit and potential, underlies and realizes itself in each step towards particular manifestation. . . .

This unity of consciousness reacts, if we may say so, upon the body. The body has other than the merely organic movements, which follow according to impenetrable laws of instinctive nature. The purely animal movements are governed by an idea : and the body itself is by mind transformed (1) into a sense, (2) into an instrument. It is in this double capacity that the body is strictly ours, the organ of our mind, of our intelligence and our will. The word 'organ', indeed, covers both meanings. As such the body is organized or articulated by the mind : i.e. its parts are differentiated in use and function, made to some extent independent of each other and under the direct control of each other, and capable at the same time of co-operation in executing a complex movement (pp. 295 f.).

That passage, I think we may say, gives us a more adequate conception than we have hitherto had of the sovereignty exercised by the Person, of the organizing power which the inner Self possesses over the outer.

We will illustrate this from another philosopher, Professor G. F. Stout :—

The idea of the Self includes in all but its latest and most abstract developments the idea of the body as the vehicle of perception and motor activity. There is also another powerful reason why the body should be regarded as part and parcel of the Self. The idea of the Self essentially includes the idea of its relation to other selves. But it can only exist

for other selves in so far as it appears to them in bodily form.

But however important the body may be, it can never be regarded as the whole Self or even as the most essential part of the Self. Its attitudes and movements, so far as they differ from those of other material things, appear to be initiated by something inside the organism. They follow on volitions, emotions, painful and pleasant sensations, and the like. These experiences constitute the inner Self, and the body, as it presents itself to the external observer, is their instrument, used in a way more or less analogous to that in which other material instruments are used. The contrast between inner and outer Self is emphasized by the process of ideational thinking, in which the body may be apparently quiescent, while the mind is active (*Manual of Psychology*, pp. 552 f.).

The writer goes on to compare the more primitive modes of representing the existence of the inner Self with our own :

Modern theories regard the soul as simply an immaterial substance, or identify it with the brain, or say that it is just the continuous series of conscious states themselves.

You will observe that these predicates are applied, not to the self but to the 'soul'. We do sometimes no doubt use 'soul' as equivalent to 'self'. This is perhaps to some extent a survival of Biblical usage. In Biblical times the idea of the self or person was not yet developed; the idea of 'soul' had made greater progress, and when a Biblical writer wished to speak of himself, he spoke of 'his soul'. There

is rather a play upon the two senses in such passages as 'whosoever would save his soul (*ψυχήν*) shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his soul for my sake and the gospel's, shall save it' (Mk. viii. 35). To gain the higher self, we may have to lose the lower; which is very much the same thing as saying that to make good, or perfect, the inner self, we may have to suffer loss in the outer self, the self of pains and pleasures. The outer, or larger, self includes both soul and body; the smaller, but dominating, Self resides within the soul, and represents its chief activities, but is not co-extensive with it.

I seem to myself to have come round to something like the big black-headed pin in the middle of the pincushion.<sup>1</sup> We must give it its black head, so

<sup>1</sup> Once more my friend puts in a word: 'I am less clear than I should like to be that any of these quotations reveal either Wallace or Stout as holding the big black-headed pin theory. Of course there is an inner unity, but is not the unity they refer to what may be called an immanent unity, a unity of and through the particulars rather than (so to speak) *over* them? This indeed is what Stout appears to say: "These experiences constitute the inner Self." For Stout "inner self", I think, is just exactly equivalent to "soul".'—That is quite true; I have distinguished between the Self and the faculties or activities of the Self, and Professor Stout does not. I shall have more to say about this distinction in the next lecture. And yet I am inclined to welcome the phrase 'immanent unity'. I am not quite sure whether it does, or does not, enable us to dispense with the distinction of which I have been speaking. I was myself far from intending to draw a hard and fast line between the Ego and its faculties. In my next lecture as well as in the immediate context I speak of the distinction between them as existing in thought, rather than in fact. I say that 'the

as to distinguish it from the other pins and to mark its superiority over them. And, as I have already reminded you, we must think of both pins and pin-cushion as *alive*, and of all the pins as equally alive. The action and reaction between them is mutual and incessant. It is only in thought, and not in fact, that the larger self is separable from the smaller or the inner from the outer. But we really want both forms of the Self, and cannot do without them. Only we ought to be clear which of the two senses we mean in any given context. It would perhaps be convenient if we were to keep Person or Ego for the inner Self, and were to add some further defining epithet when we mean the outer.

So much we may perhaps regard as established. But we have still to determine more exactly the relation of these two Selves, outer and inner, larger and smaller, to each other. And, for our particular purpose, it is important that we should examine more closely the relation of the conscious states of the Self, whether larger or smaller, to the sub- and unconscious.

larger Self and the smaller Self are perfectly continuous; the movements between them are movements in a circle; there is a perpetual flow and return'.

I may also explain that when I spoke of the big black-headed pin as 'overtopping' the other pins, I did not mean it in any literal or local sense; I meant to suggest the authority or command which the inner Self exercises over the outer. But about this, too, there is more to be said.

## II

# PERSONALITY IN OURSELVES AND IN CHRIST



## II

### PERSONALITY IN OURSELVES AND IN CHRIST

THERE is a famous passage in *Othello* which seems to me to express very well the theory of the Person. Iago speaks, and the passage is admirably appropriate in its context, which I purposely do not give though it is splendid writing, because it seems to me that for once the creator of Iago is looking beyond his own creation and laying down general doctrine.

‘’Tis in ourselves that we are thus, or thus. Our bodies are our gardens, to the which our wills are gardeners ; so that if we will plant nettles or sow lettuce, set hyssop and weed up thyme, supply it with one gender of herbs or distract it with many, either to have it sterile with idleness or manured with industry, why, the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our wills. If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to most preposterous conclusions ; but we have reason to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings,’ and so on.

This is not only written with all Shakespeare’s mastery and ease, but it also contains what I believe to be the substantial truth of the matter. though it is not quite verbally consistent, and perhaps not quite verbally and minutely accurate. The best mode of statement is the first.

’Tis in ourselves that we are thus, or thus.

Here the decisive and ultimate authority is referred to the Self. As Shakespeare himself puts it,

‘the power and corrigible authority’ (i.e. authority for correction) ‘lies in our wills’.

There we have a more popular turn of phrase, which is sufficient for Shakespeare’s purpose and which would be generally accepted and understood, but which is not so strictly philosophical. To make it this, we should have to say—should we not?—the self acting through the will. The ‘will’ is used *a potiori parte* as equivalent to the Self. And then again in like manner, when it is said a little lower down that Reason acts as a counterpoise to desire, what is really meant is not Reason acting independently, but Reason acting as an instrument or organ of the Self. Once more, the ‘corrigible authority’ belongs of right to the self, though the self acts through the medium of the reason, first setting the train of reasoning in motion and then accepting and acting upon the balance of reason. In each case—both between the will and the act and between the reason and the act—the Self or Person is interposed. Shakespeare’s statements as they stand are compendious; if they were set out in a textbook of Philosophy or Psychology, they would have to be set out in full.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> My friendly critic, of whom I spoke in the last lecture, writes: ‘I have some little difficulty about your sharp distinction—not of course separation—of the Self or Ego and the will. I like your phrasing on p. 5 better: “Strictly speaking it is

The same would hold good for all descriptions of the process that intervenes between conception and execution. The Self stands, or is enthroned, at the centre of the man ; all impulses of passion, all judgments of the reason, come up to it for endorsement, and not until its signature is affixed can they take effect in action.

It will be observed that when Shakespeare says 'Tis in ourselves that we are thus, or thus,' 'ourselves' and 'we' are not identical in meaning ; 'we' is the wider term, and 'ourselves' the narrower. They correspond to the two Selves of which I spoke in the last lecture. One stands for the inner Self—the Self within the Self, the controlling, authoritative Self ; and the other ('we') stands for the larger, outer Self, all of the man that is contained within, and bounded by, the body. Of these two senses, the one includes, and the other does not include, the body and all that belongs to it. One is the garden, and the other is the gardener. The garden is divided up into many kinds of plots ; and the gardener determines what shall be planted in

*I who will,*" &c. To me the will is simply the Self in motion (of course spontaneous motion) ; and here lies a grave objection to Dyothelism I really cannot get over. But I go with the next two or three pages cordially.—I certainly do not intend to duplicate the will ; and it is doubtless true that we do sometimes use 'will' and 'self' almost as synonyms. But, from my point of view, the will is a faculty or organ of the Self, like the reason and the emotions ; it is the Self that wills, just as it thinks or feels.

these plots, and therefore also determines what shall be the general character of the garden.

The larger Self is complex ; it is broken up into a number of parts—the body with its members, and the soul, so far as it is made up of different faculties or functions, such as thinking, feeling and willing. The smaller, inner Self is simple, and not compound. It is one and indivisible. I proposed in the last lecture that we should keep for this smaller, inner Self, the terms Ego or Person—or at least Ego ; for perhaps we want ‘Person’, as we want ‘Self’, for both senses. In the eye of the law ‘person’ means the whole man ; the ‘persons’ in a drama are the whole men and women presented upon the stage. Therefore, in the history of the word, Person in the larger sense comes before Person in the narrower. And yet, when we come to philosophical usage, the latter sense is the more distinctive. Perhaps I had better say that I will take Ego always, and Person usually, in this narrower sense. When I intend to speak of Person in the larger sense, I will indicate this by an added epithet.

The body, as I have said, is divided up into its several parts or members—foot, hand, eye and the like. It is by a mental act that we define and distinguish these, though there are conspicuous outward and visible marks which enable us to do so. In the case of the soul, it is purely by an act of mental abstraction that we distinguish between its

several states or faculties. The Ego as such is one and indivisible ; and, strictly speaking, it is *I* who think, *I* who feel, *I* who will. But in each of these cases, the act of the 'I' is passing outwards, and the larger, peripheral self (as we may call it) is very soon involved.

This reminds me that there is another aspect of the matter that we ought to keep well before our minds. Although the distinction between the two Selves is clear and strong, they are yet in fact inseparable. The larger Self and the smaller Self are perfectly continuous ; the movements between them are movements in a circle ; there is a perpetual flow and return.

Accordingly, while there are some functions that can be definitely attributed to the Ego or smaller Self, and others that can be as definitely attributed to the larger Self or 'whole man', there is perhaps at least one function that is somewhat ambiguous and that would seem to embrace the whole of the smaller Self and part, but not all, of the larger (see iii. below).

I will try to make out a list of what I conceive to be the leading functions of the smaller Self or Ego ; and then I will add a few words as to extensions of these that seem to run over into the larger Self. I shall deliberately keep back one important function of the smaller Self, in order not to give an opening for controversy which on the present occasion I should be glad to avoid. I cannot exclude everything that

is controversial ; and I would remind you that I am not attempting to press all the questions that may be raised to their ultimate issues ; I just take the phenomenal world (including ourselves) as I find it ; my psychology (such as it is) does not pretend to be more than that of the man in the street.

To the man in the street the inner Self or Ego, in its relation to human nature as a whole, appears to be :

(i) The centre or pivot or determining principle of *unity*. The faculties or powers of the larger Self appear to fit into it, and radiate from it, like the spokes of a wheel.

(ii) The inner Self is the thread of personal *continuity and identity*. It is the bond which connects the present with the past and which runs out into the future.

(iii) It is the vehicle of *reflective consciousness*. It has a special power—perhaps I should say in this case, in conjunction with the thinking process—of reviewing other mental processes, of (so to speak) taking down and examining the ladder by which the Self has arrived at any given point. Reason is the candle or searchlight of the soul ; and the Self has the power of turning this candle or searchlight back upon its own processes.

(iv) That is one way, though an important and characteristic way, in which it possesses a special *power of initiative*. This power of initiative—however relative, and not absolute—is, to our common

apprehension, a distinct property of the Ego. When we treat the individual man as a responsible being, it is by virtue of this seeming power of initiative that we so treat him. It is the inner Self that sets in motion trains of thought or voluntary action, and that at its pleasure checks or suspends the processes that it has started.

(v) Allied to this power of initiative, is the other power of which we have spoken of, *authoritative control*. The Ego is master in its own house, king over its own kingdom. It is this which constitutes its superior dignity.

This perhaps may serve for the present as a rough enumeration of the activities of the Ego.

When we think of *Character*, we think perhaps primarily of the sum of the qualities of the Ego in a moral point of view. But in this case we cannot separate the Ego or smaller Self from the faculties of the larger Self which it sets in motion. We speak of the Ego as receiving sensations, or feeling, or thinking, or willing. But each of these states or processes forms a category to itself, which we think of by itself, and which includes a very large class of activities. Each of these classes of activity has tendencies and a character of its own that can be, at least by mental abstraction, isolated from the character of the Ego. The influence of habit makes one group of physical movements, one channel or groove of thinking or feeling or willing, easier than another. Instinctively and automatically these

states or conditions seem to arise within us, apart from any direct intervention of the Ego. It is hard for us to tell whether there is or not any such intervention, because if there were it would undoubtedly act in the same direction. The Ego ends by contracting the same tendencies and qualities that in the first instance belong to its faculties. But it is not important to discriminate parts in a movement that we have seen to be continuous and unbroken. It is best to treat Character broadly as the quality of the larger Self.

In like manner *Conscience* comes to a head in the authority which ultimately determines action. It implies an habitual tendency in that authority. But that cannot be all. Conscience has a fine point, but it has also a broad base. It is based on habits gradually acquired and confirmed, and on moral judgements in the past steadily accumulated. There is not only the direct effect of these judgements, acting upon the innermost self and imparting to it a definite bias, but there also grows up by the side of this a reasoned conception of duty, a deliberate standard of obligation, which confronts the Self and claims its obedience. Thus, in the working of conscience, the larger and the smaller Self co-operate together. The smaller Self, the Person, calls in to its aid that which is best and highest in the larger Self. And, through this co-operative action of the conscience many times repeated, the sense of right and wrong, which is

the foundation of character, is educated and strengthened.

The wonderful thing in all this elaborate machinery is that there should be such complete freedom of interaction between all its parts; the various faculties and organs working together in perfect harmony; under normal conditions they never jar or collide. They form an organism; the same current of life runs through them. From one point of view we see the states and faculties of the larger Self ministering to the smaller; from another point of view the smaller Self is so deeply affected by the action and interaction of the larger that it might almost be described as a product of it.

And then there is the further wonder that when we have described the conscious half of experience there still remains the other half that is not conscious. This thinking, feeling, willing being that we call Man, 'in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god,' has another side to his nature that is dark to himself as well as to those about him. It is as it were submerged; it does not enter into the visible picture at all. And for this reason we are apt almost to forget its existence. The conscious life is the life that counts; the conscious state is the dominating state at any given moment.

But, on the other hand, we appreciate the immense importance of the Unconscious, when we remember that in it is deposited the whole of the man's past,

except just so far as any particular item of that past, a past sensation, or a past emotion, or a past idea or complex of ideas, is called up into the present. We are always under a temptation to think of the unconscious as inert and dead ; but it is really very much the reverse. We understand how much, when we remember that every present thought and every present action has the whole momentum of the past behind it. It is the past that has made both the man's larger self and his smaller self what they are.

This huge deposit of the past, made up of items as countless as the sands upon the seashore, is really the moving factor, even at times when it does not consciously enter into consideration at all. If we are to take Shakespeare's ' 'Tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus ', then it is the past that has had the making of ' ourselves '. The succession of conscious states is what we call our ' life '. But after all what a small proportion they are of our real life ! What a small proportion they are of that formative process that is constantly going on in each one of us ! I said in my book that the reservoir within us of past thoughts and past emotions and of the moral effects of past actions is not only a storehouse but also a workshop. It is none the less a workshop because the work is done in the dark. These heaped up experiences, these countless films (as it were) deposited one on the top of another,

Thick as autumnal leaves, that strew the brooks  
In Vallombrosa,

are active and not passive ; every one of them retains some subtle power of influencing the others ; and many of them do as a matter of fact influence others. We know that this is so, because the principles and ideas and emotions that go down into the depths, when they return to the surface as many of them do, return in a different shape from that in which they went down. Their sharp edges are worn off ; they have entered into new combinations ; they undergo as it were a chemical change by coming in contact with each other.

All this applies to the smaller Self no less than to the larger. That central unifying principle, the *umbilicus* of our being, like the rest of our nature, is as much beneath the board as aboveboard ; it too has a large section that is hidden out of sight. It too consists, not of present states alone but of a continuous chain of past states culminating in the present. Only the smallest portion of this chain is at any given moment active in consciousness. And yet this conscious portion cannot be isolated ; its whole history lies behind it ; and it is what it is as the net result of its history.

So far I have been speaking of the individual life as a whole, of the self in its simplicity, without specifying any particular sphere of its action. But the rest of what I have to say is concerned with such a sphere, the special sphere of religion. I have said something about the development of conscience, the

moral sense and the moral law. The life of religion brings in another new factor, the relation of the soul to God. In the order of evolution this is still further removed from the condition of the beasts, 'a crowning of the edifice'; though in the order of logic the religious life, once gained, becomes dominant and supreme, and supplies a basis for character as a whole. The first germs of religion probably existed side by side with the first germs of the conception of morals and duty. This latter conception arose, as we may imagine, out of the relation of the individual to the family and the tribe. Morality had its root in the action required by the interest of the smaller or larger society to which the individual belonged. The sanctions of morality were built up by the praise and blame which naturally encouraged certain actions and discouraged others. But from the first man was also conscious of mysterious unseen powers around him, and by degrees he came to associate his success or failure with the approval of these Powers. We recall that happy comparison which Bacon uses:—

They that deny a *God*, destroy Mans Nobility: For certainly, Man is of Kinne to the Beasts, by his Body; And if, he be not of Kinne to *God*, by his Spirit, he is a Base and Ignoble Creature. It destroies likewise Magnanimity, and the Raising of Humane Nature: For take an Example of a Dog; And mark what a Generosity, and Courage he will put on, when he findes himselfe maintained, by a Man; who to him is in stead of a *God*, or *Melior Natura*: which courage is manifestly such, as that Creature,

without that Confidence, of a better Nature, then his owne, could never attaine. So Man, when he resteth and assureth himselfe, upon divine Protection, and Favour, gathereth a Force and Faith ; which Humane Nature, in it selfe, could not obtaine. (Bacon's *Essays*, ed. Aldis Wright, p. 66 f.)

Thus there grew up the sense of communion with God. And what is the nature of this communion? How is it carried on? If we take the average of mankind, even among those who are genuinely religious, the seeking after communion with God is a conscious act. The impulse of prayer, the throwing upon God the burden of care and anxiety, the aspiration after better things, the imploring of divine assistance, are all conscious and deliberate. But what of the Divine side in this communion? What of the answers to prayer? To the average man they do not come directly and consciously. There is no sound as of a rushing mighty wind ; there are no cloven tongues as of fire. The man finds that he *has* what he wants and what he has asked for ; his strength *is* proportioned to his need ; he *does* have joy and peace in believing. And he knows that this is due to no efforts of his own, but to some subtle movement in the depths of his being. He repeats to himself the old prophetic word, 'Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord of hosts' (Zech. iv. 6).

I have spoken of the forming of character, and I am far from wishing to depreciate the conscious processes which go to the forming of character ; the

lessons of early youth, the maturer studies of manhood,

All saws of books, all forms, all pressures (i. e. impressions) past,

the inward debate and struggle with self, the reasoned working out of principle, and the holding up before the mind of principle previously accepted and acknowledged. But when the amplest allowance has been made for such present influences as these, how much remains that does not belong to the present or to conscious processes at all! How much is due to underground workings of which we are not in the least aware!

I would lay stress upon the fact to which I have more than once called attention that such underground workings of which we are not aware are constantly going on. The impressions of the past are not lost because they are forgotten. Whether they are such as may sometimes be recalled, or whether they have lost all touch with consciousness so that they will never be recalled, still they are not dead but active; still they play round and through the inner self, and make it what it is. At any given moment the present, with all the conscious processes that enter into it, is a product of the past, and of the total past. The processes which issue in this result elude us completely, because they take place in a region that is hidden and dark to us; our methods of analysis cannot penetrate to it.

We are reminded of that verse of Browning's, with its curious grammar, but distinct and impressive meaning :—

That one Face, far from vanish, rather grows,  
Or decomposes but to recompose,  
Become[s] my universe that feels and knows.

That indeed has reference to the vision of God, whereas we have only to do with the making of the Self; but in this too there go on processes of decomposition and recomposition behind the scenes; we live by what we see, and take by faith what we cannot see. When St. Paul used his remarkable phrase, ' Nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me ' (Gal. ii. 20), and again when he speaks of his little children of whom he is in travail until Christ be formed in them (iv. 19), he in like manner does not profess to follow the process, but fixes his eye upon the result.

In my book I ventured to describe that hidden unconscious region, the 'subliminal self' as it is often called, as the proper and natural sphere of Divine influence upon the soul. Does not that correspond to our experience? Are we not sure that there *is* such Divine influence? And, if there is, does not the greater part of it elude our consciousness? Does not St. Paul repeatedly imply that it works beneath the surface? Is it not just this that he means when he says, ' we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself maketh intercession

for us with groanings which cannot be uttered' (Rom. viii. 26)?

It is true that in certain exceptional natures these secret workings come nearer to the surface than they do with others. In the Old Testament God is represented as speaking with Moses 'face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend' (Ex. xxxiii. 11). There is an element of primitive realism in the expression; but I can well believe that the language is that of some prophet who had himself had a more vivid experience of God than falls to the lot of ordinary men. I should be inclined to say as much of the Prophets generally when they claim 'The Lord spake unto me saying', or when they set down a sort of dialogue between God and themselves (e. g. Is. vi. 5-13; Jer. i. 4-10, xv. 15-21, &c.). Here again the experience is so vivid that it rises up into consciousness to a degree that we cannot parallel from ourselves. I would say the same of other latter-day saints. There are doubtless many degrees of communion; and the measure that we should apply to these degrees is the extent to which they enter into consciousness. But in ordinary experience the communion that I speak of is usually sub- or unconscious; and even in exceptional experience, it begins in the sub- or unconscious region and gradually expands upwards and outwards.

Some of my hearers may remember, in the volume of *Cambridge Theological Essays* (1905), an

essay by Canon J. M. Wilson of Worcester on 'The Idea of Revelation, in the light of modern knowledge and research'. In reviewing this essay, I rather felt compelled to take exception to the strong antithesis that was drawn between two ways of conceiving of Revelation, the one subjective and internal, the other objective and external; as if these conflicting modes of conception seriously competed with each other at the present time. I thought we were sufficiently agreed that the method of Divine revelation to man was through the action of the Spirit of God upon the human spirit and human faculties of apprehension. But all that side of the antithesis seemed to me to be stated by Canon Wilson exceedingly well. I will quote a paragraph which treats of the subjective or internal method of Revelation on the broadest possible scale.

We may . . . regard it [the universe] as essentially one continuous whole, in which, from hidden sources of life within, which we call Divine, mysterious and ordered movements spring up, progressing towards some remote end. Such a development in the spheres of matter and of physical life is popularly called Evolution; in that of the intellect it is called Knowledge; and in the realm of conscience and will it may be called Revelation, though perhaps there is no real distinction. Revelation, from this point of view, is regarded as the growth or evolution of the Divine Life, and of the knowledge of its own nature, in the human race (*op. cit.*, p. 224).

Canon Wilson is treating of 'movements', where hitherto we have been concerned rather with individuals. But it is the Divine action upon individuals which goes to make a movement. Accordingly, when Canon Wilson speaks of 'hidden sources of life within, which we call Divine', I feel justified in translating this as applying to the 'subliminal states' or 'subliminal self' of elect servants of God. The phrase is convenient, and in itself it is quite harmless; if pernicious meanings have been read into it, they can be put aside.

It is true that the prophetic utterances were essentially public. But the publicity consisted in proclaiming from the housetops secrets whispered to them in the inner chambers. It was the special privilege of the prophets that they were admitted to the inner counsels of God. And the way in which they were admitted to them was, not that they beheld any visible writing upon the wall, but that 'impulses of deeper birth' came to them—impulses deeper and more searching than fall to the lot of common men.

And yet there is an analogy between their experience and ours. The Spirit spoke to them by acting upon and through the inner faculties and processes of their being. And it is in the same manner and through the same channels that He speaks to us. There is no fundamental difference between the psychology of St. Paul and St. John and that of modern times. It would in no way

disturb their language or meaning if we were to insert the 'subliminal self' as the medium of Divine inspiration and Divine indwelling.

And that which was true of the servants—the prophets and holy men of old—was true also of the Son. Even with Him, in His incarnate nature, Divine inspiration and Divine indwelling was not essentially different in the mode and region of its working. If I am not mistaken, this inquiry on which we have been engaged will help us to see more clearly wherein lies the likeness and wherein the unlikeness between Christ and ourselves.

In my book I emphasized the likeness in a way that has seemed to some—and perhaps naturally seemed—to need qualification. I said: 'The Life of our Lord, so far as it was visible, was a strictly human life; He was, as the Creeds teach, "very Man"; there is nothing to prevent us from speaking of this human life of His just as we should speak of the life of one of ourselves.' I used the present tense, but I really had in view the historical Life. I was thinking of the impression that would have been made on one of us if we had met the Prophet of Nazareth from day to day in the streets of Capernaum. We should have thought of Him as the Prophet of Nazareth; and it would at least have taken some time before we suspected that He was more than this. The public ministry was drawing to its close before St. Peter made his great confession, although for months he had lived at his

Master's side. That was one aspect, the aspect of likeness; but now I must speak of the complementary aspect of unlikeness.

If we believe that there is but one God, then we must also believe that there is but one Divine. There are not two kinds of Divinity or Deity; there is but one kind. If, or in so far as, the Holy Spirit may be said to dwell in our hearts, it was the same Holy Spirit who dwelt in Christ. The difference was not in the essence, nor yet in the mode or sphere, of the indwelling, but *in the relation of the indwelling to the Person*. And when I say the Person, I mean the whole Person—each several organ and faculty—but especially the central core of Personality, the inner, controlling, and commanding Person. There are Divine influences at work within ourselves; and those influences touch more lightly or less lightly upon the Person, but they do not *hold and possess* it, as the Deity within Him *held and possessed* the Person of the incarnate Christ.

There is the chasm, which we may conceive filled, but which, as a matter of fact, never is filled. If we take the high-water mark that human language has ever reached, that astonishing saying of St. Paul's, 'Nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me,' there, no doubt, the Apostle is speaking of an ideal which he can conceive realized, though it never has been, and never will be, completely realized. Our human experience falls far short of it. If we could conceive of it as realized we should

say, not that there were two Gods, but that there were two Incarnations.

I have tried to use all the precision of language that I can. It is demanded of me; and I desire, to the utmost of my power, to meet the demand. But this is the furthest point to which I think that we can profitably go. I would not myself wantonly go even so far as this. But what has been done once will not need to be done again.



III  
RETROSPECT



### III

#### RETROSPECT

THE foregoing lectures were delivered in November, 1910, and they might have been published by the beginning of the year. But, except from my friend Professor H. R. Mackintosh, to whom reference has been made above (page 4), neither they nor my book on *Christologies*, to which they formed a sort of continuation, had as yet passed through the ordeal of criticism by a professed philosopher. I was promised such a criticism, and I looked forward to it with especial interest, because I regarded whatever there was of novelty in the book and in the lectures as submitted in the first instance to the philosophers. Not until an opinion had been obtained from them could I feel any security that what I had written was deserving of the attention of a wider public. I did not of course expect a direct endorsement, but the preliminary objections might be too great to be overcome.

I knew that I was trespassing off my own proper ground. The only excuse that could be made, was that it was trespassing in pursuit of game started on the theological side of the hedge. I thought that perhaps excuse enough, because I was sure that questions like those I have raised would some day come up for discussion, and it seemed well to make a beginning, however modest that beginning might be.

As I am writing now (February, 1911) I have had sufficient philosophical criticism to enable me to take my bearings; and, without anticipating the result, I feel that I ought at least to complete the case stated in *Christologies* to the extent to which these lectures may be said to complete it.

I will come back quickly to the philosophical questions which are the most important that I have now to deal with. But as I have the opportunity of looking back over the ground traversed in my book, I will avail myself of it to try to correct one or two incidental points that seem to need correction. Those writers are to be envied who, with a sharp and clear recollection of all the facts that have to be embraced and summarized, and with the pen wielded by a flexible and dexterous hand, set down exactly what they mean, neither less nor more. But it is too easy, either from defective memory or from defective skill, to let the scales of justice incline unduly to the one side or to the other. It is a matter of very real regret to me that in one or two personal references, either to schools or to individuals, I should have seemed to do injustice that was far from my intention. The passage about the doctrine or theory of Kenosis and its maintainers (*Christologies*, pp. 71-8) has been described as 'severe'; and I am the more sorry that it should present itself in this light because I myself may be thought to preach a Kenotic

doctrine. It would ill become me to impute blame to those who, at the most, were only engaged as I am myself in 'experimental thinking'. Nothing could be further from my intention than to revive what I hope I may call forgotten controversies. The mellowing effect of time has passed over these, and I hope that the kindly treatment of this part of my own book by reviewers will show how little tendency there is to take hold of vulnerable points or to re-open old sores. Still I do not acquit myself of imperfect memory and insufficient stress on *caveats* and disclaimers that I ought to have remembered (especially, I may say, Bishop Gore's *Dissertations*, pp. 94-97, 179-201). So far as my own view of Kenotic theory is concerned, I am only anxious that it should be kept as much as possible within general terms; I do not want it to be allowed to harden into a system of scholastic or quasi-scholastic definitions. When St. Paul wrote to the Philippians, he was not using the language of doctrine but of morals and of wide imaginative outlook, and the more we can follow his example the better.

Another regret that I have is that I should have been thought to do injustice to a writer for whom I have a sincere respect and regard, Professor Wilhelm Herrmann, of Marburg (*op. cit.*, pp. 107 ff.). I had hoped that the opening sentences of my reference to him would be taken to cover and qualify all that followed. I am glad to see that

they were so taken by my reviewer in the *Oxford Magazine*. And, to say truth, the criticism which followed was not meant to be read too literally and seriously. I was quite aware of the essential merits of that which I was criticizing. Here, too, I was dealing with a phase of controversy which I hoped might be regarded as past and done with, and to which it was possible to look back with something of a smile. Apart from this, I gather from my friend Professor Peake—one of the most learned of bibliographers—that my criticisms were based upon an old translation which the publishers had afterwards superseded.

In the course of the paragraph relating to Herrmann there occurs an allusion to the greatest of the Reformers for which one of my own best friends rebukes me. Since my undergraduate days, when I first read Carlyle's *Lectures on Heroes*, I have been an admirer of Luther, and I would not for a great deal say anything really disrespectful of him.<sup>1</sup> I hardly think that what I wrote even hinted at anything of the kind. But the context, if it were taken more seriously than it was meant, might also give to the allusion a colour that was not intended.

The above are incidental personalities that did not affect my main argument. The only other point to which I think that I need refer here is

<sup>1</sup> I am not prepared to express an opinion on the last important phase of the Luther controversy started by Père Denifle's *Luther u. Luthertum* (Band i. 1904).

also independent of the main argument, though it belongs to a portion of my book which means much to me. I included in the volume a discussion which I thought would help to explain the foundation on which it rested and at the same time continued a train of thought begun in a previous publication.<sup>1</sup> The *Hibbert Journal* for October, 1910, p. 203, criticized this with some point, if also with some condescension. The subject was the continuity of Christian thought in the past and in the present. All that I would wish to say about it now is that it may be regarded from two points of view, religious or scientific. In the one case the leading idea is that of the Providential order; we think of the Divine guidance of the Church manifested down the centuries, and we expect to find congruity between its different parts. In the other case the leading idea is evolution; and that too is a continuous process; one part does not contradict another, but grows naturally out of it; the type is preserved, though it is steadily developed. In my book, especially in the Preface, I wrote from the point of view that I have called religious. There is, however, the scientific standpoint as well. For myself, I regard the two as different aspects of the same thing. In the one aspect it is God,

‘Existent behind all laws, who made them and, lo,  
they are!’

<sup>1</sup> Chapter on ‘Symbolism’, taking up *The Life of Christ in Recent Research* (1907). The passages involved were pp. 234–9, and Preface p. vi f.

In the other aspect it is law, as the expression of the will of God. Any one may make his choice between these two modes of presentation, or use at one time one and at another time the other according to his context. They do not contradict, but rather supplement, each other.

The reception of my book in the non-philosophical portion of the public Press had been all, and more than all, that I could hope for. I have always had a scruple about thanking my reviewers, because to do so might seem to make a personal matter of it and to suggest that their verdicts 'went by favour'. But I could not help being struck and touched by the generally sympathetic treatment accorded to me. I have lived long enough to see a great improvement in this respect, in the care with which a writer's views are reproduced and the insight and considerateness with which his aims are appreciated. This extends even to those to whom the particular point of view is more or less uncongenial. I have myself reaped the full benefit from this advance, and I cannot forget it.

But I awaited with especial interest the judgement that would come sooner or later from the side of philosophy. I have said that I think of Professor H. R. Mackintosh as philosopher as well as theologian; and his very full review of me in two successive numbers in the *Expository Times* (vol. xxi, pp. 486 ff., 553 ff.) was quite humbling in its kindness. I would venture to ask any one who desires to follow out

the subject further than the point to which I have brought it to refer to these two articles. They will see there the views which I have been trying to commend presented at their very best, except perhaps at a single point in regard to which I am responsible. It will be borne in mind that the articles are a review of my *book*, and that the writer had not before him the further material and correction contained in the lectures that I am now publishing. It was one of the chief objects of those lectures to remove the particular misunderstanding of which I have just spoken (see pp. 6-8).

I have read over again, with a view to this chapter, the three objections to my theory stated by Professor Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, pp. 556-8. The first is the attribution of superiority to the unconscious. All my philosophical critics have laid stress upon this. When Mr. J. K. Mozley did so in the *Cambridge Review*, I replied disclaiming the intention to assert such superiority. And it is true that I did not intend to assert it. But I can now see that it was at least very natural that my critics should think otherwise; and I have tried to explain (*loc. cit.*) how it was that I came to give this impression. It was never distinctly and deliberately before my mind. But I was feeling my way; and I was feeling my way along the particular line which my argument followed. I had no idea of challenging what I may call the received or current psychology, except so far as it was directly affected by the fuller

recognition of the sub- and unconscious. I did not mean to depreciate the conscious states. I did not mean to question the processes commonly referred to them. I hope that in the second of these lectures I have emphasized the importance of those states in a way that may be sufficient to clear me of this suspicion. From the point of view of the Self, and the responsibility of the Self and the formation of Character, they are all-important. And I do not wish to describe them as acting otherwise than my critics would themselves. I would only seek to enhance the *relative* importance of the sub- and unconscious states. It seems to me that in the past these states have been too much left out of sight, simply because the mind has not been allowed to dwell sufficiently upon them. The great outstanding fact which elevates them in the mental scale is the fact that in a sub- or unconscious form they contain the whole deposit of a man's past. They contain, not only all the stores of memory, but all the effects of those stores upon the roots of Self and of Character.

I desire to correct my first way of stating the case (as it is expressed in *Christologies*) by not laying so much stress upon the 'threshold' or 'dividing-line' between the conscious and the unconscious. It may in fact be treated as only imaginary, put in to help clearness of presentation. I am not sorry that I made use of such language for that reason. At the early stages of many a process of exposition we do put in dividing lines, or make them blacker

than they really are, just for this practical purpose of impressing them upon the mind. When they have served this purpose they can be rubbed out again. And in that sense I shall be quite content to rub out, or make much fainter, a good deal of the imagery that I employed at first for temporary convenience. There is a perpetual uprising of that which is generated below into the region above; and it is only in this upper region that it attains to its fullest and best expression—fullest and best at least from the point of view of human life and personality. All that I willingly admit; and I hope that the admission may help to reconcile Professor Mackintosh and others to some of the things that in my first statement were a stumbling-block to them.

I think of Professor Mackintosh and Mr. Mozley as philosophical theologians; in the *Oxford Magazine* for November 24, 1910, I received my first criticism from a philosopher proper. The initials attached to it were those of a name well known and honoured in Oxford; it was just the name that I should wish to see attached to a review of any quasi-philosophical work of mine. The contents were mainly critical, but the criticism could not have been more kindly or considerately done. The details of it seemed to me to fall under two heads. They covered the whole ground of my book; but some of them seemed to touch the heart of it, while others did not. My reviewer dwelt from time to time on interesting questions as they arose—questions that might quite

well affect the impression formed of the book and of its writer, but which were not exactly vital to the particular theory advocated. For instance, the reviewer desiderated a clearer statement of my conception of the place of authority in religion. I would gladly give this as far as I can. I may refer to a paper on 'Authority in Belief and Practice' read by me at the Swansea Church Congress in 1909. It may be enough to say here that I do not regard any authority as exempt from criticism; and I should never wish to shelter myself behind authority. But I do not regard this as excluding the endeavour to maintain a loyal continuity between the teaching of the Church and any private teaching of my own.

My reviewer devoted considerable space to another subject which has indeed a certain interest in itself, but which I should have thought had a very secondary bearing upon the main issue. This is the question of the appeal to the 'expert', the exact definition of an expert, and the question how far T. H. Green is to be regarded as an expert in philosophy and theology. On this last point I do not think I could quite agree that 'in no sense in which he [Green] could be called a first-hand philosopher was he a second-hand theologian'. Green was certainly a fresh and first-hand thinker on the subject of religion. But his interpretation of the Bible and his reconstruction of the historical course of the beginnings of Christianity depended to a large extent on data derived from outside. As I said in my book,

they rested for the most part on the theories and criticisms of Strauss and Baur. It was in that sense that I described them as second-hand. I can well believe that Green was not exactly what we should call an all-round philosopher, equally armed at all points of the history and principles of philosophy. But I do not know that any reference that I made to him depended upon the assumption that he was.

So far as my own appeal to 'experts' in philosophy is concerned, if we are to describe it by that name, I do not suppose that I could stand a very severe cross-examination: in particular, if I were asked why I mentioned the names I did in preference to others, my reasons would not be thought very satisfactory. I mentioned them chiefly because of their influence upon the genesis of my own thought. If I referred to F. W. H. Myers, it was not that I considered him a philosopher in the strict sense at all; I did not think of him in that light any more than I should think of myself; but he had a share in setting me upon the track which I followed. Professor William James would count for rather more than this. But, if I were pressed, I do not think that I expected more help from him than such as his name might give me in asking for a hearing. I gather that my reviewer would criticize Professor James almost as much as he would me. But I quite agree that anything either of us might have to say must stand strictly upon its own merits.

One little flaw which the reviewer notes in my

book I believe to have been taken over from Myers or James. He points out that the phrase 'subliminal consciousness' is self-contradictory; so far as the state is subliminal it is not conscious. I was really, I think, alive to this (see *Christologies*, p. 138 n.). I have not looked very carefully, but I believe that the phrase 'subliminal consciousness' only occurs twice in my book—once in a quotation from James, and once in what is practically a paraphrase of Myers. In any case it is a survival, and ought to be corrected; the 'subliminal self' is, I should say, all right, but 'subliminal consciousness' is a contradiction.

On all these points I do not feel that the criticism goes very deep. There remain two which I recognize as more serious. The consideration of these two carries me on to another review from the side of philosophy, which appeared in the *Hibbert Journal* for January, 1911, from the pen of Dr. C. F. D'Arcy, Bishop of Ossory [now Bishop-Elect of Down, Connor, and Dromore]. Here again, although the criticism is adverse, I have every reason to thank the Bishop for treating my book so seriously and so kindly. The two reviews—this and that in the *Oxford Magazine*—really turn upon the same fundamental points, and I may perhaps be allowed to take them together.

One of these points is that of which I have already spoken—the tendency which my book betrayed to exalt the sub- and unconscious states

above the conscious. I admit that the charge is not quite without foundation so far as the book is concerned. I admit that my language in several places naturally suggested the criticism. At the same time I have explained that, so far as it did so, it did not represent my real intention, and I have tried in the preceding lectures and in this chapter to make clear what my full intention really was. I hope that at this stage I need not say more.

The other objection cuts deeper ; indeed it is the one objection that I confess really comes home to me. This is the objection to the use that I have made of metaphor, and especially (in Dr. D'Arcy's words) of 'spatial and material' metaphor.

Dr. D'Arcy presents this objection in what I cannot but think is a rather extreme form. His net includes, as will be seen, not only me but many others besides me—and notably Professor James. He writes as follows :—

Mental facts of all kinds, feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, are not in space. They are in time only. The stream of consciousness, as we call it, has no *place*, no *locus*. If the subconscious be mental in its nature, how, then, does it exist?

It is startling to reflect that all the language which psychologists have allowed themselves to use in connexion with this subject is daringly, almost outrageously, spatial and material. The same statement may be made of their account of normal psychical experiences. They speak of the *field* of consciousness, of the *centre* and of the *margin*. But there is no field, no centre, no margin in conscious-

ness. These images are all spatial, and, in relation to consciousness, there is nothing so important about them as their utter unfitness to express the facts. (*H. J.*, p. 242.)

This is sweeping indeed. But how far is it true? 'Mental facts of all kinds, feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, are not in space.' But surely they are *ours*, and *we* are in space; we carry them about with us; they are where we are, and they are not where we are not. How then can they help being in space?

And further, the language criticized is very widely current; people use it, and it conveys a meaning to them. If it were so utterly remote from reality, how does it come to have the vogue that it has?

I will venture to say that it is impossible to avoid using spatial and material metaphor in contexts of this kind. Dr. D'Arcy himself shall be my witness. Here, for instance, are three consecutive sentences of his:—

It would seem, then, that the contents of consciousness are, in truth, inexhaustible. Every change in experience adds a new quality, and all past experiences have in some way contributed to the whole. Thus our conscious experience contains, in addition to elements which are clear and obvious, others which are extremely subtle and evasive, but which can, in fitting circumstances, become the means of wonderful constructions and reconstructions (p. 244).

I should have thought that these sentences literally

bristled with spatial and material metaphors. Why should it be any worse to speak of the 'field of consciousness' than of the 'contents of consciousness'? Why is it wrong to speak of it as having centre or margin, but right to speak of it as containing or receiving additions, of its elements clear and evasive, of its constructions and reconstructions? There is perhaps a little difference in degree, but none in kind.

In our present experience the soul is confined within the body. It is in some mysterious way related to the body; it acts upon the body, and the body reacts upon it. The nature of this action and reaction is at the present time being keenly investigated; and, as the investigation progresses, the use of language may be expected to become more accurate. But as things stand at present we cannot afford to suppress our instincts; we cannot debar ourselves from employing the only means we have of expressing our thoughts and communicating them to others. So long as our meaning is intelligible to others and recognized by them as corresponding to experiences of their own, our language fulfils a legitimate purpose.

The Bishop of Ossory has another passage which is an even more direct negation of the position taken up in the preceding lectures:—

It is the symbolical representation of the self as a mathematical point or material atom occupying a central position in the midst of its experiences,

instead of, as it truly is, the concrete synthesis of them all, and their containing principle, which has misled thought on this subject. Or, rather, it is this false view of the self, together with the whole range of symbolical spatial representations by means of which we are in the habit of examining our mental states (p. 244).

If our mental processes are not in space at all, no doubt there is an end of the matter. But I should have thought that there was just as much an end of 'the concrete synthesis and containing principle' as of the 'mathematical point or material atom'. The question rather seems to me to be which of these two modes of expression corresponds best with the facts and is the most helpful in discussion. I had not, of course, exactly used the phrase 'a mathematical point or material atom'; but the metaphors I had used were practically equivalent to these, and I am quite willing to accept them as representing my views. More strictly, I should say that they represent *half* my views; for I do not really feel called upon to deny the alternative. I had in fact been led to think that the common use of language obliges us to recognize two distinct senses of the word Self, a larger and a smaller, an inner and an outer. The larger self may well correspond to the 'synthesis of experiences'; it is not only a synthesis of experiences but a synthesis of faculties; it includes the whole man, body and soul. But when we come to the 'containing principle', there seems to me to be some ambiguity. The word 'principle'

suggests something very like what I have in my mind; but 'synthesis' and 'containing' do not seem to go well with this. We want to distinguish between the unity and that which unifies. My reason for marking off an inner or smaller self was precisely in order to explain, or describe more exactly, what it is that causes the unity.

We are conscious within ourselves of a number of faculties which are distinct from each other and to which we give separate names, such as thinking, feeling, and willing. We have as good reason, or nearly as good reason, for distinguishing these as we have for distinguishing the bodily organs, foot and hand and eye. The difference is that the latter are visible and tangible, whereas the former are not. So far the bodily organs have an advantage in concreteness and definiteness over the mental. But if, instead of looking at them from the side of appeal to the senses, we look at them rather from the side of diversity of function, in this respect they are on the same level. We must therefore think of them as separate though they are not physically separate. The will-function, the thought-function, and the feeling-function are as distinct from each other as hearing, seeing, and smelling.

Now the organs of the body are at once separate and inter-connected; apart from the inter-connexion and that which causes the inter-connexion, they would be so much inert matter. But then the principle of life runs through them, and makes them

act together or cease from acting; and they do this, under normal conditions, in complete harmony, not in the least clashing or colliding with each other. And the same holds good of the mental faculties; they too are at once functionally distinct and yet vitally inter-connected.

But then, above the parts or organs of the body and above the parts or faculties of the mind, there is as it were enthroned at the centre—it is of course a purely figurative mode of speaking to describe it in these terms, but the figure comes so spontaneously and naturally that we can hardly help having recourse to it—a *something* which governs and controls all these inferior agencies. It is its special function to govern, control and unify. And that function is so important that it seems to deserve a separate and special name. That is why I submit that we need the conception of a smaller and inner self. It is distinct from the organs and faculties. The hand is not included in it, though it moves the hand; the thinking process is not included in it, though it sets in motion the thought. It causes to act, or to cease from acting, every part of the larger self. There is nothing in a name, and it does not matter what this commanding principle is called—whether an inner self or anything else; but I do contend that it deserves, and ought to have a name of its own. This usage is at least clear and unmistakable, whereas to speak of a ‘synthesis or containing principle’ is at once inadequate and

lends itself to confusion. It is inadequate, because it does not express, and hardly even suggests, that active command and control, that unifying and organizing power, which is an essential element in the self. And it is misleading, because it is ambiguous and attempts to make a single phrase cover distinct things.

I cannot help asking myself what the result would be if the Bishop of Ossory were to try to paraphrase the passage that I quoted from *Othello* in terms of his philosophy. The passage is one that is perfectly intelligible to the plain man; he recognizes at once its fitness to describe the processes of which he is conscious. He understands what is meant both by the 'gardener' and the 'garden'. And if we paraphrase these as the 'inner' and 'outer' self, still he would understand, and I think that he would find a certain amount of light thrown upon the workings of his own mind. But if for the 'gardener' we substitute a 'synthesis and containing principle of experiences', we have indeed an impressive phrase, but one that is somewhat cumbrous to manipulate and that only tends to obscure the distinction, which should certainly be observed, between the gardener and the garden. For the garden is the experiences, and the gardener is the sum or synthesis of the experiences—which does not carry us much further. A 'sum' or 'synthesis' could hardly be said to 'plant, or weed up, nettles or lettuce or thyme'.

This is what I should have to say in reply to that part of Bishop D'Arcy's criticism which is concerned (by anticipation) with that theory of the Self which I have just been expounding. But I must add a few words upon the effect of his and other criticisms on the original thesis which has led to this discussion.

It was perhaps a bolder hypothesis than I at first realized to speak of a *locus* of the operations of the Holy Spirit or of the Divine in man. I have not indeed seen my way to agree with Dr. D'Arcy in the broad proposition that 'mental processes are not in space'. Under present conditions at least they are in space; they are so bound up with the body that they cannot be wholly detached from it. The common language and experience of mankind so associates the workings of the mind with ideas of locality that we cannot afford to dispense with them. They point to something distinctive in the experience which at present it seems difficult to express in any other way. We must wait until philosophers have analysed these local ideas more closely. At the same time I am ready to admit that they have to be discounted, and the local element in them in particular has to be discounted. What precisely remains after this has been done is perhaps an open question.

And yet, while I should agree that the local element in this symbolic language of locality has to be discounted, and although I should maintain that

abstention from the use of this symbolic language carried with it a certain loss, I still believe that it is possible to restate the main proposition that I had laid down without bringing in the idea of locality; and I still believe that the psychology which lays stress upon the subconscious and the unconscious has matter of value to contribute to us.

I do not say that the conscious processes of the human mind are inferior to the sub- and unconscious. On the contrary, I believe that in the part which they play in the formation of character they are distinctly higher. The conscious processes may be said to constitute the continuous thread of the man's self in a sense in which nothing else about him constitutes it. But, none the less, the sub- and unconscious processes play an important part of their own—a part much more important than (to the best of my belief) had been recognized until a short time ago.

The point at which I suppose this will be most clearly seen is in the fact that these sub- and unconscious states contain the whole deposit of the man's past. 'Deposit' is another material metaphor, and as such it too has to be discounted, but I do not see that we can help using it. And it is, I conceive, another important thing to realize, that all this accumulated deposit, no less than the conscious states, is and (throughout the life of the individual in whom it is found) always has been alive.

The proof that it is so lies in the fact that these

past experiences, when they return into consciousness, always return with a certain amount of alteration. A process of decomposition and recombination has taken place in them ; they never come back to consciousness in the precise form in which they left it. They have been as much affected by the other contents of that dark storehouse as they are by the other contents of consciousness which meet them in the full light of day.

That is one important condition which has to be remembered. And another is, that within these same states of sub- and unconsciousness spiritual forces are at work just as much as in the waking man. Some kinds of spiritual influence seem to be even more active under these unknown conditions than they are under those that are known.

I have always taken as typical of these the answers that we receive to prayer. These answers appear to me to work, in great part if not altogether, through channels and in ways that the reflective consciousness cannot follow. I would go further, and say that under the same dim conditions a whole life is lived which, although it is seen only in its effects, forms a most important part of religious experience. In the case of the Christian it is, if not all, yet a main constituent in that life which St. Paul describes as 'hid with Christ in God'.

That, I say, is the experience of the Christian. And must there not have been something analogous to it in the incarnate experience of Christ Himself?

It was on this analogy that I took my stand and from which I tried to draw some inferences in a tentative way.

My philosophy has been criticized ; and I am free to confess that, if I could have my time over again, I should write—or try to write—somewhat differently. I should not deal so freely in metaphor. Not that I can altogether repent even of this ; for to have passed through this metaphorical stage, I believe has been a help to me, whatever it might be to others. I cannot help thinking that there are some gaps and weak points in the philosophical position. I have ventured to indicate some of these. And nothing would rejoice me more than if the philosophers themselves, or some of our own philosophically-minded theologians, would take up and work out in their own better way, these problems that I have clumsily adumbrated.<sup>1</sup> Theology, perhaps more than any other science, needs to receive contributions from all sides.

<sup>1</sup> I welcome very warmly the assistance and (in a measure) support that is given me by Dr. Caldecott in his contribution to the April number of the *Hibbert Journal*, 1911, pp. 641-644. I can avail myself of this help the more freely because I should answer all the interrogatories put to me in the sense desired.

OXFORD: HORACE HART, M.A.  
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY







